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I. JURISDICTION
A. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
T HE ISSUE of fraudulent joinder of defendants to de-
feat federal diversity subject matter jurisdiction was
presented in Ludwig v. Leariet, Inc.1 In Ludwig, the district
court held that the proper standard to use in determining
whether a non-diverse defendant had been fraudulently
joined was a "reasonableness standard." More precisely, the
court stated that "[i] n order to meet this burden, defendant
must show that the plaintiff has no reasonable basis for a
claim against the non-diverse defendant in state court based
upon the alleged facts."2
Plaintiff had joined the City of Detroit and the airport
manager as defendants. Plaintiff alleged that these defend-
ants had breached their duty to maintain the airport prop-
erly by permitting inadequate runways, insufficient clear
space adjacent to runways, and inappropriate height restric-
tions for obstacles in the vicinity of the runway.
The court held that under Michigan law, the City of De-
troit was entitled to absolute governmental immunity.3 The
airport manager was entitled to qualified immunity and im-
munity under the public duty doctrine. 4 Under that doc-
trine, a public employee who owes a duty to the public at
1 830 F. Supp. 995 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
2 Id. at 998 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
3 Id. at 999.
4 Id.
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large, rather than a specific duty to any one individual, is
entitled to immunity. The court held that the airport man-
ager's duty was a "broad public duty" which does not im-
pose a specific duty to any particular individual.5 Because
the airport manager had not acted personally toward the
plaintiff's decedent, he owed no private duty to plaintiff's
decedent. 6 Accordingly, the court held that there was no
"reasonable basis" for the claims against non-diverse parties
and dismissed the case for lack of diversity subject-matter
jurisdiction.7
Federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the Outer Con-
tinental Shelf Lands Act8 (OCSLA) and federal admiralty
jurisdiction9 were addressed in Duplantis v. Petroleum Helicop-
ters, Inc.10 In that case, an accident occurred in transit to or
from an offshore drilling platform. The court held that the
mere fact that the helicopter accident resulted in injuries to
platform workers who were employed on the Continental
Shelf did not bring the case within the scope of federal ju-
risdiction under OCSLA.11 Instead, the court stated that
the scope of OCSLA is determined by the locale of the acci-
dent, not by the status of the individual killed or injured.1 2
The court next considered the possibility of admiralty ju-
risdiction, noting that the situs requirement is determina-
tive on this issue.13 The accident occurred in a marshy area
averaging three to five feet deep.1 4 Defendant conceded
that the area "contained 'reeds' that would make actual
navigation . . . difficult." 5 The district court held that ad-
miralty jurisdiction is limited to navigable waterways.1 6
5 Id.
6 830 F. Supp. at 999.
7 Id.
8 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988).
10 No. 93-1265, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12855 (E.D. La. Sept. 10, 1993).
11 Id. at *1.
12 Id.
13 Id. at *3.
14 Id.
15 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12855 at *4.
16 Id. at *4-5.
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While early cases defining admiralty jurisdiction as applying
to waters "within the ebb and flow of the tide" were in-
tended to define navigable waterways, the court quoted
from the U.S. Supreme Court and adopted its reasoning as
follows:
This court is not prepared to hold that water which is sub-
ject to the ebb and flow of the tide, but not navigable,
should fall within this court's admiralty jurisdiction. As the
Supreme Court has repeatedly warned, "in determining
whether to expand admiralty jurisdiction 'we should pro-
ceed with caution ....
B. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
In Antares Aircraft, L.P. v. Federal Republic of NigeriaI the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered the "commer-
cial activity" exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act.'9 This case involved the conversion by the Federal Re-
public of Nigeria of a DC-8 aircraft in Lagos, Nigeria. After
payment of a Nigerian government claim for overdue land-
ing fees, the Nigerian government failed to release the air-
craft for a period of approximately six months, during
which time the plane suffered extensive, physical damage as
a result of exposure to the elements.
Plaintiff alleged that the "commercial activity" exception
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applied to extend
jurisdiction over the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Sec-
ond Circuit held that the criteria for" the application of the
"commercial activity" exception are that the act must be
"outside the territory of the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of a foreign state" and must
cause a direct effect in the United States. ° While there was
no dispute as to whether the act of the Nigerian govern-
ment was outside the United States and that "[t] he deten-
17 Id. at *6 (citing Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249,
272 (1972) (quoting Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 203, 212 (1971))).
18 999 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994).
'9 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
999 F.2d at 35 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2)).
1994]
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tion of the aircraft in collection of landing fees were 'in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state,' 21 the element of whether there was a direct effect in
the United States was sharply in dispute.
The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the financial
effect on a United States limited partnership was sufficient
to constitute a "direct effect" in the United States.2 2 In re-
jecting this argument, the court noted that there was "no
evidence that the use of the aircraft was related to substan-
tial commerce with the United States," that all legally signif-
icant acts took place in Nigeria, and that the aircraft was
registered in Nigeria.2 3 In addition, both the damage to the
aircraft and the alleged conversion occurred in Nigeria.
Reasoning by analogy to personal injury cases held the citi-
zenship of the plaintiff was not sufficient to support a "di-
rect effect" in the United States, the court held that this
case, like personal injury and property damage cases in for-
eign countries, did not result in a direct effect in the United
States simply because the injured party was a United States
citizen. 24 Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of plain-
tiffs complaint for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdic-
tion under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
25
C. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
In Lu v. Air China International Corp.26 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York dis-
missed an action against Air China on the grounds that the
accident giving rise to the lawsuit occurred in China and,
therefore, would be subject to Chinese law under Article
XVII of the Warsaw Convention. In addition, the United
States had no public or private interest in resolving this is-
sue in the United States.27 Although the plaintiff stated
21 Id. at 35.
22 Id. at 36.
23 Id. at 35.
24 Id. at 36-37.
25 999 F.2d at 37.
26 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,369 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1992).
27 Id.
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that she intended to return to the United States and be-
come a permanent resident at some time in the future, the
court did not give any weight to that consideration in find-
ing that the private interest and the public interest strongly
favored the dismissal under forum non conveniens28 The
court also noted that the problem of providing any civil liti-
gant with a hearing in the Eastern District of New York
is acute in light of an ever-expanding criminal docket.
Many plaintiffs, who have no alternative forum available to
them, wait an inordinate period to have their cases heard.
Under such circumstances, the public has a real interest in
seeing that limited resources are not devoted to a case hav-
ing virtually no relation to this district when an adequate
alternative forum is so plainly available. 9
D. FEDERAL REMOVAL
The removal of wrongful death actions against a defend-
ant in bankruptcy from state court to federal district court
was at issue in Coker v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.30
The Coker decision involved fifty-four Florida state court ac-
tions arising from the Lockerbie disaster. The procedural
background to this decision involved the two decisions of
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Lockerbie P1 and
Lockerbie 12 In Lockerbie I, the Second Circuit held that
claims under the Warsaw Convention preempted state law
causes of action for international airline accidents. 33 Pan
Am's prior attempts to remove the Florida state actions to
federal district court had been unsuccessful because the
Florida federal district court had ruled that when the War-
saw Convention was raised only as a defense, such a defense
28 Id.
29 Id.
-o Coker v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,444 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
3, 1993).
31 In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 331 (1991) [hereinafter Lockerbie 1].
12 In reAir Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 950 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Lockerbie I].
s3 928 F.2d at 1273-75.
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does not give rise to federal question jurisdiction and can-
not serve as the basis for removal of the state court action to
federal court.34
Following the attempt at removal, Pan Am filed its peti-
tion under Chapter 11 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York. Pan Am then moved to
transfer the Florida state court actions to the U. S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York under subsec-
tion 157(b) (5) of title 28 of the United States Code, which
reads as follows:
The district court [in bankruptcy cases] shall order that per-
sonal injury tort and wrongful death claims be tried in the
district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending, or in
the district court in which the claim arose, as determined by
the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending.35
Initially, the district court declined the transfer under the
doctrine of abstention, but the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed in Lockerbie II, stating that "transfers should
be the rule, abstention the exception." 36 Nevertheless,
upon remand, it was necessary for the U. S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York to consider subsec-
tion 1334(c) (1) of title 28, which provides as follows:
Nothing in this section prevents the district court in the in-
terest ofjustice, or in the interest of comity with state courts
or respect for state law, from abstaining from hearing a par-
ticular proceeding arising under Title 11 or arising in or
related to a case under Title 11.
Plaintiffs argued that the abstention doctrine should be
given special effect in Chapter 7 or liquidating Chapter 11
proceedings.37 The district court rejected that argument,
however, stating that the need to avoid unnecessary waste of
the debtor's resources was as important in a liquidating
Chapter 11 case as in an operating Chapter 11 case. The
court went on to note that "the bankruptcy court's concern
34 Antares Aircraft, L.P., 24 Av. Cas. at 17,445-46.
35 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5)(1993).
56 Antares Aircraft, L.P., 24 Av. Cas. at 17,446 (quoting Lockerbie II, 950 F.2d at 845).
37 Plaintiffs cited In re Titan Energy, Inc., 837 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1988).
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with amassing assets and fairly parceling them out does not
end when a party moves from reorganization to liquida-
tion."38  Furthermore, the federal court distinguished the
Titan case, which involved a purely state law issue of insur-
ance contract interpretation, from the Warsaw claims,
which were the subject of the Pan Am action.3 9 Finally, the
court observed that Pan American was required to defend
numerous cases in the federal court, including companion
cases filed in federal court by the same plaintiffs who had
filed the Florida state actions.40 The transfer of these ac-
tions to the federal district court, where they could be
either transferred to the court in which the multi-district
litigation was pending pursuant to section 1407 of title 28
or dismissed on the grounds of preemption, would avoid
the need for duplicative litigation by the debtors.4'
The availability of bankruptcy court removal of state
court actions and dismissal under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens was addressed in Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft
Corp.12 Baumgart involved the crash of a Fairchild Me-
troliner III aircraft operated by a German airline. Plaintiffs
were nineteen German citizens who originally filed their ac-
tion in Texas state court. Defendant Fairchild Aircraft Cor-
poration filed a petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection for unrelated reasons, and thereafter removed
all nineteen cases to federal court. Fairchild then moved to
dismiss the cases under the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens, 43 and the district court granted the motion.4 4
58 Antares Aircraft, L.P., 24 Av. Cas. at 17,447 (quoting In re Titan Energy, Inc., 837
F.2d 325, 333 (8th Cir. 1988)).
- Id. at 17,446-47.
40 Id. at 17,447.
41 The court also rejected the argument that Florida should be preferred as the
plaintiffs choice of forum, rather than the district court in which the bankruptcy
was pending. The court noted that "nothing in the record compels Florida as the
obvious forum." Id. at 17,447.
42 Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2963 (1993).
43 Texas state courts do not recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens dismis-
sal in personal injury and wrongful death actions. See Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfara,
768 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990) ("[The Texas] legislature has statutorily abolished the
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On appeal, the plaintiffs argued to the Fifth Circuit that
in bankruptcy removal cases the district court did not have
jurisdiction to dismiss the case based upon the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. Instead, plaintiffs argued that the
power of the district court in bankruptcy cases was specifi-
cally limited to the express grant of jurisdiction found in
subsection 157(b) (5) of title 28 of the United States Code.45
Plaintiffs argued that the express language of the statute
precludes a forum non conveniens dismissal.
The Fifth Circuit rejected plaintiffs interpretation of sub-
section 157(b) (5), finding that the statute itself recognized
the federal interest in determining the appropriate forum
for the litigation. 46 Additionally, the court determined that
the cases which permitted federal bankruptcy abstention
also supported a conclusion that subsection (b) (5) was not
intended to limit the inherent power of the federal district
courts to dismiss a case under the dbctrine of forum non con-
veniens. 47 In this manner, the court held that the statute
was similar to other special venue provisions which had
been held not to limit the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. 48
Plaintiffs next challenged the district court's grant of the
forum non conveniens dismissal as an abuse of discretion
under Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Reyno.49 First, plaintiffs argued
that Fairchild was estopped from moving to dismiss on
grounds of forum non conveniens because it had previously
removed the case to the federal district court. The Fifth
Circuit rejected that argument on the ground that a party
who removes a case to federal court is not barred from seek-
ing a subsequent dismissal under forum non conveniens.50
doctrine of forum non conveniens in suits brought under Section 17.031 of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code.").
44 Baumgart, 981 F.2d at 824.
45 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
46 Baumgart, 981 F.2d at 833.
47 Id. at 828.
48 Id. at 832.
4- 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
50 Baumgart, 981 F.2d at 835.
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The Fifth Circuit applied the three-part Reyno analysis to
determine (1) whether there was an adequate remedy avail-
able in the alternate forum; (2) whether the private interest
factors supported a forum non conveniens dismissal; and (3)
whether the public interest factors supported a forum non
conveniens dismissal.5 The Fifth Circuit found that German
law recognizes both products liability and wrongful death
causes of action, and, therefore, an adequate remedy ex-
isted in Germany.52 As for the private interest factors, the
court determined that most of the physical evidence related
to the crash was in Germany; the airline's headquarters
were in Germany, as well as all of the evidence surrounding
the maintenance of the aircraft and its operational history;
the damages information was in Germany; many of the eye-
witnesses were beyond the reach of the U.S. court's compul-
sory process; and defendant Fairchild would be unable to
implead the airline and the co-pilot's estate as third-party
defendants if the case were retained in the United States.53
Finally, language problems would arise if the case were
tried in the United States, including the need to translate
into English all the documents and investigation reports
created in Germany. 4
The only private interest factors which the court found
mitigating against dismissal were that Texas had been the
plaintiffs' choice of forum and that potential difficulties
might rise regarding enforcement of any judgment.5 The
court noted, however, that Fairchild had agreed to satisfy
any judgment to the extent allowed by the bankruptcy plan
and that Fairchild submitted to the district court's retention
of jurisdiction in the event that any judgments were not sat-
isfied. 6 Based upon the private interest factors, the court
concluded that it was unnecessary to review the public in-
5' Id. at 835-37.
52 Id. at 835.
53 Id. at 837.
- Id. at 836.
55 981 F.2d at 836.
56 Id. at 836 n.13.
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terest factors.5 7 Nevertheless, the court held that the dis-
trict court had properly considered the public interest
factors and therefore had not abused its discretion. 58
II. PREEMPTION
A. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The issue of federal preemption of state products liability
tort claims was addressed in Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp.59
This widely publicized case involved a crashworthiness
claim against Piper by a pilot whose Piper Super Cub col-
lided with a parked van on a runway during an attempted
takeoff. The pilot sustained serious head and brain inju-
ries, and the jury returned a verdict of $2.5 million in favor
of the pilot and against Piper. On the first appeal, the
Tenth Circuit held that the trial court had not submitted a
proper special verdict to the jury requiring the jury to allo-
cate causation for damages between the so-called first and
second collisions. In addition, the instruction did not pro-
portion negligence for the damages caused in the second
collision.6"
On remand, the U. S. District Court for the District of
New Mexico held that the case would be re-tried only on
the issue of liability and the damage award of $2.5 million
in favor of Cleveland was allowed to stand.61 The court also
limited Piper's testimony and exhibits to those submitted in
the first trial on liability. 62 The trial court did, however, al-
low Piper to amend its complaint to add the defense of fed-
eral preemption under the Federal Aviation Act of 195863
and its corresponding regulations.64 Having permitted the
amendment, the District Court granted the plaintiffs mo-
67 Id. at 837.
58 Id.
-9 Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 291 (1993).
- 890 F.2d 1540, 1546 (10th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Cleveland I].
61 Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1440.
62 Id.
6 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988).
14 C.F.R. §§ 23.601-871 (1988).
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tion for summary judgment on the issue of federal preemp-
tion. The court also granted Piper the opportunity to take
an interlocutory appeal on the issue of federal preemption,
as well as on the pre-trial rulings relating to damages and
on the limitations on witnesses and evidence to be
presented in the re-trial of the case.65
In a lengthy opinion, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
examined the claims of federal preemption and the plain-
tiffs responses in detail. Piper did not base its claim on
express preemption, but rather implied federal preemption
of state tort actions occupying the field of aircraft design.
The doctrine of implied preemption has been applied in
cases involving both the obvious intent of Congress to oc-
cupy fully a particular field of law and regulation so as to
displace state law, or in those instances in which federal leg-
islative or regulatory decisions conflict with state law ("con-
flict" or "issue" preemption). 6
Piper contended that the plaintiff's claims were properly
characterized as a challenge to the conventional (or tail
wheel) design of the aircraft and to the failure to install a
rear seat shoulder harness in the aircraft. Plaintiff con-
tended that the issue of forward visibility was whether the
rear seat should have been higher than it was, and that the
failure to install rear seat shoulder harnesses as standard
equipment at the factory (rather than optional equipment)
rendered the aircraft defective.
Piper also contended that plaintiff's claims, no matter
how characterized, were essentially claims of defective de-
sign, and the Federal Aviation Regulations fully occupied
the field of aircraft design and impliedly preempted state
products liability actions from establishing different stan-
dards. Plaintiff responded that the federal standards were
minimum" standards. Plaintiff also pointed to the sav-
ings clause which stated that "[n]othing contained in this
Act shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now ex-
5 Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1440.
- See Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1443-45.
67 49 U.S.C. app. § 1421(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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isting at common law or by statute, but the provisions of
this Act are in addition to such remedies."68
The Tenth Circuit rejected Piper's argument that the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 impliedly preempted the en-
tire area of aircraft design. 69 The court based this determi-
nation on the facts that (1) the express preemption
provisions of the Federal Aviation Act did not specifically
include aircraft design; and (2) other expressions of con-
gressional intent to make "air commerce ... an exclusively
federal function" were not directed at aircraft design is-
sues.70 The court also concluded that the FAA certification
process was not intended to be "the last word on safety." 71
Furthermore, the delegated option authority (DOA)
adopted by federal statute or regulations only imposes a
duty on the FAA to "spot check" a manufacturer's work.72
Piper's next federal preemption challenge was under the
doctrine of "conflict" or "issue" preemption. The Tenth
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had recently rejected
the doctrine of implied conflict preemption in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc.73  However, the court decided that there
was no actual conflict in this case, and, therefore, it was not
called upon to apply the limitations set forth in the Cipollone
11 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988). This savings clause was first enacted in 1938 as
part of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and has been included in federal aviation
legislation since that time.
69 Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1444-47.
70 Id. at 1444-45 (citing 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305 (1988)).
71 Id. at 1446-47 (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 807
(1984)) ("The FAA has given manufacturers broad responsibilities for assuring their
own compliance by appointing aircraft company employees to 'act as surrogates of
the FAA in examining, inspecting, and testing aircraft for purposes of
certification.").
72 Id. On this issue, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals apparently overlooked the
significance of the certification history of the Piper Super Cub, which showed that
the Super Cub was certificated by the Federal Civil Aeronautics Administration prior
to the initiation of the DOA process. In fact, the certification and flight testing were
conducted by CAA employees. Of course, by 1970, the production inspection of the
aircraft was conducted under Piper's production certificate, but no manufacturing
defects were alleged in Cleveland.
73 _ U.S._ , 112 S.Ct. 2608 (1992). Notwithstanding broad language re-
jecting implied preemption contained in the Cippolone decision, the Tenth Circuit
expressed skepticism that Cippolone would completely overturn a doctrine that has
existed since McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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decision.74 Instead, the court concluded that the FAA regu-
lations involved did not conflict with the design features
which the plaintiff claimed were defective. 5 Specifically,
the court stated that the federal regulation required the
plane to be designed "so that [t] he pilot's view is sufficiently
extensive, clear and undistorted, for safe operation.... [It
did] not require the precise design that Piper has uti-
lized. '76 Similarly, the court concluded that, while the reg-
ulations in place when the FAA approved the aircraft's
design did not require shoulder harnesses, such a lack of
regulation did not conflict with the plaintiff's claim that
shoulder harnesses should have been installed.77
The court distinguished the federal aviation regulations
applicable to the manufacturer of this aircraft from the reg-
ulations under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act,78 which had been held to preempt state tort
claims for failure to install air bags. 79 The court pointed
out that those regulations gave automobile manufacturers a
choice of equipping cars with any of three types of passen-
ger restraints, including air bags.80 As to "conflict" or "is-
sue" preemption, however, the Tenth Circuit noted that a
closer question would have been presented by later federal
aviation regulations, which required manufacturers to
choose one of three safety options, one of which used
74 Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1443-44.
75 Id. at 1444.
76 Id. at 1445 (citations omitted). This does not preclude Piper from arguing at
trial that CAA approval of compliance with the federal standards shows its design of
the Piper Super Cub is, and since 1948 has been, recognized as a "safe" design.
77 Id. at 1445.
78 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1421 (1988).
985 F.2d at 1446 (citing the following cases involving preemptive effect of
airbag regulations in Safety Standard 208, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1979): Pokorny v.
Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 (1990); Kitts
v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065
(1990); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
994 U.S. 1065 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1965 (1990)). But see Perry v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., Inc.,
957 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1992).
-o Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1446.
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shoulder harnesses.81 The court stated that the Piper Super
Cub involved in this case was not subject to those later regu-
RI Id. at 1446. The court was referring to the 1969 regulations, found in, 14 C.F.R.
§ 23.785(g) (1970), for aircraft receiving a type certificate after September 14, 1969,
which read as follows:
Each occupant must be protected from serious head injury by -
(1) A safety belt and shoulder harness that will prevent the head from
contacting any injurious object;
(2) A safety belt plus the elimination of any injurious object within
striking radius of the head; or
(3) A safety belt plus an energy absorbing rest that will support the
arms, shoulders, head and spine.
14 C.F.R. § 23.785(C) (1990) (Emphasis added).
The court did not have a reason to consider the 1977 regulations which estab-
lished new requirements for occupant restraints on all aircraft manufactured after
July 18, 1978, regardless of the date of the original type certificate. 42 Fed. Reg.
30601 (1977). These regulations expressly required shoulder harnesses in front
seats only and provided options for crashworthiness for other seats. Id. Those regu-
lations were the result of extensive study by the FAA and public comment as to
methods of providing occupant safety, resulting from a 1973 FAA Notice of Pro-
posed Rule Making (38 Fed. Reg. 2985), which would have made shoulder harnesses
mandatory at all seats, and which also would have required that all existing aircraft
be equipped with shoulder harnesses, if they had been manufactured with structural
provisions for attachment of shoulder harnesses. The FAA received substantial ad-
verse public comment for the proposed regulations requiring such shoulder harness
installations, and the 1977 regulation reflected a reasoned Agency decision not to
mandate rear seat shoulder harnesses, stating that "the decision of whether to install
(rear seat) shoulder harnesses ... should be left to the owner." 42 Fed. Reg. 30602.
The FAA also dropped its proposal requiring installation of shoulder harnesses in all
existing aircraft having structural provisions for the attachment of shoulder har-
nesses. Accordingly, as to aircraft manufactured after 1977 without rear seat shoul-
der harnesses, and possibly as to other aircraft manufactured prior to 1977 with
shoulder harness attach points, any state regulation requiring such installation
.would, in effect, remove the element of choice authorized [by the regulations]."
Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1965 (1990).
Of course, in 1985, the FAA enacted the current 14 C.F.R. § 23. 7 85(g), requiring
installation of shoulder harnesses in all the seats of an aircraft manufactured after
December 12, 1986. 50 Fed. Reg. 46872 (1985). This development was in part the
result of a 1983 petition by the General Aviation Manufacturers Association to make
shoulder harness installation mandatory at all crew and passenger seats. 50 Fed.
Reg. 19108 (1985). The FAA also amended 14 C.F.R. § 91.14, requiring all occu-
pants to use shoulder harnesses during take off and landing, if installed. Most man-
ufacturers have made retrofit shoulder harness kits available to owners and
operators at cost and have issued service publications to each owner and operator,
stating that the manufacturers recommend or consider such retrofit mandatory.
Manufacturers cannot, however, compel such retrofit in the absence of federal regu-
lations or an airworthiness directive.
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lations, and, therefore, the issue of preemption under those
regulations was not relevant.82
The Tenth Circuit also reversed the trial court on the is-
sue of damages. The court ruled that the $2.5 million ver-
dict might be inconsistent with the court's ruling in
Cleveland 13 that the jury must first evaluate the issue of
damages arising from the first and second collisions, and
then apportion negligence and liability in causing the inju-
ries resulting from the second collision. 4
The Tenth Circuit generally affirmed the trial court's dis-
cretion to limit witnesses and evidence at the second trial
but stated that the trial court should be guided by basic fair-
ness and flexibility in order to avoid manifest injustice to
one side or the other.8 5 Specifically, the court stated that "if
a party makes a timely motion to produce new and material
evidence which is not otherwise readily accessible or
known, the court should, within the exercise of discretion,
consider whether the denial of the new evidence would cre-
ate or manifest injustice."8 6
Similarly, "if ... witness[es] [were] deceased, ill or for
whatever reason otherwise unable to attend the trial, the
court should give every consideration to allowing additional
witnesses to testify." T8  Of course, cumulative evidence was
not to be permitted, but the court stated that "[t]echnical
82 Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1446 n.19. If at the time of its manufacture, an aircraft
manufactured prior to July 18, 1978 nevertheless satisfied the 1969 Part 23 regula-
tory options, even though certificated under the earlier regulations, then preemp-
tion by those regulations would seem to be relevant and proper. However, the court
did not offer any further explanation for its failure to consider that issue other than
to say that the later regulations were not applicable to this aircraft because it was
certificated under the earlier regulations. As set forth above, later occupant protec-
tion regulations enacted in 1977, particularly those providing occupant restraint op-
tions for rear seats, were expressly made applicable to all aircraft manufactured after July
18, 1978, regardless of the date of the type certificate.
8- 890 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 898 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1990).
8 Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1488.
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rulings should never preclude new and material proofs,
[and] common sense should control.""8
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Public HealthTrust of Dade County v. Lake Aircraft, Inc. 89 (hereinafter Public
Health Trust) chose to follow the decision in Cleveland v.
Piper Aircraft Corporation.90 Public Health Trust involved an
accident in which an amphibious aircraft slammed into a
rock bank during a failed take-off attempt from a lake. As
stated by the Eleventh Circuit, "Dee [, who was occupying
the passenger seat,] was seriously and permanently injured.
The pilot suffered lesser injuries."9' The Plaintiffs claim
was that the metal passenger seat should have been
equipped with an "energy-attenuating" mechanism, like the
one installed in the adjacent pilot's seat.
The district court had granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment on the grounds that the design of
the passenger seat met the applicable federal aviation regu-
lations. The plaintiff had opposed summary judgment on
the ground that the federal regulations were not the appli-
cable standard, and, even if they were, the seat had failed to
meet those standards. The district court rejected both of
these arguments and entered judgment for the defendant,
dismissing Dee's action.92
The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment,
holding that the federal aviation regulations do not im-
pliedly preempt state law claims such as those which pro-
vided the basis for Dee's claims in this case.9" Significantly,
Id. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, the Piper Super Cub had not been certifi-
cated under the DOA program, but rather had been certificated directly by the Civil
Aeronautics Administration in 1948. Indeed, the certification process and flight
tests had actually been conducted by CAA engineers and pilots assigned to the certi-
fication program, some of whom may still be available to provide additional informa-
tion as to the design features evaluated in the course of federal approval of the
design as providing adequate visibility for safe operation and compliance with the
then applicable occupant restraint regulations. Such additional information was not
readily available or known" at the time of the earlier trial.
-' 992 F.2d 291 (11th Cir. 1993).
-o 985 F.2d 1438; see supra note 59 and accompanying text.




the court researched the issue of preemption by first review-
ing the extent of express preemption established by the Air-
line Deregulation Act of 1978. 94 The court noted that the
scope of express preemption under Title IV of the Federal
Aviation Act95 was limited to preemption of state rules
which "relat[e] to rates, routes or services. "96 The court
then quoted from the majority opinion in the Supreme
Court decision in Cipollone
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption
and has included in the enacted legislation a provision ex-
plicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision pro-
vides a "reliable indicium of congressional intent with
respect to state authority, there is no need to infer congres-
sional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive pro-
visions" of the legislation. Such reasoning is a variant of the
familiar principle of expression unius est exclusio alterius: Con-
gress' enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive
reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are
not pre-empted .... Therefore, [courts] need only identify
the domain expressly pre-empted by each of those
sections.
97
The court concluded that section 1305 reliably indicates
Congress's intent as to the scope of preemption of "matters
relating to civil aviation."" The court stated the following:
Under Cipollone, we conclude from section 1305 that Con-
gress did not intend to pre-empt state laws on matters unre-
lated to airline rates, routes or services. Because Dee's
design defect claims lie outside the pre-emptive reach of
94 Id. at 293 (citing 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1978) (current version at 49 U.S.C.
app. § 1305(A) (1988))).
95 Title IV relates to Air Carrier Economic Regulation. Congress enacted 49
U.S.C. app. § 1305 as a part of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. It does not, by
its terms, expressly encompass any other subchapter, such as Title IV, Safety Regula-
tions. Contrary to the court's analysis, section 1305 has not provided the basis for
any claim of preemption (either express or implied) in aircraft products liability
cases as a result of such safety regulations.
- Public Health Trust, 992 F.2d at 293.
97 Id. at 294-95 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2618
(1992)).
98 Id. at 295.
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section 1305, we conclude that those claims are not
preempted.99
Unfortunately, the foregoing analysis ignores the scope
of implied preemption found in other pre-ADA cases rely-
ing upon other expressions of congressional intent con-
tained in the Federal Aviation Act to provide the basis for
finding preemption of other "matters relating to civil avia-
tion."100 Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit did not con-
sider implied preemption of the field of aircraft design, but
instead, merely relying upon the Cipollone analysis, con-
cluded that since Congress had provided express preemp-
tion in the area of "airline rates, routes and services," it had
not intended to preempt any other "matters relating to civil
aviation."1 01
More important to future cases involving potential pre-
emption of products liability claims, the Eleventh Circuit
also interpreted the Federal Aviation Act to limit the fed-
eral role of regulation of aircraft design. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit noted that the Federal Aviation Act provided a
regulatory framework for issuance of type, production, and
airworthiness certificates. 10 2  However, the court also
quoted Congress' grant of authority and responsibility in
this field as that of establishing "minimum standards gov-
erning the design, materials, workmanship, construction
and performance of aircraft ... as may be required in the
interest of safety.' 0 3 The Eleventh Circuit also quoted the
9 Id.
100 See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 635-40
(1973) (pervasive nature of the scheme of federal regulation of civil aviation indi-
cates intent to preempt regulation of aircraft noise).
10- Public Health Trust, 992 F.2d at 295.
102 Id. at 293 n.2. Of course, the Eleventh Circuit did acknowledge the possibility
of direct "conflict" preemption; as had the Tenth Circuit in Cleveland II, but simply
held that no such "conflict" existed between Dee's claims in this case and the federal
regulations, as the regulations did not require the seat design involved in that case,
nor was it one of several federally established express options for safety, even though
it was a federally approved design. Id. at 295 n.5.
103 Id. at 293 (quoting 49 U.S.C. app. § 1421(a) (1988)). But see 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1421(a) (6) (1988).
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Act's "general 'remedies' savings clause," 04 which provides
that "[n] othing contained in this chapter shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law
or by statute."10 5
The Eleventh Circuit avoided the general issue of
whether "conflict" preemption may be applied in aviation
products liability cases by concluding that there was no con-
flict between the federally approved design involved in that
case and any state law claim which might require a different
design that "exceeded the minimum federal standards for
aircraft design." 106 The court noted that a different result
might have been required had the design been required by
federal law or had the plaintiff challenged the "'defend-
ants' choice between two federally approved options analo-
gous to the federal standards in the airbag cases. 
°107
Ultimately, the court reversed and remanded the case to
the district court.1
0 8
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Cleveland
II and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
Public Health Trust should not be viewed as precluding all
further attempts to raise the preemption defense in avia-
tion products liability cases. As expressly noted by the court
in Cleveland II and suggested in Public Health Trust, future
challenges to seat restraint design may present even closer
questions of conflict between federal regulations and state
common law rules. Preemption analysis is particularly ap-
propriate for (1) aircraft certificated under the 1969 op-
tions enacted in Part 23;..9 (2) aircraft manufactured under
the 1977 options applicable to all aircraft and enacted in
Part 23;110 and (3) previously certificated CAR 3 aircraft
I- A characterization of the savings clause taken by the Eleventh Circuit from the
Supreme Court decision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2037
(1992).
105 Public Health Trust, 992 F.2d at 293 (quoting 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988)).
106 Id. at 295 n.5.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 295.
109 See supra note 82.
110 See supra note 82.
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manufactured prior to July 1, 1978, but which met the
higher 1969 certification options of Part 23 at the time of
manufacture.'
Similarly, other challenges to aircraft design typically
made in products liability cases may also be susceptible to a
"conflict" or "issue" preemption defense. For example,
many FAA "requirements" or "options" for aircraft, power-
plant, and component design and manufacturing involve
decisions regarding the acceptable balance between factors
such as stability, performance, strength, and reliability,
deemed necessary for safety in civil aircraft." 2 To allow
state courtjuries to impose different requirements or to dis-
regard those options in cases involving detailed design, test-
ing, and manufacturing criteria could, in appropriate cases,
clearly conflict with applicable federal aviation regulations
establishing such requirements or options.
In Sunbird Air Services, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp.," 3 plain-
tiff argued a federal common law cause of action arising
from violations of an "implied-in-law federal common law
'duty of manufacturing integrity' and federal common law
'warranty of fitness for flight."111 4 Plaintiff argued that the
federal common law cause of action should be created be-
cause the Federal Aviation Act did not create an adequate
remedy at law. Plaintiff also argued that aircraft were inher-
ently interstate in nature and there was an unique federal
interest which required the application of a uniform federal
standard. Finally, plaintiff argued that the relative position
of power and knowledge held by aviation manufacturers
permitted them to conceal aircraft design defects until after
state statutes of repose had run.
" See supra note 83.
112 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. Pts. I to 59 (1988), and associated federal publications which
set forth detailed design, manufacturing, and testing standards, requirements, and
options for most significant aspects of general aviation aircraft design and
manufacture.
113 No. 89-2181-V, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10814 (E. Kan.,June 10, 1992).
114 Id. at *34.
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While recognizing that the Federal Aviation Act" 5
demonstrated the strong federal interest in aviation safety,
the court was not persuaded that the Act showed that avia-
tion was "inherently interstate" and required national uni-
formity in tort laws. The court rejected the plaintiffs
analogy to certain total preemption cases that involved pri-
marily federal banking and food and drug laws." 6 Instead,
the court recognized that numerous federal courts had ac-
knowledged Congress' ability to create a federal tort statute
in the area of aviation products liability, but the fact that
Congress had not created such a cause of action demon-
strated there was no intent to displace state contract and
tort laws. Moreover, the plaintiff's attempt to rely upon the
Federal Aviation Act savings clause as providing a basis for
an implied federal cause of action also was rejected.1" Fi-
nally, the court noted that the plaintiff was not contending
that the defendants had failed to meet the "minimum tech-
nical standards established by the Act,"' 8 and, therefore,
the court was not called upon to determine whether an im-
plied private cause of action would provide a basis for plain-
tiff's claims.
The decision of the district court in Sunbird Air Services
should be distinguished from other attempts to apply fed-
eral preemption in the field of aircraft products liability
law. Sunbird Air Services argued for a federal common law
cause of action, which would have involved the creation of
federal claims, defenses, and remedies wholly apart from
those established under state law. Cases such as Cleveland II
and Public Health Trust involved arguments that federal cer-
tification, design, testing, and manufacturing standards
- 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988).
116 Sunbird, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10814 at *3-6.
11 The court noted that the earlier case of Klicker v. Northwest Air Lines, Inc.,
563 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1977), which relied upon the savings clause found in the
Federal Aviation Act to imply a federal common law cause of action, was itself relying
on federal common law which existed prior to the enactment of the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958. The court stated that "contrary to plaintiff's assertion, that section
1506 represents Congress' intention that state, not federal, common law fill any
'gaps' left by the Act." Sunbird, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10814 at *12.
-a Sunbird, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10814 at *13.
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should be applied by courts and, if necessary, by juries in
state tort and contract actions, rather than allowing courts
and juries to substitute conflicting state design, testing and
manufacturing standards.
As set forth above, there are still questions to be ad-
dressed with regard to the effect of current federal regula-
tions and preemption in the area of aviation products
liability. These include the question of whether specific
federal requirements or options in the current federal regu-
lations preempt state law, notwithstanding the "minimum
standard" arguments;119 and, as suggested below, the ques-
tion of whether punitive damages are permitted in cases in
which the defendant has complied with applicable federal
regulations. 120
B. AIRLINE DEREGULATION AcT
1. Personal Injury or Wrongful Death Claims
Federal preemption of state negligence claims for inju-
ries sustained by airline passengers was addressed in Margo-
lis v. United Airlines, Inc.'21 The plaintiff was injured by
falling overhead luggage. United Airlines sought to dismiss
the plaintiffs negligence claims on the grounds that section
1305 of the Airline Deregulation Act122 preempts any state
law related to airline services. Specifically, United Airlines
relied upon the 1992 Supreme Court decision in Morales v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 23 which held that state guidelines
regarding airline fare advertising were expressly preempted
by section 1305 of the Airline Deregulation Act.
The district court noted that prior to Morales, the distinc-
tion between preemption of economic or regulatory issues
on the one hand, and personal injury, damage, or negli-
119 See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 995 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1053 (1994) (preempting punitive damages where airline meets
FAA requirements as to passenger reservations and ticketing).
121 Margolis v. United Airlines, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
122 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305 (1988).
123 _ U.S._, 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).
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gence issues on the other hand, had been "divided fairly
neatly." 12 4 However, Morales very broadly interpreted the
scope of express preemption based on Congress' use of the
phrase "relating td' rates, routes, or services. Nevertheless,
the district court refused to apply that broad statement of
preemption to preempt state common law personal injury
and negligence claims in this case.
The court specifically relied upon Justice Blackmun's
statement in Cipollone,125 in which he stated that the Court's
reluctance
to find pre-emption where Congress has not spoken directly
to the issue appl[ies] with equal force where Congress has
spoken, though ambiguously. In such cases, the question is
not whether Congress intended to pre-empt state regula-
tion, but to what extent. We do not, absent unambiguous
evidence, opt for a scope of pre-emption beyond that which
is clearly mandated by Congress' language.1 26
The district court then concluded that Congress had ex-
pressed no intent to preempt traditional state law personal
injury claims for negligence. 127 Instead, the Federal Avia-
tion Act retains the savings clause addressed specifically to
the "remedies now existing at common law."1 28 Addition-
ally, the Federal Aviation Act requires airlines to maintain
insurance for bodily injury, death, or damage to the prop-
erty of others. Finally, the court concluded that if the Fed-
eral Aviation Act displaced common law actions for
damages, then it does not provide a private cause of action
or remedy for "money damages or other restitution to a pri-
vate party." 29 The court stated that "preemption should
apply to a state law claim only if Congress has provided a
remedy for the wrong or wrongs asserted.'13 0
12 Margolis, 811 F. Supp at 321.
125 Morales, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
126 Id. at 2626.
- Margolis, 811 F. Supp. at 320.
128 Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988)).
1 Id. at 324.
-so Id. (quoting Perry v. P*I*E* Nationwide, Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990)).
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An argument which the district court considered only
briefly in Margolis was implied preemption under the fed-
eral aviation regulations to the extent that a state law negli-
gence claim might attempt to impose different standards
on the air carrier pertaining to operation and maintenance
of the aircraft, training of airline employees, oral briefing
of passengers regarding emergency exits, use of seat belts,
and proper stowage and securing of carry-on baggage. The
court merely stated that the Federal Aviation Regulations
do not "deal with the breach of the duty of care," and that
state law "does not attempt to hold [the airline] to a differ-
ent standard of care from that prescribed by the Federal
Aviation Act and the corresponding regulations." 131
In Heller v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,132 the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York also decided the issue of
federal preemption of personal injury claims arising from
baggage falling from overhead compartments. Following a
review of Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,133 the court
agreed with the result and analysis of Margolis v. United Air-
lines, Inc.134 stating that a state negligence claim for per-
sonal injuries due to baggage falling upon the head of a
passenger was "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral" to air-
line services to be subject to federal preemption. 3  Be-
cause the federal preemption defense had not been
pleaded in the answer, the court held that such a defense
13, Id. at 324 n.5. The argument might be made that if each state's negligence law
could impose different duties than those required under the Federal Aviation Regula-
tions with regard to these specific matters, then the airline would be subjected to
different standards of care. This argument would not require dismissal of the state
law negligence claim, but would merely preempt the claim in the event that the
airline complied with regulations which established the standard of care. Such a
result would promote uniformity. Additionally, as to air carrier regulations, there is
no statutory basis for arguing that such standards are presumably minimum stan-
dards. Compare, e.g., 49 U.S.C. app. § 1421(a)(1) (1988) with 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1421(a) (6) (1988).
32 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,682 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
133 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).
134 811 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Mich. 1988); see supra note 122 and accompanying text.
15 Heller, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11854 at *4 (quoting Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2040).
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was not "properly asserted. '136 Finally, the motion to dis-
miss in Heller v. Delta Airlines, Inc., appears to have been in-
tended as a complete bar to any claims for personal injury,
prompting the court to agree with the statement in Margolis
that preemption under section 1305 was "not intended to
be an insurance policy for air carriers against their own
negligence." 137
Margolis and Heller demonstrate the courts' concern re-
garding arguments for total express preemption when
other federal regulations do not provide the rule of deci-
sion and the remedy. 138 The opinions do not indicate that
the defendants attempted to support their total preemption
claims on the grounds they had complied with applicable
federal regulations. Instead, it appears the defense was that
plaintiffs recovery was barred entirely on the grounds that
state law could provide neither the rule of decision nor any
remedy in the face of express federal preemption. Such a
broad reading of the express preemption provisions of the
Airline Deregulation Act seems inconsistent with the effect
of the Savings clause, which is included in the Federal Avia-
tion Act.139 Of course, such an argument for total express
preemption arguably follows as the natural progression
from cases such as Von Anhalt v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 4° which
applied express federal preemption to totally bar state neg-
ligence, defamation, and assault and battery claims arising
from denied reboarding.14 1 Von Anhalt attempts to use sec-
tion 1305 of the Airline Deregulation Act as a total and
complete bar to airline liability in all negligence and per-
sonal injury cases (as opposed to requiring application of a
federal rule of decision). Such an approach, however, is
"3 The federal pre-emption defense was filed after the pleadings were closed.
Heller, 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,682.
137 Heller, 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,684 (citing Margolis, 811 F. Supp. at 324).
138 But see Von Anhalt v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
-5 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988).
- 735 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
- Compare Von Anhalt with the District Court's reasoning in Levy v. American
Airlines, No. 90-Civ.- 7005 (LJF), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7842 (S.D.N.Y. June 9,
1993), which takes a more limited issue-by-issue "conflict" approach to federal pre-
emption of state law tort or personal injury claims.
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not being met with acceptance by the courts. Instead, as
will be seen below, it appears that total preemption will be
limited to claims arising primarily from, and related to, avi-
ation business or employment practices and not cases due
to the failure to meet any duty to provide for the safety of
passengers in specific cases involving physical injury or
wrongful death.
The decision which most clearly illustrates the tension be-
tween the developing law of federal preemption under the
Airline Deregulation Act, the preexisting concepts of state
court jurisdiction, and the application of state substantive
law in air carrier cases is Burke v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.14 2
The Burke action arose out of the death of plaintiffs' dece-
dent in a collision between two Northwest Airlines aircraft
on the ground at Detroit Metropolitan/Wayne County Air-
port on December 3, 1990. The action was initially filed in
Texas state court, alleging claims for negligence and decep-
tive trade practices under the Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tice - Consumer Protection Act. Defendant Northwest
removed the action to the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas on September 11, 1991, stating that
the basis for removal was federal question jurisdiction pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.143
On plaintiffs' motion to remand, defendant Northwest
conceded that all causes of action alleged by the plaintiffs
in their complaint were based on state law. Nevertheless,
Northwest argued that federal jurisdiction was proper be-
cause all of the claims related to "rates, routes, or services as
an air carrier, and, therefore, [were] preempted under
§ 1305(a) (1) of the Federal Aviation Act." '144 The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Michigan approached
the removal petition on two bases: (1) whether plaintiffs'
142 819 F. Supp. 1352 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
143 It is unclear from the opinion why the defendants were not able to remove this
action based upon diversity of citizenship.
144 Burke, 819 F.Supp at 1354.
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claims were preempted under federal law; and (2) whether
removal was proper even if the claims were preempted. 145
In deciding the first issue, the Court acknowledged the
recent decision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 4 6 Sig-
nificantly, the Morales decision involved the application of
the same Texas statute and regulations upon which the
Burke claims were based. Those same regulations had been
preempted in the Morales case, although the Morales case
involved the application of those state regulations to airfare
advertising and not to claims arising from physical injury or
death. The federal court also acknowledged other air car-
rier cases that supported preemption of state law claims, in-
cluding Von Anhalt v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,'47 which involved
preemption of state law claims for negligence, defamation,
and assault and battery.
Nevertheless, the court limited the application of Morales
and these other cases by stating that they involved "direct
contact" between the plaintiff and individual "service" em-
ployees. 4 The court also quoted from Margolis v. United
Airlines, Inc.,49 in which the legislative history underlying
the Airline Deregulation Act was examined and quoted
with approval. Margolis described the scope of preemption
as follows:
Similarly, a state may not interfere with the services that
carriers offer in exchange for their rates and fares. For ex-
ample, liquidated damages for bumping (denial of board-
ing), segregation of smoking passengers, minimum liability
for loss, damages, and delayed baggage, and ... charges for
headsets, alcoholic beverages, entertainment, and excess
baggage would clearly be "service" regulation within the
meaning of Section 105.
... A state common law claim based on negligence and
the standard of reasonable care does not purport to regu-
15 Id. at 1353.
146 __ U.S. - ,112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).
147 735 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D. Fl. 1990); see supra notes 142-43 and accompanying
text.
148 Burke, 819 F. Supp. at 1363.
149 811 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
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late the services that air carriers provide to their customers
in exchange for their fares. The common law of negligence
does not hold the airlines to a different standard of care
than that provided by the Federal Aviation Act and related
regulations. Further, nowhere in the legislative history or in
the evolution of the statute is there any suggestion that the
preemption provision of the Airline Deregulation Act was
intended to preclude common law negligence actions.5 0
The court in Burke also acknowledged that detailed and
extensive federal regulations regarding training of crews,
operations at airports with control towers, and collision
avoidance precautions were "all implicated in plaintiffs'
three negligence/gross negligence counts." 151 Because
plaintiffs did not allege a different standard of care than
that set forth in the federal regulations, however, there did
not appear to be a conflict between state and federal law.
Accordingly, there was no basis for a finding of conflict or
issue preemption. 5
2
The district court went further, however, to answer the
second question of whether removal had been proper,
presented assuming that the Federal Aviation Act pre-
empted the plaintiffs' state law claims. The court followed
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Taylor,53 which held that even the existence of
an obvious federal defense did not provide a basis for fed-
eral removal jurisdiction in abrogation of the "well pleaded
complaint" rule traditionally followed in federal removal
cases. In following Metropolitan, the court concluded that
the only federal statutes which had been applied to permit
"complete preemption" had been the Labor Management
Relations Act and ERISA. 15 4
The Court held that "complete preemption" would re-
quire a finding not only of federal preemption of the plain-
tiffs' substantive claims but also an expression of
11o Burke, 819 F. Supp. at 1363 (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 9948-49 (1979)).
151 Id.
152 Id.
155 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
154 Burke, 819 F. Supp. at 1365-66 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 185(A), 1132(f) (1988)).
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congressional intent that all such federal claims be subject
to removal jurisdiction. The basis for such expression of
federal intent in the LMRA and ERISA is that there are sep-
arate grants of federal jurisdiction for all claims arising
under those laws. While these grants of federal court juris-
diction are not on their face exclusive, such as would be the
case in patent, copyright,155 and admiralty156 cases, these
grants of federal court jurisdiction in combination with fed-
eral preemption of state law have been determined to have
the effect of allowing removal if the defendant chooses to
avail itself of the federal subject matter jurisdiction pro-
vided under those statutes.
The court found no similar expression of Congressional
intent in the Airline Deregulation Act. There being no ex-
press grant of federal court jurisdiction in the Airline De-
regulation Act, the court held that the "complete
preemption" doctrine did not apply and that, even if plain-
tiffs claims were preempted under the Airline Deregulation
Act, there would not be a basis for removal to federal court
under the "complete preemption doctrine. ' 57
Interestingly, having completed its analysis of the "com-
plete preemption doctrine," the court expressed its dissatis-
faction with the doctrine, stating that if an action presented
a sufficient "federal question" to support federal jurisdic-
tion in the first instance, then sound jurisdictional policy
and the proper application of sections 1331 and 1441 of
Title 28 required that the cases be subject to removal.15 8
Finally, the court denied defendants' motion for reconsid-
155 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988) ("Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of
the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases").
156 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988). This section provides that "[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the states of: (1) any civil case of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction."
157 Burke, 819 F. Supp. at 1365.
158 Id. at 1366. While the Court held that federal preemption under the Airline
Deregulation Act did not apply to this case, in considering removal generally in
those cases in which preemption is established, the Court did not consider the possi-
ble analogy to removal of cases under the evolving interpretation of the Warsaw
Convention. In those cases in which the Warsaw Convention is seen as providing an
exclusive federal remedy, federal removal has been permitted, even when plaintiffs'
claims are based upon state law and Warsaw is pleaded as a defense.
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eration, stating that even if its analysis of the issue of federal
preemption is later found incorrect, particularly as related
to the claims of false advertising under the Texas Deceptive
Practices Act, it was obligated to adhere to the two-step
Supreme Court analysis limiting federal removal. 159
2. Air Carrier Business Practice Claims
The scope of federal preemption of air carrier ticketing,
reservation, and boarding practices after the Supreme
Court's decision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.160 was
addressed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in West v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc.161 The Plaintiff in that case initially
filed suit for compensation due to denied boarding and
overbooking under state law in Montana. Northwest Air-
lines removed the case to federal court and then moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff's state
law claims were preempted by subsection 404(b) of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act,1 62 and that the applicable statute of limi-
tations to such actions under subsection 404(b) had
expired. The district court granted summary judgment on
both grounds.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that not all of plaintiffs state law claims for compensatory
damages were preempted. In particular, the court held
that those claims based on the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing under Montana law were not preempted. The
court, however, did hold that the practices of overbooking
and bumping were accepted industry practices recognized
under the Federal Aviation Act, and that punitive damages
could not be awarded against Northwest for practices which
were permitted under the federal regulations.
Plaintiff and Northwest then petitioned for certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court
deferred ruling on the petition until after the decision in
- Burke, 819 F. Supp. at 1366-72.
160 _ U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).
161 995 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1053 (1994).
162 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374(b) (1988).
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Morales v. Trans World Airlines.'63 The Supreme Court then
granted certiorari on both plaintiff's petition and North-
west's petition and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals for further proceedings in light of Morales.
The Ninth Circuit court of Appeals effectively entered
the same judgment after Morales that it had prior to Morales.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the
Supreme Court had rejected its earlier analysis, which "dis-
tinguished between state laws which 'merely have an effect
on airline services' and those involving an 'underlying stat-
ute or regulation [which] itself relates to airline services."" 164
The court recognized that Morales rejected such a narrow
view of preemption in holding that the words "relating to"
in the Airline Deregulation Act are broad and "the words
thus express a broad preemptive purpose."' 65 Then, de-
spite dissent, the Ninth Circuit seized upon language in the
Morales opinion that left open the possibility that certain
state laws having some effect on airline rates, routes or serv-
ices would not be preempted, even under the broad read-
ing of the preemption clause. The court stated:
[W] e do not ... set out on a road that leads to pre-emption
of state laws against gambling and prostitution applied to
airlines. Nor need we address whether state regulation of
the nonprice aspects of fare advertising ... would similarly
'relat[e] to' rates; the connection would obviously be far
more tenuous.
66
To adapt to this case language from Shaw, '[s] ome state ac-
tions may affect [airline fares] in too tenuous, remote or pe-
ripheral a manner' to have a pre-emptive effect.167
The Ninth Circuit held that the effect of the Montana
state statute creating a covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing and a remedy for compensatory damages on airline
rates, routes, and services was too tenuous, remote, or pe-
163 Morales, 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).
164 West, 995 F.2d at 151.
163 Id. (quoting Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2034).
166 Id.
167 Id. (quoting Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2040).
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ripheral for application of such statute to be preempted by
the Airline Deregulation Act.168
The appellate court also recognized that both before and
after deregulation, the Civil Aeronautics Board had enacted
a regulation which permitted passengers on bumped flights
three options: "(1) ... accept the airline's offer of alterna-
tive transportation; (2) . . . accept airline compensation (in
the form of money or a voucher for future travel or some
combination of the two); or (3) . . . decline the payment
and seek to recover damages in a court of law or in some
other manner." 169
The court found that the Morales decision provided little
guidance as to those matters which were not preempted
and concluded that the statute itself also left room for regu-
latory interpretation of those areas which were pre-
empted. 70 Inasmuch as the regulatory agency itself had
recognized that there might be a remedy in a court of law
for compensatory damages other than those set forth in the
regulation itself, the court concluded that it should defer to
the agency's interpretation of the scope of preemption and
permit a state law compensatory damages claim. Notably,
the court rejected Northwest's argument that any compen-
satory damage claim must be based on federal law under
the Airline Deregulation Act, simply stating that the FAA's
regulation allowed a passenger to bring a claim in "court of
law" without limiting such claims to actions under federal
law or even to actions in federal court.17'
Significantly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not
re-address the issue of preemption of punitive damages.
However, it reaffirmed that a party could not be held liable
for punitive damages for the commission of acts permitted
under federal regulations. 172 The argument that punitive
damages should be preempted, if compliance with federal
- Id. at 152.





regulations is shown, is an argument of possibly broad ap-
plication in other areas such as those regulated by the Fed-
eral Aviation Act. Unlike the Ninth Circuit's limited view in
West v. Northwest Airlines of federal preemption of airline
ticketing, reservation, and boarding practices following
Morales v. Trans World Air Lines, Inc.,' 7 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision in Statland v. American Air Lines,
Inc.174 applied a broad view of preemption. The Statland
case presented two issues: (1) whether § 411(b) of the Avia-
tion Deregulation Act175 created a private cause of action
for airline passengers; and (2) whether the Airline Deregu-
lation Act 176 preempted state law causes of action relating
to airline ticket refunds. The Statland case involved the fail-
ure of American Airlines to refund all of the federal tax
when retaining a ten per cent ticket cancellation charge.
The amount claimed by Mrs. Statland was $1.25. However,
she also sought "similar refunds on behalf of thousands of
consumers."
1 77
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that section
411(b) does not create a private cause of action.17 While
section 411(b) is intended to regulate consumer practices
with regard to airline ticketing, it is not necessary to imply a
private cause of action in order to effectuate Congress's in-
tent. In addition, the legislative history of section 411(b)
shows that it was intended primarily to transfer the regula-
tory authority of the Civil Aeronautics Board to the Depart-
ment of Transportation following airline deregulation. 79
Since the prior CAB regulatory authority did not imply a
private cause of action, a private cause of action would not
be implied simply by reason of transfer of the CAB's author-
ity to the DOT.
173 __ U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).
174 998 F.2d 539 (7th Cir. 1993).
175 49 U.S.C. app. § 1381(b) (1988).
176 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305 (1988).
177 Statland, 998 F.2d at 539.
Il Id. at 541.
179 Id.
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With respect to state law claims, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals broadly interpreted the effect of the pre-
emption provisions of the Airline Deregulation Act' 80 as
preempting application of any law, rule, regulation, stan-
dard, or other provision having the force and effect of law
relating to rates, routes, or services in any carrier.
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., found that the [se] words
express a broad preemptive purpose, and held that Texas
guidelines governing air fare advertising were preempted by
the Deregulation Act because they related to rates. [The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals] had also held (before
Morales) that the Deregulation Act preempted state claims
challenging an airline's ticket advertising policies. 8 '
Notably, the Illinois state law claims were based on
breach of fiduciary duty, violation of the Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, conversion, and breach
of contract. The court concluded that it was "obvious that
cancelled ticket refunds relate to rates. Under Morales and
the Airline Deregulation Act states cannot regulate Ameri-
can's ticket refund practices either by common law or by
statute. This sweeps aside Statland's state law claims."
1 8 2
As seen by the Ninth Circuit decision in West v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc.,' the Montana statutory covenant of good
faith was held not to have been preempted on the grounds
that it would have too tenuous an impact on the regulation
of rates, routes, or services. 184 The Ninth Circuit based its
decision on the fact that the pre- and post-regulation CAB
and DOT regulations had preserved a common law cause of
action for "bumping."185 Statland v. American Airlines, Inc.
involved only airline practices with regard to refunds on
cancelled tickets. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of con-
ceptual consistency, Statland validates the dissent's argu-
ment in West, namely that in an area where Congress has
- 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305 (1988).
is, Statland, 998 F.2d at 541 (citations omitted).
,82 Id. at 542.
183 995 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1053 (1994).
184 Id. at 151.
1- Id. at 151-52.
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established preemption, a federal agency cannot lawfully
authorize state regulation. 186 In other words, if the only dif-
ference in West and Statland is that there are federal regula-
tions in West which purportedly permit state law claims for
"bumping," then it would seem that the federal regulations,
and not the argument that one regulation "relates to rates,
routes or services" and the other has "tenuous" relation-
ship, are the basis for these inconsistent results between the
Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals with regard to
express preemption by the Airline Deregulation Act. 187
3. Air Carrier Employment Practice Claims
The issue of federal preemption of state laws relating to
employment practices involving discrimination against per-
sons "because of a handicap" was addressed by the Colo-
rado Court of Appeals in Belgard v. United Airlines. 8 8 In that
case, a challenge was made to a United Airlines' restriction
against employment of pilots who had "undergone surgery
that was designed to alleviate the effects of myopia."189
Plaintiffs contended that United's policy violated certain
regulations promulgated by the Colorado Civil Rights Com-
mission. Complicating the case was the fact that a pre-ADA
§ 1305 implied preemption challenge to action by the Colo-
rado Anti-Discrimination Commission had been unsuccess-
ful in the U.S. Supreme Court in Colorado Anti-Discrimination
Commission v. Continental Airlines Co. 9
The Colorado Court of Appeals determined that it was
necessary to evaluate the issue of preemption from the
I" Id. at 153 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
187 Of course, the opposite is possible. For example, if Congress has not expressly
preempted an area, but has authorized a federal agency to enact regulations, then
under the doctrine of implied preemption, the federal regulations may establish
preemption. But, arguably, according to the dissent in West where Congress has
expressly stated its intent to preempt a particular area or field, then federal regula-
tions cannot grant the states the right to regulate that area. Of course, if Congres-
sional intent is unclear, as may be the case here, federal regulations may be given
deference by the courts in defining the scope of preemption.
1 8 857 P.2d 467 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1066 (1994).
189 Id. at 468.
19 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
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standpoint of express and implied preemption. The Colo-
rado appellate court noted that § 1305 of the Airline Dereg-
ulation Act,191 "specifically prohibits the enforcement of
any state law 'relating to' the 'services' of an air carrier.' 1 92
By analogy to Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,93 which involved
similar "relat[ion] to" language in the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 94 the Colorado
Court of Appeals held that Congress had intended to ex-
pressly preempt any conflicting state regulations.1 9 5
The court then went on to review the recent decision in
Morales v. Trans World Airlines,196 which gave a broad inter-
pretation to the express preemption provisions of the Air-
line Deregulation Act. The court concluded that there
were few factors more important in determining the nature
of services that an airline is to provide than the quality of its
flight crews.19 7 The court cited French v. Pan Am Express,
Inc.198 and World Airways, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters'99 Finally, the court distinguished the prior deci-
sion in Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Continental
Airlines, Inc. by characterizing that decision as involving a
state regulation against racial discrimination which could
not conflict with the prior federal law, because the converse
of the state regulation, "i.e., a requirement to engage in ra-
cial discrimination, could not be validly enforced in any
state."2 00
In Belgard, if the state regulations were enforced, the
states might be free to regulate the employment of persons
having a physical handicap and even to define the very con-
cept of a "handicap" in a variety of ways, leaving airlines
191 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305 (1988).
192 Belgard, 857 P.2d at 470.'
193 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
-" 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
195 Belgard, 875 P.2d at 470.
196 _ U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).
197 Belgard, 857 P.2d at 470.
1'9 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that state drug testing was preempted).
- 578 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1978) (concluding that reinstatement under the Railway
Labor Act was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act).
- Belgard, 857 P.2d at 471.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
subject to a multiplicity of varying regulations on employ-
ment of flight personnel. Such a result led the court to
comment that even in the absence of express preemption,
the apparent predominant federal interest and the need for
uniformity preclude such state regulation.2 °1
Belgard clearly demonstrates the comprehensive regula-
tion of air transportation and Congress's intent to assure
uniform regulation. However, these observations are not
appropriately made in areas in which implied preemption
would exist either because Congress has chosen to regulate
those particular areas or aspects of air transportation or be-
cause of the predominant federal interest, rather than by
the expansion of express preemption through the exten-
sion of the Morales decision. The difficulty with such a fur-
ther extension of Morales is that, while the federal
preemption statute may be interpreted as providing a very
broad express preemptive requirement, there are many ar-
eas in which federal law simply may not provide a rule of
decision or remedy. Instead, implied preemption limiting
the doctrine to those areas in which Congress has chosen to
regulate air transportation or in which national uniformity
is clearly required. 2
In Anderson v. American Airlines, Inc. 203 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of federal removal
under the doctrine of complete preemption as applied to a
state retaliatory discharge claim under Texas law. Plaintiff
Anderson alleged that he had been the subject of a retalia-
tory discharge for filing a Workers' Compensation claim in
violation of Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8307c. American
sought removal to federal court on the grounds that plain-
tiff's state law retaliatory discharge claim was completely
201 Id. at 470 (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471
U.S. 707 (1985); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, (1947)). Cf Florida
Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, (1963); Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, (1959).
202 Cf Levy v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 90-Civ.-7005 (LJF), 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7842 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1993).
202 2 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1993).
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preempted either by the Railway Labor Act20 4 or by the Air-
line Deregulation Act.20 5
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Texas
retaliatory discharge claim did not require an interpreta-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement with defendant
American Airlines.2 °6 The mere fact that American could
refer to the collective bargaining agreement to "support the
credibility of its claims" that it did not discharge Anderson
in retaliation for filing a Workers' Compensation claim
made it unnecessary to require an interpretation of the col-
lective bargaining agreement.207 Accordingly, plaintiff's
claims did not invoke the preemptive scope of the Railway
Labor Act.
The court also considered the issue of complete preemp-
tion under § 1305 of the Airline Deregulation Act. The
court noted that the Supreme Court in Morales had defined
the scope of express preemption under § 1305 very broadly.
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also stated
that the Supreme Court cautioned that the pre-emptive
sweep of § 1305(a) (1) was not infinite: " [S]ome state ac-
tions may affect [airline fares] in too tenuous, remote or pe-
ripheral a manner to have a pre-emptive effect."20 8
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a claim for
money damages under the Texas Civil Workers' Compensa-
tion Act for retaliatory discharge was "far too remote to trig-
ger preemption."29 The Fifth Circuit also stated that it
need not consider whether the Federal Aviation Act would
preempt the availability of reinstatement under the same
provision of the Texas Civil Workers' Compensation Act.210
The court held that, even if reinstatement were preempted,
45 U.S.C. §§ 151(a), 184 (1988).
- 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305 (1988).






it would not necessarily conclude that the Federal Aviation
Act completely preempted a claim for money damages.211
Finally, the court in Anderson stated that the complete
preemption doctrine was limited to cases in which there
was "a clearly manifest Congressional intent to make state
claims removable to federal court."21 2 In so stating, the
court had previously noted that removal based on the pres-
ence of a federal defense usually is improper; however,
under the doctrine of "complete preemption"
a federal statute is occasionally "so 'extraordinary' that it
'converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one
stating a federal claim.'
Once an area of state law has been completely preempted,
any claim purportedly based on that preemptive state law is
considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and, there-
fore, arises under federal law.21 3
The court held that Congress did not clearly intend that
§ 1305 of the Airline Deregulation Act should make claims
such as the Texas Workers' Compensation claim involved in
this case removable to federal court.2 14
4. Implied Preemption of Air Carrier Claims
The case which presents a primer on federal preemption,
the Warsaw Convention, and the Airline Deregulation Act is
Levy v. American Airlines, Inc.21 5 The Levy case managed to
implicate virtually all of these issues. Levy resulted from at-
tempts by Federal Drug Enforcement Administration
agents to extradite Mr. Levy from Egypt to the United
States on drug-related charges. Mr. Levy contended that
his extradition from Egypt to the United States was im-
proper in that Egyptian authorities had been misled as to
the criminal charges against him. Nevertheless, he was
21, Anderson, 2 F.3d at 597-98.
212 Id. at 598 (citing Beers v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 836 F.2d 910, 913
n.3. (5th Cir. 1988)).
213 Id. at 594 (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) and
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987)).
214 Id. at 598.
215 No. 90-Civ-7005 (LJF), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7842 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1993).
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turned over by Egyptian authorities to two U.S. DEA agents,
Grabowski and Oberti. He was handcuffed and placed on
board a Swissair flight from Cairo to Zurich. His handcuffs
were released during the takeoff in response to information
from the flight attendant that safety regulations required
that he not be handcuffed for the takeoff. After eating a
meal, he was permitted to go to the restroom where he was
permitted privacy in the restroom but the door was kept
ajar so that the agents could observe his actions. While in
the restroom, Levy attempted "to cut his wrists with the
pull-tab from a soda can. '"216
As the old adage goes, "that's when the trouble started."
Levy was forcibly pulled from the lavatory and forced to the
floor of the adjacent galley. Levy fought with the agents
who found it necessary to restrain him on the floor and
place a towel in his mouth to stop him from screaming to
other passengers that he was being kidnapped by the
agents.
According to Levy, he had merely asked the agents to
show him the extradition papers as he was being restrained
on the floor and the agents' response was to hit him several
times in the face and to try to choke him with a towel. Nev-
ertheless, according to a witness on board the aircraft, Levy
was on the floor, screaming that he was being kidnapped,
and trying to bite the agents who were restraining him.
Because of his screams, the agents asked a flight attend-
ant if there was anything that could be used to stop him
from screaming and the flight attendant provided a towel
which was placed over his mouth. Because of the self-in-
flicted wound, the officers also asked the flight attendant to
attempt to locate a doctor. Luckily, Dr. Jusela, who was on
board the flight, came to the officers' assistance. An in-
flight medical kit was located and Dr. Jusela gave Levy two
or three injections of Valium.
After the sedative took effect, Levy remained on the floor
of the galley for the remainder of the flight to Zurich.
216 Id.
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Upon arrival in Zurich, the Swiss police took Levy to a hold-
ing cell.
Later that day, the agents retrieved Levy and attempted
to place him on an American Airlines flight to New York.
The captain of the American Airlines flight examined the
identification of the DEA agents but did not ask to see the
extradition papers. An attempt was then made to place
Levy on board the aircraft. He was rolled onto the aircraft
on a stretcher while being restrained with a restraining
jacket, ajacket over his head and tape over his mouth. The
other passengers had already boarded the aircraft, and in
response to their complaints and concerns that this man
might have been a terrorist or otherwise dangerous, the
captain demanded that Levy be removed from the aircraft.
After a request for further assistance, a deputy U.S. Mar-
shall Oboyski arrived in Zurich several days later to trans-
port Levy to New York. This time Levy was placed on the
American Airlines flight prior to any of the other passen-
gers boarding the airplane. Levy was restrained with his
mouth taped throughout the flight from Zurich to New
York. He received no food or drink and was not permitted
to leave his seat to go to the bathroom. At one point in the
flight, Levy indicated to Oboyski that his hands hurt and
Oboyski loosened his restraints. The flight was otherwise
uneventful. Upon arrival in New York, Levy was examined
prior to being placed in the Metropolitan Correction
Center. At that time, his medical complaints were ex-
amined and, other than an injury to his left wrist, a cut on
his right wrist, and a possible dislocation of the small finger
on his right hand, no other medical problems were identi-
fied. X-rays were taken and the X-rays indicated that the
only injury evidenced was an old, healed fracture of the
fifth finger of Levy's right hand.
Now, before proceeding any further, the reader may wish
to perform the following test. There may be more than one
correct answer, so circle all of the answers believed to be
applicable:
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1. Levy has claims as a result of this incident which may
be asserted against the following:




e. the DEA agents
f. the deputy U. S. Marshall







which Levy might assert include the
alienation of affections
false imprisonment
failure to provide safe passage
assault and battery
e. kidnapping
f. failure to provide proper medical super-
vision and treatment
g. negligently releasing Levy to federal
agents





claims are cognizable or limited by the
a. New York state law
b. the Airline Deregulation Act
c. Warsaw Convention
d. Federal Aviation Regulations
e. Tokyo Convention
If you answered each of the foregoing questions by omit-
ting only claims against the United States and the Egyptian
governments and the somewhat spurious reference to alien-
ation of affections, you have accurately described the law-
suit which Levy filed and the basis upon of which the
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Southern District of New York granted summary judgment
to all defendants. 17
First, with respect to the Warsaw Convention,"' the court
held that Levy's claims against American and Swissair, while
they involved international air transportation, were not "ac-
cidents" as defined under the Warsaw Convention. 219 Spe-
cifically, the court held that while the actions of other
passengers may, under certain circumstances, give rise to an
"accident" under Warsaw, such accidents and injuries must
be "external to the passenger." 220 In this case, Levy's own
admitted conduct in attempting to cut his wrists with the
pop tab gave rise to the federal agents' actions. Therefore,
their conduct was not "an unexpected or unusual event or
happening that [was] external to the passenger."221 The
court distinguished other cases involving terrorist acts,
hijackings, and drunken passengers which did not involve
conduct on the part of the injured passenger.
The next issue under the Warsaw Convention, however,
was the defense raised by American Airlines that the War-
saw Convention provided the exclusive remedy and pre-
empted state law claims arising out of international air
transportation. The court noted that the U. S. Supreme
Court in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Royd 222 reserved ruling on
the exclusivity of the Warsaw Convention in cases in which
no remedy was provided under Warsaw. The court con-
cluded that the Warsaw Convention was not the exclusive
remedy for accidents arising out of international air trans-
portation, but that in those cases in which it did not provide
a remedy, state law remedies were preserved.223 The court
specifically referred to the statement in In Re Lockerbie, Scot-
217 Levy, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7842 at *1.
218 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T. S. No. 876 (1934).
219 Levy, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7842 at *11-13.
22o Id.
22, Id. at *11 (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985)).
222 Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
223 Levy, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7842 at *15.
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land 124 that a plaintiff "plainly may institute" a state law
cause of action when his or her claim does not arise under
the Warsaw Convention.225
Next, under the Tokyo Convention, 26 airline crew mem-
bers, passengers, and others were granted immunity to the
extent that they were involved in restraining any person
necessary "(a) to protect the safety of the aircraft or persons
or property therein; or (b) to maintain good order and dis-
cipline on board. '227 On the basis of the Tokyo Conven-
tion, the court held that the claims of false imprisonment
and assault and battery against Swissair were subject to sum-
mary judgment.228 The court did not, however, grant sum-
mary judgment with respect to those claims which involved
the failure of Swissair to take certain action, such as failing to
provide Levy with safe passage, failing to provide proper
medical supervision and treatment, and negligently releas-
ing him to agents.2
Instead, as to those issues, the court addressed the extent
of any common law duty of common carriers to provide safe
passage, adequate medical care and proper release of the
passenger to the DEA agents. The court stated that the
duty to provide safe passage competes with the airline's ob-
ligation to protect other passengers and not to interfere
with law enforcement officials. 23 0 As such, the court con-
cluded that, even accepting the facts most favorably to Levy,
which included accepting that the agents hit him, broke his
fingers, and choked him, given Levy's admitted extreme be-
havior, some force was necessary to restrain him and pro-
224 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub. nom., Rein v. Pan Am World
Airways, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
225 Levy, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7842 at *15 (quoting In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie
Scotland, 928 F.2d at 1267).
22, Convention Relating to Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed On
Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941.
227 Levy, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7842 at *17.
228 Id. at *26.
2 Id.
250 Id. at *25.
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tect both him and the other passengers. 23 1 The court stated
the following:
Under the circumstances -where the alleged excessive force
occurred for a very brief period, where Levy was clearly dis-
turbed and dangerous, and where crew members faced po-
tential criminal liability if they did interfere - no reasonable
jury could find that the Swissair crew violated a duty to Levy
by not interfering with or questioning the agents'
conduct.232
Accordingly, the District Court granted summary judgment
on these state law common carrier claims against
Swissair.2 3
As to the state law claims against American Airlines,
which also involved transportation to the United States, the
issue of preemption of the state law claims under the Air-
line Deregulation Act also was presented. The U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York rejected broad
express preemption under § 1305 of the Airline Deregula-
tion Act and the decision in Morales v. Trans World Air-
lines.234 Instead, the Southern District of New York followed
the exception in Morales by concluding that any state laws
implicated in Levy's allegations were too "'tenuous, remote
or peripheral"' to be related to airline rates, routes or serv-
ices.235 The court interpreted the broad "relating to" lan-
guage set forth in the statute and the Morales decision as
preempting state law "only when that law is directly related
to airlines, not when its effect on the airline industry is
merely incidental. 236
Nevertheless, the court went on to consider implied pre-
emption. The court first determined that Congress had not
fully developed the law in the area of airline travel, and,
231 Id. at *28.
232 Levy, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7842 at *29.
233 Id.
234 ___U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).
235 Levy, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7842 at *231 (citing Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2040).
236 Id. (citing New York v. Pan Am World Airways, 728 F. Supp. 162, 176 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (overly broad interpretation of § 1305(a) (1) could doom all state regulations
affecting airlines)).
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therefore, the existence of federal regulations per se did
not establish implied preemption of Levy's state law
claims. 237 In so doing, the court specifically relied upon the
savings clause, which stated that "nothing contained in this
Act shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now ex-
isting at common law or by statute, but the provisions of
this Act are in addition to such remedies." 238
Despite the savings clause, the court considered the possi-
bility of preemption by conflict with specific regulations
and noted that the federal regulations provide that "high
risk passengers must remain under the control of at least
two armed law enforcement escorts at all times while on
board an airplane." 239 Additionally, the court noted that
federal law makes it a crime to "oppose an extradition
agent of the United States in the execution of his duties."24 °
Accordingly, the Southern District of New York noted that
under these federal regulations and statutes "American was
not only prohibited from interfering with the agents, [but]
its employees could have been criminally liable if they at-
tempted to do so. 1 241 Under these circumstances, the court
concluded that all of the common law claims against Ameri-
can Airlines for allegedly failing to provide him with safe
passage, falsely imprisoning him, and failing to provide him
medical supervision and treatment would have interfered
with the DEA agents' custody of him and conflicted with
federal law. Therefore, they were preempted.242
Finally, with respect to the claims against Swissair for fail-
ing to provide medical care and releasing Levy to the DEA
agents in Zurich, which both involved only travel outside
the United States and were not preempted by the U.S. stat-
ute, the court noted that Levy had been provided medical
care in the person of Dr. Jousela who provided him with
235 Id. at *24.
2 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1988)).
239 Levy, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7842 at *25 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 108.1(a) (1988)).
240 Id. at *26 n.12 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1502 (1988)).
241 Id. at *26.
242 Id.
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immediate medical attention on board the flight.243 Addi-
tionally, an ambulance was available upon the flight's arri-
val in Zurich, and Levy was handed over to Swiss police.
Therefore, Swissair had satisfied its obligations.244
In addition to presenting an interesting factual scenario,
the Levy case demonstrates again the limitations in the fed-
eral cases applying express preemption under § 1305 of the
Airline Deregulation Act and Morales v. Trans World Airlines.
Levy also demonstrates the proper use of conflict preemp-
tion in those cases not subject to express preemption, but
in which federal regulations specifically authorize and im-
pose certain duties which conflict with the state law claims.
Whether the Warsaw Convention provides an exclusive
remedy against air carriers for international air transporta-
tion, and therefore precludes claims in circumstances to
which it does not apply, is another issue which seems to be
the source of continued conflict among the federal courts.
III. WARSAW CONVENTION AND AIR CARRIER
LIABILITY
A. WARSAW JURISDICTION, PREEMPTION AND REMOVAL
Lathigra v. British Airways245 involved federal preemption
of state law claims by the Warsaw Convention. The case
also involved the liability of a connecting carrier under the
Warsaw Convention. The case arose as a result of a discon-
tinued flight on Air Mauritius, which had been scheduled
and ticketed by British Airways in the United States. The
case initially was filed by the plaintiffs in state court, but
removed to federal court on the basis of the Warsaw Con-
vention. The defendant also moved for summary judgment
on the grounds that the three year statute of limitations
under the Warsaw Convention barred the claim.
The court first found it necessary to evaluate the defini-
tion of "carrier" under the Warsaw Convention. The court
243 Id. at *29.
2- Levy, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7842 at *31.
245 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,343 (W.D. Wash. 1993).
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noted that persons other than the airlines providing car-
riage could have liability as "carriers" under the Convention
if they were acting as agents of the air carrier.246 The court
noted several cases which involved non-employees who
were providing security or skycap services. However, the
court refused to apply the definition of "carrier" so nar-
rowly as to apply only to agents of that type and held that
the Convention applies to any agent who has furthered the
contract of carriage or performed services the airline other-
wise would be required by law to perform.247 Relying upon
the decision of In re Air Crash Disaster at Gander, Newfound-
land,248 the court noted that "the framers of the Warsaw
Convention intended to include all those concerned with
the enterprise of air carrier's international air travel within
the scope of the Convention. 2 49 The court stated that
"[e]ven under the narrowest of these definitions,"250 British
Airways comes into the definition of carrier. "[A]n entity
which makes reservations for a carrier and which confirms
flights, acts in furtherance of the contract of carriage - no
less, at any rate, than does a baggage handler or a security
agent."151
The court noted that other cases which had unsuccess-
fully attempted to hold booking agents liable as carriers
under the Warsaw Convention were cases involving per-
sonal injuries due to aircraft highjacking and the "plaintiffs'
injuries. . . were in no sense connected to the agency rela-
tionship. 25 2 In this case, the discontinued flight was di-
rectly related to the agency relationship. Based upon its
determination that plaintiffs claims were preempted by the
Warsaw Convention, the court held that the claims were
246 Id. at 17,346.
247 Id.
248 660 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Ky. 1987).
249 Lathigra, 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,345 (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster at Gander,
Newfoundland, 660 F. Supp. at 1220)).
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 17,346.
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barred by the shorter statute of limitations under the War-
saw Convention.253
In Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,254 the court was
presented with the issue of federal court removal of five law-
suits resulting from the destruction of TWA Flight 843 de-
parting New York's John F. Kennedy Airport for San
Francisco on July 30, 1992. Five of the passengers filed suit
in San Francisco Superior Court, relying exclusively on state
law theories of recovery. Defendant TWA removed to fed-
eral court under the Warsaw Convention the three cases in
which the plaintiffs held tickets for international flights.2 55
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia was called upon to decide the question of "complete
preemption" and removal of state court actions under the
Warsaw Convention. Based upon a detailed review of the
Warsaw Convention, the court concluded that the drafters
of the Convention intended it to be the exclusive basis for
recovery of damages arising from personal injury and death
during international flights.2 56 Accordingly,. the court held
that the Warsaw Convention preempts state law causes of
action, not just remedies, and that TWA's removal of the
actions was proper.257 The court recognized the substantial
uncertainty as to the propriety of removal based on the
Warsaw Convention, and, therefore, the case was certified
for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).258
B. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE UNDER WARSAW
CONVENTION
1. Notice of Liability Limitations
In Keally v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion,259 the issue of
notice of the liability limitations to international passengers
253 Id.
254 820 F. Supp. 1218 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
255 Id. at 1226.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id.; see also Lathigra, 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,343 (granting Warsaw Convention
removal).
259 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,384 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
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under the Warsaw Convention was addressed. The issue
was not whether the ticket included the limitation, but
whether the passenger even received a ticket as opposed to
simply having received a boarding pass. Possession of the
ticket was established by Mexicana's possession of the flight
coupons for the roundtrip flight between Dallas - Ft. Worth
and Cancun. Apparently, the passenger's original ticket
was not accounted for, and at the time the passengers ar-
rived at the DFW airport for their departure to Cancun,
they had not yet received their airline ticket booklets. Nev-
ertheless, the airline procedure of returning the airline
flight ticket booklet to the passenger after removing the
flight coupon, as well as the markings indicated on the
flight coupon which showed that it had been accepted for
travel and marked at the time the passenger received her
seat assignment and boarding pass, established that the
ticket itself had been in the possession of the passenger and
had been returned to the passenger on the flight from Dal-
las to Cancun. The return ticket coupon also had been re-
moved from the same booklet in Cancun three days later
for the return flight. The court concluded that this evi-
dence, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom, supported a finding of fact that the passenger
had possession of the airline ticket booklet containing the
limitations of liability prior to departing from Dallas to
Cancun.2 60  Accordingly, the liability limitations of
$75,000.00 under the Montreal protocol were enforceable
in that case.261
2. Jury Trial
The availability of a jury trial for wrongful death claims
arising out of international air transportation over the high
seas was the subject of Stevens v. Korean Air Lines.2 62 The U.
S. District Court for the Southern District of New York came
to the same conclusion in this decision which other district
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 814 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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courts had reached following the liability trial in the Korean
Air Lines63 case and the remand of the damages cases to
the courts in which they were originally filed. Korean Air
Lines had filed a motion to strike the demand for jury trial,
contending that the applicable law of the United States was
the Death on the High Seas Act2 64 and that the Death on
the High Seas Act did not include a right to a jury' trial.
Based upon the Second Circuit decision in Lockerbie, 65 the
court concluded that the Warsaw Convention 266 provided a
separate remedy, apart from the Death on the High Seas
Act, which was governed by federal common law.267 The
district court also reviewed the maritime cases, including
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,268 and concluded that
the U. S. Supreme Court had recognized that a wrongful
death action was recognized under the federal common
law, particularly in maritime causes.269 The court declined
to extend the limitations of the Death on the High Seas Act
to aviation accidents, particularly in view of the ratification
of the Warsaw Convention after the Death on the High Seas
Act.270 The court concluded that, in the interest of uni-
formity, the right to jury trial would not be based upon
whether the accident occurred outside the territorial waters
of the United States (DOSHA), but held that any action
governed by the federal common law of wrongful death, as
applied under Warsaw, was merely the enforcement of a
common law right "enforceable in an action for damages in
the ordinary courts of law."271 Accordingly, plaintiff was en-
titled to a jury trial.
263 Id. at 600 (describing and citing the history of the KAL KE 007 litigation result-
ing in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirming a jury finding of willful miscon-
duct and reversing an award of punitive damages).
264 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (1988).
265 In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 331 (1991) [hereinafter Lockerbie I].
2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T. S. No. 876 (1934).
267 Stevens, 814 F. Supp. at 601.
26 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
2 Stevens, 814 F. Supp. at 602-03.
270 Id. at 602.
271 Id. at 604.
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In Park v. Korean Air Lines Co.,272 the district court also
held that, in federal common law wrongful death actions
under Warsaw established by the Lockerbie I decision, plain-
tiffs were entitled to ajury trial.273 The court noted that the
issue seemed to have been presented again by Korean Air
Lines primarily for purposes of preserving it on appeal.
Nevertheless, the court stated that, if the issue was being
presented for substantive determination, then the court was
still of the view that the plaintiffs were entitled to jury trial
under the Warsaw Convention.274
In Bowden v. Korean Airlines,275 six of the Korean Air Lines
cases involving Michigan residents were transferred to the
Eastern District of Michigan for trial on the issue of dam-
ages. The District Court denied Korean Air Lines' motion
to strike the jury demand on the grounds that the objec-
tions to the transferee court's prior rulings on the availabil-
ity of ajury trial had not been appealed, further and on the
grounds that the right to a jury trial was the law of the
case.276 The court also concluded that the "respective
rights" of plaintiffs under Article 17 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion 27 included the rights made available under national
law, which included the right to a jury trial. 278 The court
rejected the argument that the Death on the High Seas
Act 279 precluded a jury trial in Warsaw cases involving acci-
dents over the high seas because such a conclusion would
defeat the objective of uniformity between air crash cases
over land and those over the high seas. 80
272 No. 83-Civ-7900 (PNL), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16841 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1992).
273 Id. at *5-6.
274 Id.
275 814 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
276 Id. at 595.
27 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T. S. No. 876 (1934).
278 Bowden, 814 F. Supp. at 597.
279 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (1988).
2- Bowden, 814 F. Supp. at 597.
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C. OCCURRENCES AND INJURIES WITHIN SCOPE OF
CONVENTION
In Gezzi v. British Airways28 t the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that a passenger who slipped and fell on a pud-
dle of water on steps boarding the airplane had sustained
an "accident" which was both "unexpected and unusual"
and external to the passenger.282 Accordingly, the court
held that the passenger was entitled to compensation under
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, 283 which provides that
"an air carrier is liable for bodily injury suffered by a passen-
ger 'if the accident which caused the damage so sustained
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of
the operations of embarking or disembarking. "'284 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's ar-
gument that the case was controlled by Price v. British Air-
ways,2 81 which held that injuries sustained in a fistfight did
not result from a "accident" because the fight had no rela-
tionship to the operation of the aircraft.28 6
The application of the Warsaw Convention to survival
and wrongful death claims arising from exposure to a ter-
rorist attack were considered in Sakaia v. Trans World Air-
lines.8 7  In Sakaria, plaintiff's decedent had been a
passenger on board a TWA flight from New York to Athens,
Greece. The flight was scheduled to stop in Rome, Italy,
but, upon approaching Rome, the crew was informed that a
terrorist attack had taken place and that the airport was
closed. Due to insufficient fuel to continue to another des-
tination, the Boeing 747 landed at the airport in Rome, but
was held in a secure area away from the location of the ter-
rorist attack. The passengers were confined in the aircraft
for approximately one and one-half hours until a waiting
281 991 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1993).
282 Id. at 605.
283 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T. S. No. 876 (1934).
284 Gezzi, 991 F.2d at 604.
285 No. 91-Civ-4947 (JFK), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9581 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
28- Gezzi, 991 F.2d at 603-04.
287 8 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 1993).
1994]
58 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [60
area was prepared for them in the terminal away from the
location of the terrorist attack. While there was evidence
that it might have been possible for certain passengers to
leave the secured terminal area if they had not been
stopped by the guards, there was no evidence from any of
the other passengers on the flight that anyone actually did
SO.
Upon his late arrival in Athens, plaintiff's decedent excit-
edly related the events surrounding the terrorist attack to
members of his family. Included in his recollection of the
events were reports of being held in the stifling heat aboard
the aircraft and of having seen bodies when he went up-
stairs to go to the washroom in the terminal. According to
family members, Mr. Sakaria refused to eat, remained up-
set, and broke out in tears several times while describing his
experience in Rome. That evening he retired early, and
the next morning he was found dead in his bed, having suf-
fered a heart attack.
The original complaint in this action asserted state law
survival and wrongful death claims based upon (1) a breach
of contract with Sakaria to fly from New York to Athens
nonstop, and (2) negligence due to the failure to have suffi-
cient fuel on board the flight to avoid landing in Rome af-
ter the terrorist attack. TWA denied any negligence and
also raised the Warsaw Convention, as modified by the
Montreal Agreement, 28 as an affirmative defense limiting
its liability.
After discovery, TWA sought summary judgment on all
claims. The only expert testimony supporting the assertion
that Mr. Sakaria's heart attack had been due to any of the
events associated with his TWA flight to Athens was that of a
cardiologist who testified that confinement in the aircraft
for one and one-half hours before being exposed to
"graphic evidence of the carnage caused by the terrorist at-
218 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and
Hague Protocol, May 13, 1966, reprinted in CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, AERONAUTICAL
STATUTES AND RELATED MATERAL 515-16 (1974).
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tack,"2 9 could probably have provoked Mr. Sakaria's heart
attack. When presented on cross-examination with a scena-
rio in which Mr. Sakaria neither saw the aftermath of the
attack nor was exposed to a stifling environment on the
plane, the cardiologist renounced that conclusion. 9 °
Both the magistrate and the district court had failed to
consider whether plaintiffs were entitled to relief under the
Warsaw Convention.2 91 As stated by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, it is now without question that the War-
saw Convention creates an independent cause of action
which is basically a strict, but limited, liability cause of ac-
tion.292 Under the Warsaw Convention, the two issues to be
decided were whether an injury was caused by an "accident"
and whether the accident occurred during the course of
the flight or during embarking or disembarking from the
aircraft.2 93
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the only
basis for any conclusion that Mr. Sakaria had witnessed any
carnage were his own reports after he arrived in Athens. 94
TWA had obtained medical information indicating that Mr.
Sakaria suffered from hallucinations and confabulations. 95
Indeed, Sakaria's wife had indicated that, upon watching
events involving the Iran-Iraq war, Sakaria had become ex-
cited and imagined that he was threatened by those events,
even though in New York. Based upon this evidence, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that even if Sakaria's
reports in Athens could be considered contemporaneous
reports which otherwise might be entitled to admissibility
under the "excited utterance" doctrine, the fact that
Sakaria was subject to hallucinations and confabulations un-
2 9 Sakaria, 8 F.3d at 167 n.2.
290 Id.
-1 Id. at 168.
22 Id. at 170.
-3 Id. at 168-69.
- Sakaria, 8 F.3d at 171-72.
-5 Id. at 167, n.6. "'Confabulations' are the 'recitation of imaginary experiences
to fill gaps in memory.' It was described by one expert as 'generating or reporting
nonexistent situations, either totally nonexistent or mixed with real events.'" Id.
(Citation omitted).
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dermined the spontaneous credibility of any such re-
ports. 96 Therefore, Sakaria's reports were not admissible
under the "excited utterance" doctrine. 97 Once the evi-
dence of having been exposed to carnage was eliminated,
the court concluded that there was no basis to find any cau-
sation between any of the actual (as opposed to imagined)
events on the TWA flight from New York to Athens and that
summary judgment was therefore, proper under the War-
saw Convention. 98
The court then stated that if the Warsaw Convention was
not applicable, the next issue would be whether any state
law claims for negligence were preserved9.2 9 The court
noted that while in In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland,3 ° °
the Second Circuit held the Warsaw remedy, where applica-
ble, is exclusive of any others, the Supreme Court has re-
served decision on whether the scope of exclusivity
precludes other state law claims if the Warsaw Convention
does not provide a remedy.30 1 Without deciding that issue,
however, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that
any state law claims would also fail for lack of proximate
cause.3 12 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
noted that any negligence in failing to sufficiently fuel the
plane in New York to allow the plane to be flown nonstop
to Athens would not provide a basis for establishing foresee-
ability in the possible causation between the Rome layover
events and Sakaria's death. 3
Finally, any contract claims also were barred under the
doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale.3 °4 The court also noted that
in cases involving wrongful death many states do not permit
-9 Id. at 171-72.
297 Id.
28 Sakaria, 8 F.3d at 169.
- Id. at 173.
- 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991) [hereinafter Lockerbie1].
01 Sakaria, 8 F.3d at 173.
302 Id.
-0 Id.
- 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
such actions to be based upon contract.3 0 5 Therefore, any
wrongful death actions would be barred for that reason as
well.306 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed sum-
mary judgment in favor of Defendant Trans World Airlines
on all of plaintiffs' claims.30 7
D. DAMAGES RECOVERABLE UNDER CONVENTION
1. Korean Air Lines KE 007 Decisions
In Park v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., °8 the court consid-
ered the issues of wrongful death damages, survival dam-
ages, and also the claim of a Korean cause of action for
mental anguish and grief on the part of the survivors. Ko-
rean Air Lines argued in this case, as it had in other
cases,30 9 that the sole source of applicable law was the Death
on the High Seas Act. °10 The district court disagreed, em-
phasizing again that the Lockerbie3lt decision stated that the
Warsaw Convention was to be applied and interpreted
under federal common law principles. 12 Nevertheless, the
district court concluded that maritime law, in particular the
Death on the High Seas Act, was the primary guide where
deaths occur on the high seas. 13 Pursuant to the Death on
the High Seas Act, the court concluded that only pecuniary
losses could be recovered and that there would be no re-
covery for loss of society or the related claim of loss of
consortium. 14
This decision conflicts with Stevens which looked to mari-
time law and concluded that damages for loss of society or
loss of consortium are recoverable in maritime cases.31 5
-" Sakaria, 8 F.3d at 173.
s6Id.
307 Id.
308 No. 83-Civ-7900 (PNL), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16841 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
-o0 In re Korean Airlines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 814 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
310 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (1988).
- 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
312 Park, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16841 at *13-15.
3 Id. at *21.
314 Id. at *22.
315 814 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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The decision also conflicts with decisions such as In re Ko-
rean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983,16 Zarif v. Korean
Air Lines 17 and Bowden v. Korean Air Lines, Inc. 318 which
looked to the Warsaw Convention itself and the definition
of injuries to the person to conclude that any person who
could claim an injury, either pecuniary or due to loss of
care, comfort or society, was entitled to a recovery under
the Warsaw Convention.
The district court in Park nevertheless rejected the argu-
ment that a survival action was not available because such
an action is not provided under the Death on the High Seas
Act.319 The district court reiterated that the Death on the
High Seas Act was not an exclusive remedy and that general
maritime law was unsettled as to the availability of a survival
action.32 ° In order to determine that issue, however, the
court decided to look to other federal statutes and state law
statutes to determine the recoverability of pre-death pain
and suffering in a survival action. The court concluded that
the vast majority of federal statutes had been construed to
provide such an action, and state laws also generally pro-
vided such a recovery.12 1 Accordingly, the court further
concluded that the federal common law to be applied
under Warsaw required the availability of a survival action
for pre-death pain and suffering.3 22
Finally, plaintiff argued for the application of Section 4
of the Death on the High Seas Act which recognizes the
availability of foreign causes of action. The district court
pointed out that the Lockerbie P 2' decision had emphasized
the importance of achieving uniformity in air crash disaster
litigation.32 4 The court also concluded that if federal stat-
316 807 F. Supp. 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
317 836 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
-18 814 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
319 Park, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16841 at *25.
320 Id.
321 Id. at *23-25.
332 Id. at *25.
-23 928 F.2d at 1267.
324 Park, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16841 at *28.
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utes such as DOHSA which provided for the applicability of
the law of a foreign state in the event of a death by wrongful
act were to be applied under the Warsaw Convention, then
the goal of achieving uniformity under the Warsaw Conven-
tion would be defeated.125 In the case of a conflict between
the Warsaw Convention and federal statute, the treaty
would supersede the provisions of the statute and govern
the availability of a survivor's recovery.326 Accordingly, the
district court ruled that any recovery under a Korean cause
of action for recovery of damages for mental grief and
anguish, as applied under DOHSA, would be inconsistent
with the Warsaw Convention and not permitted.2 7
The recent release by the Russian Federation govern-
ment of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and digital flight
data recorder (DFDR) tapes from the Korean Air Lines
Flight KE 007 accident provided the evidence upon which
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
in Zarif v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. 28 concluded that the
passengers had suffered conscious pain and suffering fol-
lowing a missile strike which caused the aircraft to go out of
control.32 9 Specifically, the CVR and flight data recorder
provided the basis for an ICAO report which the court
found concluded that "the plane had flown for at least nine
minutes in a descending spiral, was lost from radar contact
at 5,000 meters .... and was destroyed upon impact with
sea."330 This report, along with the testimony of an eyewit-
ness who saw a large explosion and the fact that the wreck-
age was located within an area of approximately 60 by 160
meters broad and 174 meters deep, caused the federal dis-
trict court to conclude in this non-jury case that the aircraft
had not broken up in flight, as contended by Korean Air
325 Id.
326 Id. at *31.
227 Id.
'2 836 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
- Id. at 1349.
3- Id. at 1346 (characterizing ICAO report).
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Lines, but had remained intact until the time of final
impact.331
The court also analyzed the conflicting medical testi-
mony as to the likelihood that the passengers would have
donned their emergency oxygen masks and, therefore, had
been conscious during the final nine minutes after the mis-
sile strike and prior to impact with the ocean. Korean Air
Lines contended that the oxygen masks probably would not
have dropped down quickly enough for the passengers to
have donned the masks. Once the masks extended, the ef-
fect of air through the unpressurized cabin would have
caused the masks to "kite" above the passengers' heads
making them unaccessible during the 15 to 18 seconds of
consciousness at high altitude during which the passengers
might have placed the masks on their faces.332 Finally, Ko-
rean Air Lines' expert also testified that, during that period
of consciousness, the lack of oxygen would have caused the
passengers to have experienced euphoria and a lack of mus-
cular coordination.333 However, based upon Korean Air
Lines' expert's prior testimony and writings, the flight sur-
geon's manual, the ICAO report, and the testimony of
other expert witnesses, the court concluded that Korean Air
Lines' expert's testimony was incredible.334
instead, the court concluded the following:
It appears to the Court that the passengers, who had already
likely been awakened by the breakfast and landing an-
nouncement, most certainly heard the missiles strike, heard
the explosive sounds of decompression, heard the pressure
alarm, and had ample time to don their masks (between 20
and 35 seconds). They were aware of the plane zooming to
38,250 feet, out of control, and of the rapid descent (with
limited control and forces up to twice that of gravity), of the
rolls which culminated in the Dutch roll, and spirals, and of
at least the entire nine minutes during which they were
tracked down to 15,000 feet on radar. The final spiral and
53, Id. at 1346.
33 Id. at 1349.
11 Zarif, 836 F. Supp. at 1349.
"4 Id. at 1346-47.
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explosion into the sea followed. The fearfulness and pain of
the experience need not, and cannot, be described. 
35
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the court
awarded $1,000,000 to the Estate of Mrs. Zarif for pre-im-
pact conscious pain and suffering.33 6 The court held that
damages for loss of economic support to the plaintiff would
have been a recoverable element of damages, but found no
evidence to support such an award in this case.337 Similarly,
the court also was willing to consider an award of damages
for mental anguish if accompanied by physical manifesta-
tions, but concluded that there was no medical evidence to
support a finding of such physical manifestations. 3 s Inas-
much as plaintiff was an adult, the court did not award dam-
ages for loss of nurture because there was no evidence the
adult child either was dependent upon or had reasonable
grounds for expecting any pecuniary benefit from a contin-
uance of decedent's life. 339 The court also rejected an
award of damages for loss of services since there was no evi-
dence to support such an award. 340 Nevertheless, the court
awarded the plaintiff damages for the loss of care, comfort
and society of his mother in the amount of $500,000.341
In Bowden v. Korean Air Lines,342 the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan also followed Korean Air
Lines IP 43 in denying the motions to apply DOHSA limita-
tions to pecuniary losses. The court noted that the Warsaw
Convention permitted recovery of dommage materiel and dom-
mage moral, or moral and nonpecuniary damages. The Dis-
trict Court held that such dommage moral included damages
for pre-impact pain and suffering, to the extent such suffer-
ing had resulted in physical injury as required by Eastern
5 Id. at 1349.
356 Id.
-3 Id. at 1350.
3- Zarif 836 F. Supp. at 1351.
39 Id. at 1349-50.
-0 Id. at 1351.
341 Id.
M2 814 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
34- 807 F. Supp. 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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Airlines Inc. v. Foyd.344 The court also held that it would not
permit recovery of hedonic damages for the loss of quality
of life because such damages normally did not survive the
victim in cases other than civil rights cases.3 45 Nor would
the court permit recovery of decedent's future lost wages
because the court would permit the survivors to claim loss
of support, loss of society, lost inheritance, lost services and
love and affection. 46 The court held that a recovery of fu-
ture lost wages would result, in part, in a double recovery.347
The recoverability of pre-judgment interest to the
mother and sister of one of the victims of the KAL 007 trag-
edy was determined in Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.,
Ltd.348 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York reviewed the history of the KAL 007 litigation and
concluded that the award of prejudgment interest was
proper in that case because the Warsaw Convention limita-
tion had been lifted as a result of the jury's finding of willful
misconduct.3 4 The court distinguished the prior decision
in O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,35° in which the court
had held that the award of prejudgment interest in a War-
saw case would not be permitted because the framers of the
Warsaw Convention did not intend for compensation to ex-
ceed $75,000.00.311 In cases in which willful misconduct
eliminated the $75,000.00 cap, however, the court con-
cluded that the reason for denying prejudgment interest
also was eliminated. 52 The court in Zicherman then ana-
lyzed the recoverability of prejudgment interest under fed-
eral law. The court concluded that the result of the Second
Circuit opinion in Lockerbie P53 was that the Warsaw Con-
vention created a federal cause of action and must be con-
44 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
145 Bowden, 814 F. Supp. at 599.
346 Id.
34 Id.
348 814 F. Supp. 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
'4 Id. at 607.
-- 730 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1984).
35' Zicherman, 814 F. Supp. at 607.
3552 Id.
353 In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 950 F.2d at 839.
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strued exclusively under the federal common law. 54 Under
federal law, "in the absence of an applicable federal statute,
it is for federal courts to determine, according to their own
criteria, the appropriate measure of damage expressed in
terms of interest for non-payment of the amount found to
be due."3 55 The court concluded that the purpose of pre-
judgment interest is compensatory and, since the object of
the Warsaw Convention also was compensation, pre-judg-
ment interest was consistent with the Warsaw Conven-
tion 56 Similarly, the court found that pre-judgment
interest normally is awarded in admiralty, DOSHA and civil
rights cases, and also under various federal statutes.35' Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that the federal common
law as it pertains to damages available under Warsaw would
permit the recovery of pre-judgment interest in the event of
a finding of willful misconduct.
35 8
2. Cargo and Passenger Baggage - Warsaw
The issue of whether the Warsaw Convention and its pre-
sumption of liability extend to surface transportation associ-
ated with a shipment by air was addressed in General Electric
Co. v. Harper Robinson & Co.359 Ajet engine, transported on
an Air France flight, was being transported by a trucking
company outside of the airport when it was damaged. In
response to General Electric's claims against Air France, the
court concluded that the Warsaw Convention applied only
to the period of transportation by air which extends only to
the airport's border.3 60 Further, General Electric had made
its own arrangements for ground transportation and failed
to notify the air carrier of the claim within the time re-
quired by the tariff. The court, therefore, also granted sum-
mary judgment to the air carrier on the grounds that timely
- Zicherman, 814 F. Supp. at 607-608.
-15 Id. at 608 (quoting West Va. v. United States, 479 U.S. 305 (1987)).
356 Id. at 611.
357 Id. at 609-610.
'58 Id. at 611.
59 818 F. Supp. 31 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
s- Id. at 34.
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notice had not been given as required under the tariff. 61 If
the air carrier had itself arranged for the surface transporta-
tion, then notice to the surface carrier might have been suf-
ficient notice to the air carrier. General Electric itself made
the arrangements with the surface carrier, and, therefore,
notice to the surface carrier was not effective notice to the
air carrier.
The application of a tariff limitation prohibiting the ship-
ment of certain types of goods in a Warsaw Convention case
was the issue presented in Williams Dental Co. v. Air Express
International.3 62 Plaintiff Williams Dental Company had
contracted with Air Express International to ship a package
containing dental supplies, including fifty ounces of gold,
from New York to Sweden. Williams Dental Company de-
clared a total value of $23,474.50 and had paid a higher
rate for shipment due to the higher declared value. Wil-
liams Dental Company also had identified the goods by the
Schedule B Commodity Number which refers to a type of
gold. The Schedule B Commodity Number is a "universal
number used by all freight companies and any transporta-
tion company. ''363 Upon arrival in Sweden, the 50 ounces
of gold were missing from the shipment.
Plaintiff filed suit to recover the full declared value of
$23,474.50 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York under the Warsaw Convention. Air Ex-
press International defended, contending that its tariff
prohibited the shipment of gold, and, in view of the limita-
tion in the tariff, its total liability would be limited to $9.07
per pound under Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention.
The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff
Williams Dental Company, Inc. on the grounds that the un-
disputed evidence showed that Williams Dental Company
had declared a higher value.364 Under the Warsaw Conven-
tion, the carrier would be liable for the full declared value
361 Id.
362 824 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
363 Id. at 440.
- Id. at 439-40.
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of the goods since Williams Dental Company had declared
a higher value . 65 The court reviewed many of the Warsaw
Convention cases, including Orlov v. Philippine Air Lines,
Inc.,366 and Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.367
In these cases, the Supreme Court had enforced the War-
saw liability limitation, but also had noted that "had such a
declaration been made, and an additional fee paid, the
shipper would have been able to recover in an amount not
exceeding the declared value. ' 68
The District Court rejected the argument that the plain-
tiff was on notice of the tariff because such tariffs no longer
are required to be filed by the Civil Aeronautic Board. 69
Moreover, any such tariff limitation would be unenforce-
able unless it met the requirements for enforceability under
the Warsaw Convention.3 7 0 The court reasoned that the
Warsaw Convention precluded any provision "tending to re-
lieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit than that
which is laid down in this [C] onvention. '' 371 Since the plain-
tiff satisfied the requirements of the Convention by declar-
ing a higher value, any provision tending to limit the
carrier's liability must meet the requirements of Article 23
of the Warsaw Convention.Y The court set forth the fol-
lowing requirements:
In general, a liability limitation is enforceable if (1) it re-
sulted from a fair, open, just and reasonable agreement be-
tween the carrier and shipper entered into by the shipper
for the purposes of obtaining the lower of two or more ship-
ping rates proportioned to the amount of the risk, and (2)
the shipper was given the option of additional recovery
upon paying a greater rate. In determining whether these
requirements for enforceability have been met, courts have
considered such factors as (1) whether the carrier has given
365 Id.
257 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1958).
- 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
Williams, 824 F. Supp. at 439 (quoting Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. at 246 n.2).
Id. at 439-40.
370 Id. at 441.
371 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1988)).
372 Id. at 441-43.
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adequate notice of the limitation of its liability to the ship-
per, (2) the economic stature and commercial sophistica-
tion of the parties, (3) the availability of "spot" insurance to
cover a shipper's exposure. The reasonableness of notice is
a question of law to be determined by the court. Although
defendant does not seek to limit its liability to an amount
lower than that specified by the Warsaw Convention, de-
fendant does seek to limit its liability through its tariff to an
amount below the "full actual damages" specified in an air
waybill valid under the Warsaw Convention. Therefore, to
the extent the defendant's tariff tends to "relieve the carrier
of liability" under Article 23, that limitation of liability is not
enforceable, because there is no evidence that the defend-
ant, a commercially sophisticated carrier, gave plaintiff ade-




The court reacted very strongly to the carrier's accept-
ance of the goods at the higher declared rate, charging an
increased shipping rate, and then attempting to limit liabil-
ity to that which would be established by the minimum War-
saw Convention limitation simply because the tariff
prohibited acceptance of the shipment. The court summa-
rized the shipper's obligation under these circumstances as
follows:
In sum, there is no genuine issue of fact that plaintiff told
defendant the shipment contained one pail and two boxes
of dental supplies worth almost $25,000, and supplied the
Schedule B [Commodity] [N] umber for gold. Defendant ac-
cepted an additional rate to ship the package, based on its
additional declared value. Thus, plaintiff provided informa-
tion sufficient to notify defendant that the shipment con-
tained gold. It was then up to defendant, a commercially
sophisticated carrier, either to enforce its own tariff or to
assume the additional risk associated with the increased
shipping rate. In other words, because plaintiff declared
that the shipment was worth far more than the Warsaw Con-
vention limitation of $9.07 per pound, provided enough in-
formation to indicate the shipment contained an item
prohibited by defendant's tariff, and has not been shown to
373 Williams Dental Co., 824 F. Supp. at 441 (citations omitted).
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have been actually aware that the tariff prohibited the ship-
ment, defendant is liable notwithstanding the existence of
the tariff.374
Finally, the court rejected Air Express International's at-
tempt to limit the recovery to $1,262.93, which apparently
was the proportionate value of the total declared value
based upon the relative weight of the fifty ounces of gold to
the total weight of the shipment.3 75 Instead, the court con-
cluded that the value of the gold was $407.40 per ounce on
the date of the shipment.3 76 The court concluded that the
value of the pail obviously was not equal to the value of the
gold, and limiting the recovery to the proportionate weight
would mean that
a shipper who ships an expensive but lightweight item in an
inexpensive but heavy container (or with other inexpensive
but heavy items) may not recover the value of the expensive
items unless the entire shipment is lost; alternatively, if the
expensive item is lost, the shipper may recover only a frac-
tion of the item's declared value.
377
The court noted that Air Express's argument was not sup-
ported by any case law under the Warsaw Convention and
that the Warsaw Convention "is a simple, 'bright-line' liabil-
ity rule for lost international shipments: if the shipper de-
clares an additional value for a shipment and pays an
additional shipping charge, the carrier is liable for the
value if the shipment is lost. 378
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Maritime Insur-
ance Co. Ltd. v. Emery Air Freight Coip. 379 upheld a strict con-
struction of Articles VIII and IX of the Warsaw Convention,
which require that the air waybill contain all of the particu-
lars set out in Articles VIII (a) to (i) inclusive, and (q), - in
order for a carrier to be entitled to limit its liability under
374 Id. at 442.
375 Id.
376 Id.
377 Id. at 443.
378 Williams, 824 F. Supp. at 443.
- 983 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1993).
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the Warsaw Convention.3 80 It was undisputed that Items
(a), (c), and (e) were omitted, but Emery Air Freight ar-
gued that under the decision in Exim Industries v. Pan Am
World Airways, 381 any such omissions must be commercially
significant or prejudicial. The Second Circuit limited its
prior holding in Exim Industries only to subsections (h) and
(i), and stated that all other particulars must be included in
order for the carrier to avail itself of the limitation on liabil-
ity."8 2 Accordingly, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that Emery was not entitled to avail itself with the limi-
tations of liability under the Warsaw Convention and fur-
ther stated that any cases in the Second Circuit holding to
the contrary were overruled. 83
E. AIR CARRIER LIABILITY
1. Liability - General
The liability of a national or international trunk airline
for injuries or death to a passenger carried by a related
commuter airline was debated in Shaw v. Delta Airlines,
Inc. 384 Indeed, the impression created in the minds of
members of the public as to whether national or interna-
tional trunk airlines and commuter airlines are "related"
and how that relationship may be perceived was precisely
the issue which precluded summary judgment in Shaw v.
Delta Airlines, Inc. In that case, plaintiff suffered serious per-
sonal injuries in a crash on January 15, 1990, aboard
Skywest Flight 5855 from Salt Lake City, Utah, to Elko, Ne-
vada. Delta moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that it had no liability for any torts committed by Skywest.
Delta relied, in part, upon several Warsaw Convention cases
which held that connecting carriers are not liable for per-
sonal injuries or death under the Warsaw Convention. 85
58 Id.
-s' 754 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1985).
3812 Maritime Ins. Co., 983 F.2d at 440-41.
383 Id. at 441.
-1 798 F. Supp. 1453 (D. Nev. 1992).
-5 Id. at 1458 n.6.
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Delta also cited another case that rejected a liability claim
against a ticketing agent for injuries or death. 86
After a detailed analysis of the relationship between Delta
Airlines and Skywest, the court held that issues3 8 7 of fact
were presented to the jury on the theory of actual or appar-
ent agency. The court rejected plaintiffs argument that
Delta and Skywest were partners or joint venturers.8 8 The
court indicated, however, that there might be a principal-
agency relationship and that the jury would have to deter-
mine the scope of such relationship. Moreover, even if no
actual agency existed, an apparent agency might be found
if the plaintiff was successful in establishing that the joint
Skywest and Delta marketing strategy created the impres-
sion in the minds of the travelling public that the two air-
lines were "equated." The court stated that:
Plaintiffs also present evidence that tends to show that
Delta's actions have effectively managed to equate Skywest
with Delta in the minds of the travelling public. Delta pub-
lished the Skywest information in Delta timetables and re-
fers to Skywest's service as the "Delta Connection." The two
names (Delta and Skywest) appear together in national ad-
vertising materials along with the same trademark the
"Delta Connection". The agreement between Delta and
Skywest provides for the use of Delta slogans and insignia
"to reflect the Delta Connection and the relationship be-
tween Skywest and Delta." Advertising materials depict the
Delta trademark (a red, white and blue triangle) close to
the Skywest name and Delta includes Skywest destination
cities in its own list of Delta destinations. Delta issues
Skywest tickets on Delta ticket stock and provides Delta
ticket stock to Skywest for some of their ticketing needs. 89
The court went on to state that the issue before it was
similar to those presented in cases involving franchisors and
franchisees. Referring to one such case, the court noted
86 Id. (citing Stanford v. Kuwait Airlines Corp., 648 F. Supp. 1158 (S.D.N.Y.
1986)).
387 Id. at 1457.
38 Id. at 1456.
-9 Shaw, 798 F. Supp. at 1458 (emphasis added).
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that the test was whether the franchisor "strictly controlled
the manner in which the franchisee was perceived by the
public, creating an appearance of ownership and control
purposely designed to attract the patronage of the pub-
lic."390  Noting that franchisor/franchisee cases were
neither controlling nor completely analogous,391 the court
recognized that they "do accurately portray the issues that
the trier of fact will face in an apparent authority case such
as this one. 39 2
Those familiar with the airline industry, in particular the
origin and growth of commuter carriers and their relation-
ship with the trunk airlines, may believe it is obvious that
they are independent businesses. However, the question of
whether the appearance of "ownership and control pur-
posely designed to attract the patronage of the public" has
now been created appears to be closely related to the extent
of joint advertising, marketing, scheduling, and the use of
trademarks and in some cases similar trade dress, such as
aircraft paint schemes.
In Stanford v. Kuwait Airways Corporation3 3 the issue of po-
tential liability to non-passengers for breach of negligent se-
curity screening was presented. The court rejected the
motion of Middle Eastern Airways (MEA) for summary
judgment based upon the claim that Middle Eastern Air-
ways did not have a duty of care owed to non-passengers or
passengers of connecting interline flights. Adhering to Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, section 324a, the court held
that an airline which undertakes as a part of the Interna-
tional Air Transport Association (IATA) to provide security
services may be liable if the failure to exercise reasonable
care in providing these services increases the risk of harm
or is relied on by other air carriers as a part of the security
screening system. 9 4 Additionally, the court rejected MEA's
390 Id.
39, Id. at 1459.
392 Id.
-3 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17202 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1992).
194 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17205.
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argument that the negligence of the connecting airline was
the sole proximate cause of the damages.395 The court
stated than "an actor whose negligence has set a dangerous
force in motion is not safe from liability for harm it has
caused innocent persons solely because another had negli-
gently failed to take action that would have avoided this.'396
Instead, it was "reasonably foreseeable that the conse-
quences complained of would follow from the allegedly
wrongful act."3 97
2. Damages
In Bea v. Aerolineas Argentinas3 98 the court entered a sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant airline in a claim
arising from its issuance of a ticket to the plaintiff for a date
on which the airline did not have a scheduled flight. The
plaintiff claimed that the defendant had breached a con-
tractual obligation and that the breach had resulted in con-
sequential damages noted in the amount of $43,705. The
court noted that the ticket itself specifically stated that the
times shown on the ticket were not guaranteed and formed
no part of the contract and that the schedules were subject
to change without notice. 99 Moreover, the court found
that the ticket also disclaimed any consequential dam-
ages.40 0 The court held that the consequential damages sus-
tained by plaintiff were not foreseeable in contract under
the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale,40 1 and that summary judg-
ment on this contract claim should be entered in favor of
the defendant.40 2
395 Id.
- Id. at 17,205 (quoting Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 719 (2d
Cir. 1964) (rejecting the "last clear chance" doctrine), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944
(1965)).
197 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,205 (quoting Bernstein v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 702 F.
Supp. 962 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), vacated in part, In Re Crazy Eddie Sec. Lit., 714 F. Supp.
1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)).
598 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,415 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).
- Id. at 17,416.
400 Id.
401 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
402 Bea, 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,416.
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3. Cargo and Passenger Baggage
In Hill Construction Corp. v. American Air Lines, Inc.,4"' a
non-Warsaw Convention case, the issue of enforcement of
the limitation on liability set forth in the air way bill was
presented, notwithstanding the obvious negligence of the
air carrier in damaging the goods. The court held that the
limitations on liability contained in American's air waybill
were enforceable.40 4 The limitations set forth on the reverse
side stated that American's liability for cargo "lost, dam-
aged, or delayed" was "limited to $9.07 per pound (plus
transportation charges) unless the shipper declared a
higher value and paid an additional charge. 4 °5 Although
the district court had found that American was negligent in
the handling of plaintiff's cargo, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the limitation on liability was nevertheless
enforceable because the shipper had not declared a higher
value for the goods.40
In this case, a helicopter blade had been delivered to
American Airlines in Puerto Rico for shipment to Califor-
nia. The helicopter blade then was lost by American Air-
lines, and subsequently, American discovered a container
which it believed contained the helicopter blade. A repre-
sentative of Hill Construction was called and asked to in-
spect the package. Upon locating the package, American's
employees proceeded (over Hill's objection) to open the
package with a forklift. Once the package was opened, the
helicopter blade, damaged by the forklift, was found
enclosed.
The particular facts of this case caused the First Circuit
Court of Appeals to consider two possible deviations from
the cases enforcing a tariff or waybill limitation on liability.
The court first considered whether the Ninth Circuit deci-
sion in Coughlin v. Trans World Air Lines, Inc.,4 °7 involving
- 996 F.2d 1315 (1st Cir. 1993).
4- Id. at 1318-19.
405 Id. at 1316.
406 Id. at 1318, 1320.
407 847 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1988).
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an air lines' increased liability for losing the ashes of a pas-
senger's deceased husband, was applicable. The court held
that the Coughlin case should be limited to its facts, in which
a separate special promise was breached by the airline by
refusing to allow the passenger to carry the ashes into the
cabin, and then losing the ashes.40 8 According to the First
Circuit Court of Appeals, the breach of this separate con-
tract was not subject to the limitation on liability.40 9
Hill also raised the "deviation doctrine," which originated
in maritime law. Under the "deviation doctrine," if there is
a deviation in the method of carriage which fundamentally
changes the foreseeable risks to the cargo, then the limita-
tion on liability may not be enforced.410 In both of the
cases cited by Hill, there were separate promises made as to
either the specific route over which the goods would be
transported or the precise manner in which the goods
would be transported. The court stated that these cases in-
volved subsequent agreements, which superseded the provi-
sions of the air waybill, and refused to follow the state court
decisions in those cases.41
Finally, the court concluded that there might be author-
ity in one Ninth Circuit decision for lifting the limitation on
liability in cases involving willful misconduct.412 Of course,
this was not a Warsaw Convention case in which willful mis-
conduct would have lifted the Warsaw limitations on liabil-
ity. Nevertheless, the court concluded that there was not
evidence of willful misconduct in this case, and the trial
court's conclusion that the limitation on liability was inap-
plicable was reversed.413
408 Hill Constr. Corp., 996 F.2d at 1318-19.
4- Id. at 1319.
4)0 Id.
411 Id. at 1319-20.
412 Id. at 1320.
413 Hill Constr. Corp., 996 F.2d at 1320.
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4. Miscellaneous
In United States v. Hicks,414 a First Amendment challenge
was made to 49 U.S.C. § 14720) which makes it a criminal
offense for a passenger to "assault, intimidate, or threaten
* . . so as to interfere" with a crew member's duties.415 In
Hicks, certain passengers on an aircraft had repeatedly used
angry, profane and defiant language in response to multi-
ple requests by the aircraft's personnel not to operate elec-
tronic equipment aboard the aircraft so as to interfere with
the navigational equipment and/or annoy other passen-
gers. The court rejected the plaintiff's First Amendment
challenges, holding that the statute was constitutional
under the "time, place and manner" cases involving limita-
tions on protected speech.416 However, the Fifth Circuit
also rejected the government's argument that profane
speech was ipso facto not protected by the Constitution.417
The Court noted that such language was protected by the
Constitution, but that the regulation of such speech wasjus-
tified in view of the unique circumstances and the need to
provide for the safety of all passengers during a commercial
airline flight.418
The court noted that the facts in that case indicated both
cockpit crew members and cabin crew members were taken
away from their normal duties as a result of the disruption
caused by the defendants. 419 The court further held that
the intent required under the statute was only a general in-
tent to intimidate and that there was no requirement of any
specific intent to interfere with the operation of the air-
craft.420 Finally, there was evidence that the electronic
equipment had, in fact, caused a navigational malfunction
during the take-off.
414 980 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1618 (1993).
415 Id. at 968.
06 Id. at 971.
417 Id.
418 Id.
4,9 Hicks, 980 F.2d at 972.
420 Id. at 972.
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Hicks was sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment to be
followed by three years of supervised release. Moore was
sentenced to eight months' imprisonment, to be followed
by three years of supervised release. A bystander passenger
who engaged in the disruption was sentenced to four
months' imprisonment, to be followed by three years of su-
pervised release. Each was required to pay restitution in the
amount of $1,871.35 to Continental.
The Federal Aviation Administration's regulations per-
taining to enhanced security, promulgated pursuant to the
Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990421 were re-
viewed by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in
Public Citizen, Inc. v. FAA.422 Public Citizen objected be-
cause the notices of proposed rule making did not set forth
in sufficient detail the security staffing, training, and meas-
ures which were to be implemented pursuant to the Act.
Public Citizen insisted: (1) that the regulations themselves,
which set forth certain minimum staffing and training re-
quirements, were inadequate as they did not set forth the
specific number of screeners or the details of the training
program other than to state that each air carrier must have
its own air carrier security program; (2) all persons involved
in screening must be qualified pursuant to the program;
and (3) that if they fail the test, they must take remedial
training before being permitted to take the test again.
Public Citizen also complained that the specific rules per-
taining to air carrier security systems should have been
made available under the Freedom of Information Act423
and the Administrative Procedure Act.4 24 Public Citizen ar-
gued that even though the Federal Aviation Act had been
amended to preclude disclosure of such information under
the Freedom of Information Act when "in the interest of
aviation safety," such limitation was not sufficiently exten-
sive to preclude disclosure under the Administrative Proce-
42, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1357(h)(1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
422 988 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
423 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
424 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
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dure Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
responded by stating that the Federal Aviation Act was suffi-
ciently definite to unmistakably indicate Congress's intent
that, even if such information was subject to disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act, it certainly was not
available under other provisions of federal law.4 25
Finally, Public Citizen objected to the FAA's determina-
tion that nondisclosure of such information was in the in-
terest of aviation safety. Public Citizen produced an
affidavit from the previous director of aviation security for
the FAA which stated that the FAA should only be con-
cerned about disclosure if its rules were inadequate. If the
rules were adequate, then there would be no harm in dis-
closure. Sensibly, the D.C. Circuit rejected this argument,
stating that providing this information to potential ter-
rorists would possibly assist them in avoiding airport secur-
ity systems because no security system is perfect.4 26 The
D.C. Circuit, therefore, affirmed the FAA's determination
as not being arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law.4 27 The D.C. Cir-
cuit also noted that, in interpreting the Federal Aviation
Act, the proper method of interpreting the act was to apply
the unmistakable intent of Congress, and, if the intent was
not clear, then great deference would be given to the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration's own interpretation of the
statute.428
IV. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. STATUTE OF REPOSE
The most significant recent development in aviation
products liability law is the enactment of the General Avia-
tion Revitalization Act of 1994.429 On August 17, 1994, Pres-
ident Clinton signed into law a federal statute of repose
425 Public Citizen, 988 F.2d at 194-96.
426 Id. at 197.
427 Id. at 197-98.
428 Id. at 196-97.
42 Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (1994).
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applicable to personal injury, wrongful death or property
damage claims against general aviation manufacturers and
arising "out of an accident involving a general aviation air-
craft."430 The statute of repose was the result of the contin-
ued efforts of certain key senators and representatives,
including Representative Dan Glickman and Senator Nancy
Kassebaum of Kansas, but ultimately was supported by
nearly every member of the U.S. Senate and passed on a
voice vote by a clear majority of the House of
Representatives.4"'
The federal statute of repose applies generally to product
liability actions arising from accidents which occur eighteen
(18) years following the date of first delivery of the aircraft
to its first purchaser or lessee, if delivered directly from the
manufacturer; or from the date of first delivery of the air-
craft to a person engaged in the business of selling or leas-
ing such aircraft.4 32  For new and replacement parts, the
1' Id. § 2(a).
43 The vote in the Senate was 91-8 in favor of the legislation.
432 The text of the federal statute of repose is as follows:
Section 1. Short Title.
This act may be cited as the General Aviation Revitalization Act of
1994.
Section 2. Time Limitations on Civil Actions Against Aircraft
Manufacturers.
(a) In General. - Except as provided in subsection (b), no civil action
for damages for death or injury to persons or damage to property aris-
ing out of an accident involving a general aviation aircraft may be
brought against the manufacturer of the aircraft or the manufacturer
of any new component, system, subassembly, or other part of the air-
craft, in its capacity as a manufacturer if the accident occurred-
(1) after the applicable limitation period beginning on-
(A) the date of delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser or lessee,
if delivered directly from the manufacturer; or
(B) the date of first delivery of the aircraft to a person engaged in
the business of selling or leasing such aircraft; or
(2) with respect to any new component, system, subassembly, or other
part which replaced another component, system, subassembly, or
other part originally in, or which was added to, the aircraft, and which
is alleged to have caused such death, injury or damage, after the appli-
cable limitation period beginning on the date of completion of the
replacement or addition.
(b) Exceptions. - Subsection (a) does not apply-
(1) if the claimant pleads with specificity the facts necessary to prove,
and proves, that the manufacturer with respect to a type certificate or
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statute of repose applies generally to actions arising from
accidents eighteen (18) years after the replacement or the
addition of the part.433
airworthiness certificate for, or obligations with respect to continuing
airworthiness of, an aircraft or a component, system, subassembly, or
other part of an aircraft knowingly misrepresented to the Federal Avia-
tion Administration, or concealed or withheld from the Federal Avia-
tion Administration, required information that is material and
relevant to the performance or the maintenance or operation of such
aircraft, or the component, system, subassembly, or other part, that is
casually related to the harm which the claimant allegedly suffered;
(2) if the person for whose injury or death the claim is being made is a
passenger for purposes of receiving treatment for a medical or other
emergency;
(3) if the person for whose injury or death the claim is being made was
not aboard the aircraft at the time of the accident; or
(4) to an action brought under a written warranty enforceable under
law but for the operation of this Act.
(c) General Aviation Aircraft Defined. - For purposes of this Act, the
term "general aviation aircraft" means any aircraft for which a type
certificate or an airworthiness certificate has been issued by the Ad-
ministrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, which, at the time
such certificate was originally issued, had a maximum seating capacity
of fewer than 20 passengers, and which was not, at the time of the
accident, engaged in scheduled passenger-carrying operations as de-
fined under regulations in effect under the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 (49 U.S.C. App. 1301 et seq.) at the time of the accident.
(d) Relationship to Other Laws. -This section supersedes any State
law to the extent that such law permits a civil action described in sub-
section (a) to be brought after the applicable limitation period for
such civil action established by subsection (a).
Section 3. OTHER DEFINITIONS.
For the purpose of this Act-
(1) the term "aircraft" has the meaning given such term in section
101(5) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1301(5));
(2) the term "airworthiness certificate" means an airworthiness certifi-
cate issued under section 603(c) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
(49 U.S.C. 1423(c)) or any predecessor Federal statute;
(3) the term "limitation period" means 18 years with respect to gen-
eral aviation aircraft and the components, systems, subassemblies, and
other parts of such aircraft; and
(4) the term "type certificate" means a type certificate issued under
section 603(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1423(a))
or under any predecessor Federal statute.
Section 4. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATIONS OF ACT.
(a) Effective Date. -Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act
shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Application of Act. -This Act shall not apply with respect to civil
actions commenced before the date of the enactment of this Act.
433 Id. § 3(3).
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The definition of "general aviation aircraft" requires a
type certificate or airworthiness certificate issued by the
Federal Aviation Administration, which at the time of issu-
ance, had a maximum seating capacity of 20 passengers,
and which was not at the time of the accident engaged in
scheduled passenger-carrying operations as defined by Fed-
eral Aviation Regulations.434
The statute of repose applies not only to aircraft, but also
to any component, system, subassembly, or other part of a
general aviation aircraft.43 5
The federal statute of repose supersedes only those state
laws which would permit the action to be filed after the ex-
piration of the federal statute of repose, but does not super-
sede any state law statute of repose or statute of limitations
which would require the earlier filing of such an action.436
The federal statute of repose also includes exceptions for
(1) case in which a manufacturer knowingly misrepresents
to or conceals from the Federal Aviation Administration re-
quired information relevant to the performance, mainte-
nance or operation of an aircraft or component;437 (2)
cases in which the person injured or killed is a passenger
for purposes of receiving treatment for medical or other
emergency;438 (3) cases in which the person injured or
killed is not aboard the aircraft at the time of the acci-
dent;439 or (4) cases actionable under a written warranty
enforceable under the law.440
Significantly, the statute of repose is based upon the date
of the accident, and not the date of commencement of the
suit. Other forms of products liability statutes or repose typ-
ically preclude the commencement of actions following expira-
tion of the statute of repose, but the Act precludes filing an
action if the accident occurs eighteen years after the statute of re-
44 Id. § 2(c).
- Id. § 3(3).
4- Id. § 2(d).
437 General Aviation Revitalization Act § 2(b)(1).
418 Id. § 2 (b) (2).
43" Id. § 2(b) (3).
440 Id. § 2(b)(4).
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pose.441 Accordingly, unlike other statutes of repose, the Act
will not in any case shorten the time of filing product liabil-
ity actions, which may be brought within the otherwise ap-
plicable state statute of limitations or statute or repose, as
long as the accident was within eighteen (18) years of the
date of commencement of the limitation period. On the
other hand, it can be expected that certain challenges will
be made to the application of the statute to actions not pre-
viously commenced for accidents prior to the effective date
of the legislation, which became barred by the enactment
of the federal statute of repose.
The immediate effect of the Act was the announcement
that the Cessna Aircraft Company would resume the manu-
facture of piston-powered general aviation aircraft, and that
Piper Aircraft Corporation considered its chances of emerg-
ing from Chapter 11 bankruptcy to have been enhanced.
Based upon the age distribution of the existing fleet of gen-
eral aviation aircraft, this federal legislation should substan-
tially limit the products liability exposure of all
manufacturers.
B. ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE
The Alaska Supreme Court considered the issue of strict
products liability and economic loss in its decision in Pratt
& Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sheehan.442 The Sheehan case
arose from damage to a Dehaviland Turbo-Beaver, owned
and piloted by Joseph Sheehan. The aircraft's engine ex-
perienced a catastrophic failure shortly after takeoff. The
resulting forced landing caused substantial damage to the
aircraft, including damage to both the air frame and the
engine. Sheehan filed suit, including claims for strict prod-
ucts liability for the resulting property damage. The trial
court entered judgment in the amount of approximately
$393,000, and both parties appealed.
441 See generally, Frumar, PRODUTrs Lt.nILrr § 26.05; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-551
(1978); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21430(3) (1977); O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(2) (1987);
Ind. Code Ann. § 33-1-1.5-5 (1989).
442 852 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1993).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Pratt & Whitney Canada argued that the economic loss
for the damage to the aircraft should not be compensable
in a tort action for strict product liability. The parties ac-
knowledged that Northern Power & Engineering Corp. v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co. "held that a litigant may recover economic
loss in strict products liability if the 'defective' product cre-
ates a situation potentially dangerous to persons or other
property, and loss occurs as a result of that danger."443 The
court then noted the parties' acknowledgment that "mid-
flight engine failure caused by a defective product is a para-
digmatic example of a 'potentially dangerous' situation for
which economic loss is recoverable.""4 Nevertheless, Pratt
& Whitney Canada urged the Alaska Supreme Court to
overrule its earlier decision in favor of a per se ban on recov-
ery for economic loss, particularly for damage to the prod-
uct itself.
In addressing Pratt & Whitney Canada's challenge to
Alaska's "potentially dangerous" exception the court noted
that two extreme positions on recovery of economic loss,
particularly resulting from damage to the product itself, are
represented by Seely v. White Motor Co.,445 and Santor v. A &
M Karagheusian, Inc. 446 The court also noted that the
United States Supreme Court had discussed the issue of re-
covery of economic loss and strict products liability in its
decision in East River Steamship Corp. v. TransAmerica Delaval,
InC.4 4 7 In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the
extreme positions represented by Seely and Santor, as well as
the intermediate approach involving "potentially danger-
ous" situations as adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court in
Northern Power. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the "po-
tentially dangerous" intermediate rule of Northern Power on
the grounds that "[t] he tort concern with safety is reduced
4 Id. at 1175.
444 Id.
-5 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965) (holding that economic loss is recoverable in con-
tract, but not in strict products liability).
446 207 A.2d 305 (NJ. 1965) (holding that economic loss is recoverable in strict
products liability).
447 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
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when an injury is only to the product itself."44 The Court
held that the intermediate approach was "too indetermi-
nate to enable manufacturers easily to structure their busi-
ness behavior. 4
49
The Alaska Supreme Court also considered the extent to
which each of the foregoing rules had been adopted in
other states. The court noted that the majority tended to
follow the rule that economic loss was not recoverable in
products liability actions. 45 0 However, the court noted that
many of these cases involved adoption of the rule over a
vigorous dissent.451 Additionally, the court noted that at
least one commentator cites the "intermediate position" as
the majority rule.452
The Alaska Supreme Court focused on the potential dan-
ger to customers and consumers, as well as on the impor-
tance of tort law in promoting product safety as important
considerations in determining the extent of products liabil-
ity remedies. 45 3 The court quoted with approval, a dissent-
ing opinion from the Wyoming Supreme Court which
stated:
[The intermediate rule reflects] not only the developing di-
rection of case law but socially appropriate engineering phi-
losophy directed toward better products and a safer
environment. Neither the pure East River idiom nor its half
of a loaf commercial transaction offspring as a minority pos-
ture deserve adaptation for either consumer or commercial
purchasers in this jurisdiction. Confining recovery to con-
tractual remedies makes no real sense .... Sometimes by
fortuity, other property or personal injury will not result
but, unfortunately, fortuity is not continuity and with faulty
and dangerous products, there will inevitably be injury and
other property damage in time.454
44 Id. at 871.
449 Id. at 870.
4- Pratt & Whitney Canada, 852 P.2d at 1180.
451 Id.
452 Id.
4.5 Id. at 1173.
454 Id. at 1180-81 (quoting Continental Ins. Co. v. Page Eng'g Co., 783 P.2d 641,
684-85 (Wyo. 1989) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting)).
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Finally, the court noted in its opinion that application of
contract law would be ineffective because either through a
disparity in bargaining position or through appropriate lim-
itations on warranties and remedies, manufacturers of po-
tentially dangerous products could limit their responsibility
for contract damages.4 55 Accordingly, the Alaska Supreme
Court rejected Pratt & Whitney Canada's argument for
adopting a prohibition on recovery of economic loss in
products liability actions. The Court retained its rule that a
strict products liability recovery was available in cases involv-
ing property damage to the product itself in "potentially
dangerous" situations.45
C. GOVERNMENT CONTRACrOR DEFENSE
In Bailey v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp.,457 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed the applicability of the govern-
ment contractor defense to so-called manufacturing defect
claims. Plaintiffs claims in Bailey arose from the crash of a
McDonnell-Douglas F-4J Phantom in which the trim system
allegedly locked in the nose-down position due to a failure
of a component in the aircraft trim system. Plaintiff con-
tended that the failure of the component was due to a
"manufacturing defect" and that the tendency of the trim
system to "lock" in the nose-down position was a "design
defect."458
McDonnell-Douglas filed a motion for summary judg-
ment on all claims, which was granted by the district court.
On prior appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
summary judgment was affirmed as to the design defect
claim, but vacated and remanded for further consideration
455 Pratt & Whitney Canada, 852 P.2d at 1180.
- The court also noted that adopting Pratt & Whitney Canada's argument that
economic loss was not recoverable in strict products liability actions for damage to
the product itself would also have required the court to consider whether damage to
the air frame, as well as the allegedly defective engine, was damage to the product
itself. Id. at 1175 n.3.
457 989 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1993).
4- Id. at 796.
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of the manufacturing defect claim.459 On remand, the dis-
trict court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the govern-
ment contractor defense did not apply to manufacturing
defects, and held that a manufacturing defect claim was
simply another way of stating that the airplane did not con-
form to the government's design specifications.460
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this reason-
ing, stating that it was possible for manufacturing defects to
exist with respect to materials of manufacture which were
not included in the government specifications. 46' Further,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected any reliance
upon the labels "design defect" or "manufacturing defect"
in an extensive review of prior government contractor de-
fense cases.462 Instead, the court stated that the proper
analysis was the three-pronged approach used in Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp.: "(1) the United States approved
reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment con-
formed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned
the United States about the dangers in the use of the equip-
ment that were known to the supplier but not to the United
States." 46
3
The court stated that a faithful adherence to the Boyle
analysis would demonstrate that certain manufacturing de-
fects were subject to the government contractor defense,
particularly where there was a defect in the government
specifications for materials or methods of manufacture.4 64
Under these circumstances, the government contractor
would be liable only for a non-conformity with the govern-
ment specifications. On the other hand, in cases involving
defects in materials or methods of manufacture which did
not involve reasonably precise government specifications as
4-9 Bailey v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 947 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1991)
(unpublished).
460 Bailey, 989 F.2d at 798.
461 Id. at 799.
462 Id. at 801.
46- Id. at 798 (emphasis added) (quoting Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487
U.S. 500, 512 (1988)).
46 Id. at 801.
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to the materials and methods of manufacture, the govern-
ment contractor defense would not apply. Both of these
results are simply the application of the first and second
prongs of the Boyle analysis, and neither of these results de-
pends on any inquiry other than into the government speci-
fications or any non-conformity. The analysis is totally
independent of any consideration or labeling of the specifi-
cations as "design" or "manufacturing." The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals expressly rejected further use of that ter-
minology in government contractor cases.465
Finally, the court held that, at the time McDonnell-Doug-
las filed its motion for summary judgment, an affidavit was
in the record which created an issue of fact as to the exist-
ence of a metallurgical defect in the material used in the
suspect component. 466 The court stated that the govern-
ment contractor defense is an affirmative defense and that
McDonnell-Douglas would have the burden of proof on
that defense at trial.4 67 As such, it also had the burden of
coming forward "with evidence [on summary judgment]
which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence
went uncontroverted at trial. 468 It is "only after the moving
party meets this burden [that] . .. the non-moving party
[must] produce its 'significant probative evidence"' to de-
feat the motion for summary judgment.469 In this case, Mc-
Donnell-Douglas did not present evidence that the three
Boyle conditions had been satisfied with regard to the metal-
lurgical defect and was not entitled to summary judg-
ment.470 Accordingly, the case was reversed and remanded
to the district court.
The issue of a government contractor's liability for
wrongful death of combat personnel due to alleged manu-
facturing defects in military armament is the subject of the
-' Bailey, 989 F.2d at 801.
- Id. at 802.
467 Id.
468 Id.
4- Bailey, 989 F.2d at 801.
470 Id.
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decision in Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co.471 In Bentzlin, the
plaintiffs' decedents were all United States Marines killed
during combat operations as a part of Operation Desert
Storm. As stated by plaintiffs:
[T] he Marines were riding in a light armored vehicle toward
enemy Iraqi land forces when a Maverick AGM-65D missile,
fired from a U.S. Air Force A-10 aircraft, struck the vehicle
and killed the Marines. Plaintiffs claim that a manufactur-
ing defect caused the missile to deviate from its intended
target and strike the Marines.472
Prior to the filing of the motions to dismiss, the United
States intervened in order to support the plaintiffs' motion.
All defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the fol-
lowing grounds: "(1) the Political Question Doctrine ren-
ders the case nonjusticiable; (2) the State's Secrets privilege
bars adjudication of the case; and (3) common law
preempts state law tort actions against government contrac-
tors that arise out of combat."473 After an extensive analysis,
the district court granted the motions to dismiss on all
three of the foregoing grounds.
Significantly, the court fully analyzed the "government
contractor defense" as it related to the alleged manufactur-
ing defects in this case.474 The court noted that Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp.475 had expressly limited the "gov-
ernment contractor defense" to design defects. 476 Never-
theless, the district court applied the Boyle test to determine
whether the case involved "uniquely federal interests" and
whether a "significant 'conflict' exists between an identifi-
able 'federal policy or interest and the operation of state
law.' "477
The District Court limited its decision to cases involving
technically sophisticated single purpose, single-use military
47, 833 F. Supp. 1486 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
472 Id. at 1487.
473 Id.
474 Id. at 1488.
475 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
476 Bentzlin, 833 F. Supp. at 1489.
477 Id. at 1489.
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products intended to be used only in combat and without
any commercial counterpart.47 8 The court noted that such
products by their nature are designed to be destroyed as a
result of their use and cannot be field tested.479 Also, in a
determination as to whether a manufacturing defect ex-
isted, even if parts of the product are available (as was the
case here), the disclosure of secret design data would be
required in order to allow a trier of fact to determine the
existence of a manufacturing defect.480 The court noted
that such impediments probably would not be presented in
the case of injuries due to the use of a truck, or, possibly,
even a military helicopter.481 Nevertheless, with regard to
claims involving the manufacturing of weaponry subject to
strict governmental security, tort suits against manufactur-
ers would conflict with federal interests: (1) in precluding
disclosure of the design and the capabilities of such weap-
onry; (2) in governing the manufacturing process, particu-
larly during wartime; and (3) in determining the duty of
care in combat.482 This latter ground was based upon the
express exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity in
the Federal Tort Claims Act483 for "combatant activities."
The court determined that "the combatant activities excep-
tion [also] generates a federal common law defense which
immunizes manufacturers such as Hughes from state tort
suits arising from war."484
In applying the doctrine of combat preemption, the
court analyzed the relationship between the federal interest
in the conduct of war and the purposes of tort law. The
court stated that the purposes of tort law are deterrence,
punishment, and providing compensation to innocent vic-
478 Id. at 1490.
479 Id.
480 Id.
481 Bentzlin, 833 F. Supp. at 1490.
482 Id. at 1491-92. The district court relied upon the recent decision in Koohi v.
United States, 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2928 (1993) (claims
brought by descendants' representatives arising from the shooting of Iranian Civil
aircraft by U.S.S. Vincennes in July 1988 "tanker war").
483 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(h), 2680(j) (1988).
4- Bentzlin, 833 F. Supp. at 1492.
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tims. 48 5 In a detailed analysis, the court concluded that the
federal interest was in obtaining sophisticated military
equipment in as timely a fashion as possible, and not neces-
sarily requiring its contractors to "exercise great caution at
a time when bold and imaginative measures might be nec-
essary to overcome enemy forces."486 Similarly, neither the
government nor its contractors should be punished solely
as a result of design or manufacturing defects occurring
during wartime. 487 The court noted that the government
has remedies available to it, such as the threat of terminat-
ing business relationships or bringing criminal suit against
contractors whose misconduct during wartime is egre-
gious. 488 Finally, the court noted that the victims of war
should not be compensated differently from one another,
particularly where a deliberate choice has been made by
the government to tolerate casualties in furtherance of na-
tional interests and for some higher purpose.48 9
As a practical matter, the court noted the difficulty in
preserving evidence of such cases involving battlefield casu-
alties, as well as the effect on morale of possibly requiring
soldiers to testify for and against each other's interests and
the importance of "ensuring the secrecy of wartime military
decision-making due to the causation issues that arise from
such suits."
490
The court also considered the State Secrets privilege.
The court stated that "[t] he State Secrets privilege is a com-
mon law evidentiary rule that allows the Government to
withhold from discovery military secrets whose disclosure
would be harmful to national security."49 ' The court indi-
cated that the State Secret privilege also required dismissal
in this case. The court concluded that the Maverick missile
485 Id. at 1493.
486 Id. (citing Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1334-35).
487 Id.
488 Id.
48 Bentzlin, 833 F. Supp. at 1494-95.
4- Id. at 1495.
491 Id. (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953), and Ellsberg v.
Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984)).
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continues to be an important weapon and any discovery
into its capabilities could hamper future use.4 92 The State
Secret privilege would preclude plaintiffs from proving a
manufacturing defect and also would prejudice Hughes'
ability to defend against the plaintiffs' case.498
Finally, the court held that the Political Question Doc-
trine also rendered the plaintiffs' suit nonjusticiable.494
The court determined that the trier of fact could not reach
the issue of a manufacturing defect without eliminating
other variables which necessarily involved political ques-
tions.495 The orders to the A-10 pilots and ground crew
clearly would be involved in determining whether the prod-
uct was used for the purpose intended.496 These orders in-
volved the implementation of executive branch policy
decisions clearly beyond the competence of the court to
review.497
The court distinguished the Ninth Circuit's refusal to dis-
miss the plaintiffs' claims in Koohi, on the basis that Koohi
involved "claims on behalf of civilians; [and] tort suits
brought by civilian plaintiffs are clearly within the judicial
system's expertise. 498  In contrast, plaintiffs' suit was
brought on behalf of soldiers, serving within the Executive
Branch. Accordingly, the court dismissed plaintiffs'
claims.499
492 Id. at 1496-97.
493 Id. Even if there was no claim of State Secret privilege by the United States,
the court said that even under the government contractor defense, if the United
States requested that the suit be dismissed as contrary to the federal interests, then
the suit must be dismissed. The federal interest which might lead to such a claim by
the United States might involve the effect of tort litigation on the ability to procure
weaponry and military equipment. Id.
194 Bentzlin, 833 F. Supp. at 1497.
495 Id.
4- Id. The court in reviewing the government contractor defense even went so far
as to say that the concept of foreseeability was meaningless in combat situations, as
weaponry and equipment often had to be used in a fashion which would never have
been foreseen or contemplated by the designer. Id. at 1493.
497 Id. at 1497-98.
498 Bentzlin, 833 F. Supp. at 1497. The Koohi claims were dismissed, however, on
the basis of "combat preemption." 976 F.2d 1328.
- Id. at 1498.
1994]
94 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [60
The application of the government contractor defense
and the definition of "reasonably precise specifications" to
which the manufacturer must prove conformity were the is-
sues presented to the court in Landgraf v. McDonnell Douglas
Helicopter Co.5°0 Specifically, the helicopter accident in-
volved in this case occurred when the helicopter lost power,
and during a sharp turn and descent following the loss of
power, one of the main rotors struck the tail boom and sev-
ered it. Military Specifications MIL-S 8698 (Mil Spec) was
incorporated by reference into the detailed specifications
for the OH-6A helicopter, and included the following
statement:
During operation in all flight regimes, the clearance be-
tween main rotor blades and other parts of the helicopter
shall not be less than nine inches, and preferably 12 inches
.... The design of the rotor shall be such as to preclude
the possibility of the blades striking each other or any part
of the helicopter .... I"
McDonnell Douglas filed a motion for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that the detailed specifications for the
OH-6A were controlling and that the Army's approval of
the final design of the OH-6A, notwithstanding the incor-
porated military specification, demonstrated conformity to
a reasonably precise specification.
Plaintiff argued that the Mil Spec was a part of the design
specification and that there was no deviation from the Mil
Spec set out in the detailed specifications, even though
there were numerous deviations expressly approved from
other similar specifications. 50 2
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argu-
ment that there were "higher tier/lower tier specifications,"
or that mere acceptance of the overall design by the mili-
tary demonstrated conformity with reasonably precise de-
sign specifications. 03 Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit Court
993 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1993).
Io ld. at 561.
W2 Id. at 563.
-3' Id. at 564.
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of Appeals reviewed the Army's 20-year involvement in the
design, testing, production, and post-production testing of
the helicopter, and determined the Army was aware that,
under certain extreme circumstances which exceeded "nor-
mal pilot technique," the rotor could strike, and had struck
the tail boom of the OH-6A aircraft.50 4 Indeed, the Army
had requested tests in 1969 to investigate possible design
changes which would reduce the probability of such tail
boom strikes. Hughes, McDonnell Douglas's predecessor,
conducted such tests, and had reported to the Army that
the clearance might be as little as three inches under cer-
tain circumstances, and had recommended further tests.
The Army never responded to the recommendation and
continued to accept the OH-6A helicopters.
The failure of the Army to request further tests indicated
to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that the government
had performed a discretionary function in deciding to ac-
cept the results of the tests in 1969.505 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals summarized its holding as follows:
Boyle makes clear that the government contractor defense
is intended to protect military contractors from state tort lia-
bility when they produce equipment conforming to design
specifications adopted by government agencies in the exer-
cise of their discretion. This is such a case. We agree with
the interpretations of Boye reached by the Harduve °6 and
Kleeman507 courts as well.
50 8
- Id. at 563-64.
- Landgraf 993 F.2d at 564.
-0 Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding
that government contractor defense applies if government either approves specifica-
tions or has actually participated in discretionary design decisions in designing the
product).
-7 Kleeman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding
that "general qualitative specifications" such as requirement that landing gear must
meet all normal landing loads without causing uncontrolled motion of plane, may
only represent hopes for intended and wanted results, but product still meets rea-
sonably precise design specifications if it satisfies an "intended configuration," even
if does not achieve intended or wanted results).
508 Landgraf 993 F.2d at 564.
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A dissenting opinion acknowledged the position taken by
the majority, but remained unsatisfied as to what the "rea-
sonably precise specifications" were in this case. 50 9 The dis-
sent argued that the failure to request further tests may
have indicated that the Army did not fully understand the
significance, or the results, of the tests underlying Hughes'
recommendation for further investigation.5 10 Further, a
specific warning in the 1969 pilot's operator's manual de-
scribed abrupt and erratic control movements that should
"be avoided to prevent a rotor blade strike on the tail
boom. '51 1 The dissent stated that, even if the operator's
manual was the ultimate expression of the reasonably pre-
cise specifications, it was not clear that the accident, had in
fact, been caused by the types of control movements de-
scribed in the pilot's operating manual, or even those
which were the subject of the 1969 tests. 51 2 The dissent be-
lieved that the Mil Spec standards were not superseded, ex-
cept with respect to those specific hazards, and that a
deviation from the Mil Spec under circumstances other
than those known to the Army either through the 1969 tests
or the pilot's operating handbook might constitute a basis
for liability on the part of the government contractor.513
In Lewis v. Babcock Industries51 4 the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals addressed the applicability of the "government
Id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
510 Id. at 567.
511 Id.
512 Id.
513 Landgraf 993 F.2d at 567. The dissent summarized as follows:
What were the "ultimate" reasonably precise specifications as they re-
late to the main rotor blade-tail boom clearance in this case? Based on
one's view of the record evidence, the answer to this question could lie
anywhere between no clearance at all and nine inches, with three in-
ches being a reasonable possibility. And one's answer essentially deter-
mines the availability of the government contractor defense. Since the
[record], viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party [cita-
tions omitted], show[s] there to be a genuine issue of fact on an issue
critical to whether McDonnell Douglas is entitled to the government
contractor defense in this case, I would reverse the grant of summary
judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings.
Id. at 568.
514 985 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 3041 (1993).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
contractor defense" in a case in where the Air Force was
aware of the alleged defective condition of the part which
failed in the accident, but chose to continue ordering and
using the part.515 The Lewis case involved the crash of an
Air Force F-111Fjet fighter over England. The F-111F in-
corporates a self-contained crew module ejection system.
After the module separates from the aircraft, a parachute
system deploys and large air bags on the bottom of the
module inflate and cushion the landing. In this case, one
of the cables which connect the parachute to the module
severed, causing the module to land at an incorrect angle
without adequate cushioning. The plaintiff sustained back
injuries as a result of the impact.
Prior to the accident involved in this case, the Air Force
had determined that the cables which connected the mod-
ule to the parachute were subject to corrosion as a result of
maintenance personnel inadvertently cutting the coating
on the cables during the installation of a redesigned wind-
shield for the F-111F. As a result of this information, the
Air Force replaced the forward repositioning cables on all
F-111Fs and incorporated a revision to the maintenance
manual warning personnel to be careful not to cut the
cable's coating during maintenance operations. Following
the crash in this case, the Air Force instituted additional
tests and performed a second redesign of the windshield to
avoid cutting the cable's coating.
Plaintiff argued that the government contractor defense
should be subject to certain prerequisites including: (1) a
significant conflict between the requirements under the
federal contract and state tort law; and (2) the govern-
ment's exercise of its discretion in accepting a safety risk.
The Second Circuit rejected these prerequisites, holding
that the standard Boyle three-part test satisfied the need to
determine the existence of federal requirements and fed-
eral approval of the design. 16 The three-part test was
stated as follows:
515 Id. at 84.
516 Lewis, 985 F.2d at 85.
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Under this defense, conflicting state law is displaced "when
(1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifica-
tions; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications;
and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the
dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the
supplier but not to the United States."
5 17
The Second Circuit emphasized that these requirements
preclude the application of the government contractor de-
fense when the government does not establish detailed
specifications, or when the government merely rubber
stamps the design.518 In this case, the court affirmed the
district court's finding that approval of reasonably precise
specifications could be established by the military's partici-
pation in the design and testing of the module, including
the cables, as well as by the continued use of the cable by
the military "after it found out that it was susceptible to cor-
rosion when cut."519 "In effect, the district court held that
approval may be established by the Government's contin-
ued use of a product after it learns of the defect."521
The plaintiff urged that the Boyle test be limited to de-
fects which are discovered during the initial design of the
product. The court rejected this limitation, and deter-
mined that the order and acceptance of the alleged defec-
tive part after the defect was fully known to the government
constituted sufficient acceptance and approval of the
specification.521
Finally, the Second Circuit rejected the plaintiff's argu-
ment that the government was misled by the defendants to
believe that the cause of the problem was the design of the
windshield which was cutting the cables, rather than the
easy penetrability of the coating.5 22 The court noted the
government's own pre-accident reports indicated the wind-
517 Id. at 85-86 (quoting Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512
(1988)).
518 Id. at 87.
519 Id. at 86.
520 Id.
521 Lewis, 985 F.2d at 89.
522 Id. at 90.
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shield clips were the primary cause of damage, thereby rec-
ognizing that there may be other causes of the coating
being cut. 23 Under these circumstances, regardless of the
cause of the coating being cut, the government was aware
of the propensity of the cable for corrosion when cut and
chose to reorder the cable despite this knowledge. There-
fore, the contractor supplying the cable was entitled to the
government contractor defense. 24
D. BANKRUPTCY
The Piper Aircraft Corporation bankruptcy has resulted
in two decisions relating to the effect of Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy on post-petition products liability actions. Specifi-
cally, the issue presented to the court in Piper Aircraft Corp.
v. Calabro5 25 involved whether the filing of the Piper Air-
craft Corporation Chapter 11 bankruptcy would affect
product liability actions against the debtor for accidents
which occurred after the date of filing, but before the date
of confirmation of any bankruptcy plan of reorganization.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
Florida held that such post-petition, but pre-confirmation
accidents were "claims" under Section 101 (5) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, and that the prosecution of such state law
claims against the debtor post-petition was subject to the
automatic stay in bankruptcy.5 26
As will be discussed below, the Court previously had held
that any class of future products liability claimants could
not be identified with sufficient specificity to meet the defi-
nition of "claims" under section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy
Court. Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Court in Calabro deter-
mined that Calabro's claim arising from a post-petition,
pre-confirmation accident either arose or would be deemed
to have arisen pre-petition.5 27 Alternatively, the court ruled
52S Id.
524 Id.
525 In re Piper Aircraft Corp. 169 B.R. 766 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994).
526 Id. at 772-773.
527 Id. at 775-776.
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that the definition of claim under section 101 (5) did not
require that the claim be determined based on the filing
date, but included pre-confirmation events similar to those
involved in other claims against the debtor which would be
treated under the plan. 52
The most significant decision arising from the Piper Air-
craft Corporation bankruptcy is the decision that future
products liability tort actions are not "claims" under section
101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.129 The Bankruptcy Court
had approved the appointment of a special class of future
product liability tort claimants. Dean Epstein argued that
the class of future claimants held "claims" to be adminis-
tered under any Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.530 The
debtor and the unsecured creditors' committee objected to
including such claims in the Piper Aircraft Corporation
bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy court affirmed the
objection.
In an extensive opinion by Judge Mark, the court held
that the class of future accident claimants was too indefinite
to be considered a class of claimants under section 101 (5)
of the Bankruptcy Code.531  The court distinguished the
treatment of future products liability claims in other Chap-
ter 11 proceedings involving manufacturers on the grounds
that in those cases the claimants were persons who had
come into pre-petition contact with the product and there-
fore were identifiable. 32 In the case of an aircraft manufac-
turer, however, the group of persons who might come into
contact with the aircraft at a later date and who might be
injured in an aircraft accident basically included the entire
528 Id. at 780.
5- In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.), affd sub nom., Ep-
stein v. Official Comm. of Unsec. Creditors of the Estate of Piper Aircraft Corp., 168
B.R. 434 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
53o At the time, the court was considering a possible sale of the assets of Piper
Aircraft Corporation and the need to establish a class for distribution for future
product liability claimants from the proceeds of any sale of the assets of Piper Air-
craft Corporation. The claim was in the approximate amount of $100,000,000. Id.
at 621-22.
531 In re Piper, 162 B.R. at 622-629.
532 Id.
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world.533 As such, there was no identifiable class to be con-
sidered as "claimants" under section 101 (5) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 4  The bankruptcy court's decision was
appealed to the U.S. District Court, which affirmed the de-
cision on the same basis.535
E. EVIDENCE
The D.C. Circuit decision in Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron,
Inc.136 involved several evidentiary and trial practice issues
of importance. First, the case involved the admission of evi-
dence concerning other alleged similar incidents.5 37 The
case also involved the application of the doctrine of negli-
gence per se and the sudden emergency doctrine. 38 Finally,
the case involved certain evidentiary issues pertaining to
proof of future lost earnings and related expert testimony
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
The Joy case resulted from a helicopter accident in the
District of Columbia in which a 1987 Bell helicopter suf-
fered a power failure and crashed into the Potomac River.
At the time of the accident, the helicopter was operating
within the restricted height/velocity (H/V) zone and was
unable to perform a successful autorotation. The pilot of
the helicopter contended that it was necessary to transition
the restricted area of the H/V zone in order to make a but-
533 Id.
534 Id.
5-5 Both the bankruptcy court and the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida stated that the denial of a bankruptcy remedy to future claimants did
not necessarily bar any recovery by such future claimants. As stated by Bankruptcy
Judge Mark:
In determining that the Future Claimants do not hold claims under
the Bankruptcy Code, the Court is not determining whether any or all
of the future victims may have a non-bankruptcy future remedy. The
nature of the reorganization plan eventually confirmed in the case
may affect the result as will, in the event of a sale of Piper's assets,
application of successor liability laws which may vary among the states.
The ruling simply means that the future claims are not bankruptcy
"claims" that will be administered in this case.
In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. at 629; see also 168 B.R. at 440 n.13.
5- 999 F.2d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
537 Id. at 554.
58 Id. at 557.
1994]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ton-hook turn required by the air traffic controllers near
Washington National Airport. Additionally, the pilot's alti-
tude was limited to less than 200 feet along a specified heli-
copter route to avoid commercial traffic at Washington
National Airport.
The cause of the engine failure was a separation of the
spur adaptor gear shaft, which is one of the components
which connects the turbine section of the engine to the
compressor section. The plaintiff contended that the com-
ponent failed because it had been improperly carburized.
The defendant contended that the part had been subjected
to improper operating forces because it had been mis-
aligned during an overhaul by a third party, and because
foreign material in the engine's oil system blocked the flow
of oil to the forward spline of the spur adaptor gear shaft.
The first evidentiary issue considered by the court was the
admissibility of evidence of other spur adaptor gear fail-
ures.5 3 9 The plaintiff contended that these reports were not
being placed into evidence to prove the cause of the acci-
dent, but merely to rebut the defense that the spur adaptor
gear could not have been defective because it was manufac-
tured according to specifications. 4 ° According to plaintiffs,
this evidence showed failures of the spur adaptor gear
within the recommended operating life of the compo-
nent.5 141 The district court concluded that the evidence was
relevant to the defense that the part could not fail because
it was manufactured according to specifications.542 More-
over, the court refused to reverse the district court's discre-
tionary ruling not to exclude the evidence under Federal
Rules of Evidence 403.
The court distinguished Brooks v. Chrysler Corp.544 on the
grounds that there the "minimally probative" evidence had
been excluded and the trial court's discretion had not been
59 Id. at 554.
5- Id. at 555.
54, Joy, 999 F.2d at 555.
542 Id.
543 Id.
544 786 F.2d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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reversed.545 In Joy, however, the trial court had exercised its
discretion to allow the reports into evidence.546 Finally, the
court noted that the evidence in Brooks involved significant
amounts of extraneous and highly inflammatory material,
while the reports involved in this case "played only a minor
role during the two week trial. 5 47
Allison, the main manufacturer of the helicopter's en-
gine, argued that the jury instructions had been improper
in that they only focused on whether the spur adaptor gear
was in a substantially changed condition. 54 Allison con-
tended that the issue should have been whether either the
engine or the helicopter was in a substantially changed con-
dition, based upon improper overhaul and failure to prop-
erly service the engine lubrication system. 549 The court
rejected Allison's argument on the grounds that the charge
permitted the jury to determine that the spur adaptor had
been "substantially changed as a result of the misalignment
[of the helicopter drive mechanism] or poor lubrication [of
the engine] .550
Allison also had filed claims for contribution against the
pilot and against the District of Columbia.551 The claims
against the pilot were based upon the failure to maintain a
proper height and velocity. Allison contended that the jury
should have been instructed on negligence per se based
upon violations of Federal Aviation Regulation § 91.79 552
and Federal Aviation Regulation § 91.13(a). 553  The court
held that these regulations were simply another way of say-
545 Joy, 999 F.2d at 555-56.
546 Id.
547 Id. at 556.
548 Id.
549 Id. at 557.
55 joy, 999 F.2d at 557.
551 Id.
-52 14 C.F.R. § 91.119 (1994) (maintaining altitude from which an emergency
landing can be made in event of power loss).
5-3 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (1994) ("no person may operate an aircraft in a careless
or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another").
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ing that a pilot must exercise due care, and were not the
basis for an instruction on negligence per se.554
Allison also contended that the court erred in instructing
the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine if the negli-
gence of the pilot had partially caused the emergency.55
The court agreed that the sudden emergency doctrine
seemed to be inappropriate, but stated that the instruction
specifically stated the sudden emergency must be one "not
of [the pilot's] own making. '5 56 The instruction, therefore,
would have been irrelevant if the jury accepted Allison's
contention as to the cause of the crash.557
Another of the defendant's arguments was that there was
insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the
pilot was not negligent since he admitted flying the helicop-
ter within the restricted area of the H/V diagram. 558 The
pilot testified that during the course of a button-hook ma-
neuver, the helicopter necessarily reduced its speed below
that required by the H/V diagram.55 9 The pilot also testi-
fied that it was not possible to fly at a higher altitude due to
the FAA restrictions in the helicopter corridor near Wash-
ington National Airport.560
Allison contended that the witness statements indicated
the helicopter was merely hovering and that such a hover
was clearly negligent.561 The D.C. Circuit noted, however,
that the pilot's own testimony, as well as that of one of the
ground witnesses, appeared to support the conclusion that
the pilot was, in fact, engaged in a button-hook turn at the
time of the power failure.562 The D.C. Circuit seemed to be
particularly impressed by the fact that FAA restrictions gov-
erning the flight precluded a higher altitude.56 Appar-
551 Joy, 999 F.2d at 558.
555 Id. at 559.
556 Id.
557 Id.
558 Id. at 560.
159 Joy, 999 F.2d at 560.
560 Id.
561 Id.
562 Id. at 561.
565 Id.
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ently, the court also believed there was sufficient evidence
that the FAA procedures required the turn.564 Accordingly,
the court supported the jury's finding. 65
Allison also filed a contribution claim against the District
of Columbia for negligence in the attempt to rescue the
passengers from the Potomac River.566 The D.C. Circuit
certified that question to the District's court of appeals. 67
Finally, the D.C. Circuit agreed with the defendant that
the damage awards to the widow of Robert Joy were im-
proper and excessive.568 The court held that she was not
entitled to recover lost consortium in addition to her
wrongful death claim. 69 Moreover, the court held that ex-
pert testimony from an economist as to projected future
earnings for Mr. Joy were merely guesswork, speculation
and conjecture.5 7 0 The court held that the Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, which permitted expert testimony had been
relaxed, but not to the extent that mere speculation was
permitted in the form of opinion. 1 Moreover, the D.C.
Circuit rejected "the temptation to answer objections to re-
ceipt of expert testimony with the shorthand remark that
the jury will give it 'the weight it deserves'."572 Instead, the
court stated its intention to "turn a 'sharp eye' to those in-
stances, hopefully few, where ' . . the decision to receive
expert testimony was simply tossed off to the jury under a
'let it all in' philosophy.51
73
The court concluded by referring to the recent U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 74 in which the Supreme Court stated
that Rule 702 "clearly contemplates some degree of regula-
5' Joy, 999 F.2d at 561.
565 Id.
- Id.
57 Id. at 563.
-' Id. at 564.
56 joy, 999 F.2d at 564.
570 999 F.2d at 568.
57 Id. at 568-69.
572 Id. at 569.
573 Id.
574 _ U.S. _, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
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tion of the subjects and theories about which an expert can
testify." '575 The D.C. Circuit paraphrased the Supreme
Court as follows:
... Rule 702 permits an expert to testify only when 'scien-
tific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact,' id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702) (some emphasis
deleted), and that "the word 'knowledge' connotes more
than subjective belief or unsupported speculation." As dis-
cussed above, [the economist's] testimony concerning Mr.
Joy's future career path fails to meet this standard.576
V. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT (FTCA)
A. DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
The discretionary function exemption to the Federal
Tort Claims Act 577 was addressed in Mellott v. United States.5 78
That case resulted from an accident in which an agricul-
tural aircraft collided with guy wires to a power pole main-
tained by the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA),
an agency of the United States. The United States moved
to dismiss the claim based upon the discretionary function
exception. The United States argued that the WAPA had
adopted the guidelines of the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion in deciding how to mark power lines like those in-
volved in this case. The WAPA admitted that there were
instances in which it had marked lines on occasions where
the FAA did not require such marking, but that it made
those decisions grounded on the "technical, economic, social,
environmental and political factors which are present in
each situation."579 As such, these additional decisions were
subject to the discretionary function exemption, which pre-
cludes liability for decisions "grounded in social, economic
and political policy. 5 8 0
575 Id. at 2795.
576 Joy, 999 F.2d at 570.
-77 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988).
578 808 F. Supp. 746 (D. Mont. 1992).
579 Id. at 748 (emphasis added).
5- Id. at 749.
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The United States District Court for Montana agreed.
The Court distinguished the Supreme Court decision in In-
dian Towing Co. v. United States,5 81 and the "Good Samari-
tan" doctrine under Sections 323 - 324A of the Second
Restatement of Torts. It distinguished Indian Towing on the
grounds that it did not involve a discretionary function ex-
emption claim. 2 The court also rejected the Good Samar-
itan doctrine because discretionary decisions, even if
negligently carried out, are excluded from the waiver of lia-
bility under the Federal Tort Claims Act.585
The plaintiff also argued that, because the government
had made a decision to mark the guy lines for snowmobiles,
it had a duty to exercise reasonable care in marking the guy
lines for other hazards as well, including hazards to avia-
tion.5 84 The Court held that the two part test in Berkovitz v.
United States, 58 was met in this case since the decision to
mark the wires for ground traffic also fell within the discre-
tionary function exemption. 8 6 It fell within the exemption
because the decision to mark the guy wires for
snowmobilers was based upon concerns raised by landown-
ers in the area, cost effectiveness, and the beneficial and
adverse environmental effects of marking the wires. 87
Thus, the steps taken to mark the wires in certain instances
to protect snowmobilers could not provide the basis for a
"Good Samaritan" undertaking which might extend to avia-
tors as well.5 8
8
-1 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
582 Mellott, 808 F. Supp. at 749.
58 Id.
- Id.
486 U.S. 531 (1988). The Supreme Court established the following test for
application of the discretionary function exemption:
(1) Does the challenged conduct involve an element of choice for the
acting employee; and
(2) if the challenged conduct does involve a degree of choice whether
that choice involves legislative or other administrative decisions
"grounded in social, economic or political policy."
Id.
N Mellot, 808 F. Supp. at 750.
587 Id. at 749.
-, Id.
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This decision substantially undermines the "Good Samar-
itan" doctrine as a basis for liability claims against the fed-
eral government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. If the
initial undertaking by the government involves discretion-
ary factors such as social, economic and political policy,
then that undertaking cannot be broadly construed to pro-
vide the basis for liability. Instead, the Court applied the
Berkovitz test narrowly to limit the scope of government lia-
bility to those cases in which a federal statute, regulation or
policy prescribes a course of action for the employee to fol-
low and the employee fails to follow that function. If there
is any degree of choice, that degree of choice must not in-
volve "social, economic and political policy."
An issue of federal governmental immunity was
presented in TPI International Airways v. FAA.589 In that
case, TPI had instituted bankruptcy proceedings in the U.
S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia.
The Federal Aviation Administration filed a claim in the
bankruptcy court for $810,000 in civil penalties. TPI Inter-
national Airways counterclaimed for $20,000,000 claiming
that the FAA inspectors had intentionally misrepresented
facts relating to certain alleged operating violations, caus-
ing TPI's officers to surrender TPI's operating specifica-
tions. The debtor alleged that it later learned that the FAA
representations were incorrect and that the operating speci-
fications should not have been surrendered.
The court focused on 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)-(c), which is a
limited waiver of immunity in the Bankruptcy Code.5 90 The
FAA responded by stating that it could not be sued, only
the United States could be sued, and then only under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.591 The bankruptcy court rejected
the argument that the Federal Tort Claims Act provided the
exclusive waiver of sovereign immunity and concluded that
§ 106(a) was an unlimited and independent waiver of sover-
eign immunity in cases which the government has submit-
589 141 B.R. 512 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1992).
5- Id. at 516.
- 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(h) and 2671-80 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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ted the claim, and in which the claim against the
government is a compulsory counterclaim. 92 Having con-
cluded that the Federal Tort Claims Act was not the sole
basis for the waiver of sovereign immunity, however, the
court then faced the issue of whether a discretionary func-
tion exemption applied to such claims against the federal
government.
The bankruptcy court analyzed the discretionary func-
tion issues by reference to Federal Tort Claims Act cases,
including United States v. Varig Airlines,593 Heller v. United
States, 594 and United States Fire & Insurance Co. v. United
States.595 The court held that the discretionary function de-
fense was "implicitly extended to a section 106 tort action,"
basing it's holding upon the language of the seminal Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act decision in Dalehite v. United States.59
6
The Dalehite decision stated that even if Congress had not
included a discretionary function exception to the Federal
Tort Claims Act, the doctrine of separation of powers would
require such an exception.59 7 The bankruptcy court stated
that:
it is appropriate for the court to refuse to entertain a tort
action which arises out [of] the exercise of discretionary reg-
ulatory authority .... Thus, although there has been waiver
of immunity pursuant to Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, separate and independent from the Federal Tort
Claims Act, nonetheless TPI's claims cannot be entertained
due to the discretionary function exception which is implic-
itly applicable to the FAA's conduct.59
8
Thus, as in other discretionary function cases, the court
held that the discretionary function exemption applied,
59-2 TPI Int'l Airways, 141 B.R. at 517-18.
59- 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
- 803 F.2d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1986).
595 806 F.2d 1529, 1534-36 (11th Cir. 1986).
5- 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
597 Id. at 34.
598 TPI Int'l Airways, 141 B.R. at 521.
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even though the conduct of the regulatory agency may have
been negligent or an abuse of discretion.599
B. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
The Ninth Circuit, in Steering Comm. v. United States, et
aL., 600 affirmed the district court finding that liability for the
Cerritos air disaster should be apportioned 50 per cent
each to the Estate of William F. Kramer, the pilot of the
light aircraft, and to the United States.60 1 The district court
had based its findings of fact regarding the United States
upon the result of an advisory jury determination that allo-
cated fault and negligence in that manner. The jury also
advised that Aeromexico was not negligent and that the
Aeromexico pilots had complied with 14 C.F.R. § 91.67(a)
(1986), which requires pilots to be vigilant in seeing and
avoiding other aircraft.6 °2
The United States appealed, in part, on the ground that
the district court had not properly instructed the jury on
the presumption of negligence arising out of a violation of
14 C.F.R. § 91.67(a). The current version of that section
provides as follows:
When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an
operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or vis-
ual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person
operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft.60 3
Under California law, violation of a safety statute in-
tended to prevent injury or death to the class of persons
injured triggers a presumption of negligence. 6 4 All parties
agreed that any violation of the above noted regulation
would require application of this presumption. Neverthe-
less, the appellate court concluded that the threshold ques-
tion for the factual and legal determination that a violation
599 Id.
- 6 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 1993).
-1 Id. at 573-74.
602 Id. at 576.
-3 14 C.F.R. § 91.113(b) (1992).
CAL. Evi. CODE § 669(b)(1) (West 1980).
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occurred was a prerequisite to the application of the Cali-
fornia negligence presumption.6° 5 The court stated that
the legal issue was the meaning of the word "vigilance" as
used in the regulation. 06 The court listed the various pos-
sibilities as follows:
1. "Vigilance" requires a pilot to see and avoid other air-
craft unless to do so would be physically impossible;
2. "Vigilance" requires a pilot to see and avoid other air-
craft unless to do so would be more than unreasonable; and
3. "Vigilance" requires a pilot to see and avoid other air-
craft unless to do so would be unreasonable.
The distinction between the second and third definitions is
difficult to conceptualize and even more difficult to articu-
late. Nevertheless, whether there is an "elevated" standard
of care somewhere between reasonableness and physical im-
possibility is a concept debated in this case. The United
States argues for the "physically impossible" and, alterna-
tively, the "more than unreasonable" standards of care,
whereas Aeromexico asserts that vigilance to see and avoid
simply requires a pilot to exercise reasonable care.60 7
The court characterized the "physical impossibility" stan-
dard as approaching the imposition of strict liability on pi-
lots for mid-air collisions.6"8 The court, citing Transco
Leasing Corp. v. United States,60 9 rejected such an application
of the standard because the regulation requires a pilot to
"exercise vigilance," but it does not impose an absolute duty
to see and avoid.610
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the "elevated" standard of
care urged by the United States in cases involving mid-air
collisions.6 ' The court recognized cases cited by the gov-
ernment that held that pilots have a duty to attempt to com-
pensate for blind spots by head movement and aircraft
-5 Steering Comm., 6 F.3d at 576.
66 Id.
-7 Id. at 576-77.
6o8 Id. at 577.
-o 896 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1990).
610 Steering Comm., 6 F.3d at 578.
611 Id.
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movement, and that pilots had been held liable for mid-air
collisions, even though overtaken from behind and above
by other aircraft.612 Nevertheless, the court affirmed the
district court's conclusion that the standard of "vigilance,"
as required by the Federal Aviation Regulations, is "one of
vigilance to see and avoid those aircraft a pilot could rea-
sonably be expected to see." '613 Under this "reasonableness"
standard of care, vigilance requires that the pilot search
"thoroughly and diligently" for other aircraft.61 4 The court
stated that a "reasonably prudent pilot need not be super-
human in seeing and avoiding other aircraft, but he or she
must scan the sky with such frequency and respond with
such precision as is possible."61 5
In evaluating the district court's finding that the Aer-
omexico crew was vigilant, the court noted expert evidence
of the "acquisition time" in which the unwarned Aeromex-
ico crew, scanning the sky, was likely to see the approaching
plane. The "acquisition time" was expressed in a series of
probabilities as to the likelihood of seeing the approaching
aircraft. 616  Defendant Aeromexico's experts contended
that the likelihood or probability of acquisition did not in-
crease to more than fifty percent until approximately six to
twelve seconds before impact. Plaintiffs' experts testified
that it would have been impossible for the Aeromexico pi-
lots to have seen the approaching aircraft more than seven-
teen seconds before impact, and it was possible that the
Aeromexico pilots "'wouldn't see [the Piper] until perhaps
the last moments prior to collision'." 61 7 The expert for the
United States testified that the Aeromexico pilots'
probability of acquisition was seventy-five percent approxi-
mately 14.6 seconds before the impact.61 8
612 Id.
613 Id. at 579.
614 Id.
615 Steering Comm., 6 F.3d at 579.
616 Id. at 579-80 n.5.
617 Id. at 580 n.5.
618 Id. at 580.
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Based upon the conflicting expert testimony, the district
court's finding that the Aeromexico crew was "vigilant" and,
therefore, reasonably diligent was not clearly erroneous.6 19
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, however, that
there was other evidence suggesting "that the Aeromexico
crew, if reasonably vigilant, should have seen the Piper in
time to avoid the collision."620 Nevertheless, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that "the district court did not clearly err when it
found that 'there is no evidence that Aeromexico was in any
way negligent, or committed any act or omission, which
contributed to this accident.'
6 21
The plaintiff's burden of proof in establishing the negli-
gence of an air traffic controller in allegedly failing to pro-
vide accurate weather information and the extent of the
controller's possession of such information were the issues
presented in Sonnemaker v. United States.6 22 This case in-
volved an apparent in-flight breakup of a Cessna Centurion
on a flight from Illinois to Orlando, Florida. The accident
occurred north of Gainesville, Florida, as the pilot ap-
proached the back of a frontal system extending from west
of Gainesville, Florida, and north through the Carolinas.
The accident occurred at night. The pilot had received de-
tailed weather briefings before departing Illinois, during a
stop at Huntsville, Alabama, and, again, during the flight
from Huntsville to Orlando. The pilot had requested suc-
cessive altitude changes and had reduced his altitude from
9,000 to 5,000 feet prior to the accident. Shortly after being
switched to the Jacksonville, Florida air route traffic control
center, the pilot made the following inquiry:
Jacksonville Center, are you painting any adverse weather
ahead of niner eight alpha?
The air traffic controller ... replied:
619 Id.
62 Steering Comm., 6 F.3d at 580.
621 Id.
6 2 807 F. Supp. 483 (C.D. Ill. 1992).
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Yeah, there is some precip there, uh, just north of Gaines-
ville; don't look to bad, and let me get a route readout here
on you; just a second; okay, your route looks pretty good
right on down toward Orlando.623
Within five minutes of that report, the aircraft crashed
nearJasper, Florida, resulting in six fatalities. The evidence
at trial involved conflicting testimony as to the presence of
a thunderstorm in the area of the plane at the time of the
crash. The plaintiff relied primarily on ground witnesses,
whereas the government relied on meteorological experts
who indicated that there was a thunderstorm in the general
area, but not at the location of the crash. The government
buttressed its position with photographs of the Waycross,
Georgia, weather station radar taken at the time of the acci-
dent. The radar did not show precipitation at the site of
the crash. Plaintiffs meteorological expert admitted that,
based upon the radar data alone, he also would have been
unable to identify a thunderstorm in progress at the loca-
tion of the crash.
The district court summarized the issue of liability as fol-
lows: "The plaintiff must persuade the court that there
were patterns respectively depicting increasing levels of ra-
dar return intensity on the controller's radar screen and
that the controller failed to report these patterns to the pi-
lot upon the pilot's inquiry."624 The court concluded that
the plaintiff had not shown that it was more likely than not
that the above mentioned patterns were present on the ra-
dar scope at the time of the report from the controller.62 5
As an alternative theory of liability, the plaintiff argued
that the controller either should have warned the pilot that
the air traffic control radar was on circular polarization and
that precipitation was filtered out, or that other steps
should have been taken to examine the weather. The court
concluded that the air traffic controller "had a right to as-
sume that the pilot was cognizant of the general meteoro-
623 Id. at 484.
624 Id. at 486.
625 Id.
RECEANT DEVELOPMENTS
logical conditions," detailed weather briefings being the
duty of the flight service station.626 The controller's duty
was only to give "correct and adequate available weather in-
formation" and to "suggest alternative routes when re-
quested."62 7 The court concluded "that there was nothing
before [the] air traffic controller.., that would have alerted
him to high intensity precipitation in the path of the air-
craft," particularly in view of the evidence at trial that "the
Waycross weather radar [which was not on circular polariza-
tion] was not showing any significant precipitation."62
Thus, the court concluded that the controller exercised a
"degree of care that would be expected of reasonably pru-
dent air controllers acting under the same or similar cir-
cumstances. ' 629 The court concluded that the accident was
associated with weather conditions in crossing the frontal
trough, but, that "the most probable inference to be drawn
from the evidence is that the pilot flew under conditions
[presumably unknown to the controller] that were beyond
the capabilities of the aircraft and put himself in a position
from which he could not recover. 630
The issue of a pilot's intervening cause was addressed in
Budden v. United States.631 The Budden case arose from a he-
licopter accident on December 20, 1985, when a medivac
helicopter crashed at approximately 7:00 p.m. in a sparsely
populated area in the vicinity of Ainsworth, Nebraska. At
the time of the crash, witnesses reported that the cloud ceil-
ings were between 300 and 1,000 feet and that it was driz-
zling rain. Witnesses observed the aircraft flying for over
eight miles in the deteriorating weather conditions. The
flight operated under visual flight rules (VFR). At the time
of the crash, the pilot violated both the Federal Aviation
Regulations and the Medivac Operator's Flight Manual.632
626 Id.




-2 15 F.3d 1444 (8th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Budden H1].
-2 Id. at 1448.
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Following an earlier trial, the Eighth Circuit had reversed
a finding that the FAA Omaha Flight Service Station Spe-
cialist provided a proper weather briefing to the pilot.633
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the weather briefing
failed to advise the pilot of forecasts of low clouds and low
visibilities along the planned flight route.634 Accordingly,
the Eighth Circuit found the Flight Service Station Special-
ist negligent but remanded the case to the federal district
court for a determination as to proximate cause.633
On remand, the plaintiffs contended that the pilot was
attempting to locate a place to land when he was observed
by ground witnesses to be flying below extremely low
clouds. The United States defended by arguing that the pi-
lot was continuing to fly into deteriorating weather condi-
tions and had been doing so for at least eight miles prior to
the crash.
The district court determined that under Nebraska law, a
plaintiff must show not only negligence but also that such
negligence was the cause in fact, that the injury was a natu-
ral and probable result of the negligence, and that there
was no efficient intervening cause.63 6 Nebraska law pre-
sumed the pilot would not have acted negligently, however,
ground witnesses'
observations [support] the District Court's finding that [Pi-
lot] Craig Budden breached his duty of care by failing to act
reasonably when he encountered cloud ceilings below 1,000
feet and visibility of less than three miles. Budden knew or
should have known that his only reasonable course of action
was to abort the mission, either by turning the aircraft
around or landing immediately.637
The Eighth Circuit also held that the "the briefer was not
duty-bound to anticipate that Budden would continue the
mission despite weather conditions which mandated abort-
63 See Budden v. United States, 963 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter
Budden 1].
634 Id. at 192-93.
635 Id. at 194.
66 Budden II, 15 F.3d at 1449.
637 Id.
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ing the flight. Thus, the district court's proximate cause
determination rests on the proposition that Budden's con-
duct broke the causal connection between [the briefer's]
breach of duty and the crash. ... 638 Under these circum-
stances, the Eighth Circuit held that the district court's ulti-
mate finding that the pilot's negligence was the sole
proximate cause of the accident was not clearly
erroneous.
63 9
Senior CircuitJudge Lay dissented, stating that the negli-
gence of a pilot in proceeding under deteriorating weather
conditions was a foreseeable consequence of an inadequate
weather briefing. ° The dissent further emphasized that
"the doctrine that an intervening act cuts off the liability of
a tortfeasor comes into play only when the intervening cause is
not foreseeable.'64 1 The dissent contended that the majority
failed to consider the Nebraska comparative negligence
statute, which would permit a partial recovery by the pilot
and also a contribution on the payments made for the
wrongful death claim of the passengers.642 In summary, the
dissent apparently would have required a specific finding of
fact that the pilot's negligence was not "foreseeable,"
whereas the majority seemed satisfied to conclude that the
briefer was not duty-bound to anticipate that the pilot
would violate federal aviation regulations and continue the
flight despite the deteriorating weather conditions. Thus,
the majority implicitly supported a finding that the pilot's
negligence under the circumstances was not reasonably
foreseeable to the briefer.
The information available to an approach controller and
the approach controller's duty to warn a pilot of a deviation
from the published Instrument Landing System (ILS) pro-
cedure were the basis for the claims against the United
638 Id. at 1450.
-59 Id. at 1451.
-4 Id. at 1453.
41 Budden II, 15 F.3d at 1453 (quoting Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand,
345 N.W.2d 300, 308 (Neb. 1984)).
642 Id. at 1454-55.
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States in Finley v. United States.643 The United States District
Court for the Southern District of California, summarizing
the information available to an approach controller, con-
cluded that there was no evidence the controller had any
knowledge that the pilot had deviated from the published
altitudes on the ILS approach to Montgomery Field in San
Diego, California, during a night approach under mini-
mum conditions.6 44 The NTAP data available from Los An-
geles center, which was retrieved after the accident, but
which was not available to the San Diego approach control-
ler, indicated that the aircraft intentionally descended well
below the published altitudes before reaching the outer
marker of the ILS localizer course. This was done before in
an apparent attempt to avoid a higher cloud level. During
this time, the approach controller would not have received
any altitude information on the aircraft, and the low alti-
tude warning system, which is actuated by data available to
the approach controller on the ARTS III Approach Control
radar systems, would not have alerted the air traffic control-
ler to an unusually low altitude. The absence of an altitude
readout in that location would not have been unusual be-
cause of the terrain in that area. The controller switched
the pilot to the airport advisory radio frequency and no
longer communicated with the pilot. The pilot intercepted
the ILS localizer, climbed to intercept the glide slope, and
proceeded on the glide slope toward the airport. Within
two miles of the airport, the pilot suddenly descended 500
feet below the glide slope, impacted power lines, and
crashed. Again, the approach controller had not been in
contact with the aircraft during this time. Furthermore, the
final descent was shown on only one radar return recorded
by the NTAP data, leading to the conclusion that the de-
scent was a sudden deviation from the glide slope.
The Finley court concluded that the air traffic controller
had met all requirements to provide proper clearances and
,4 No. 86-1151-S(M), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18949 (S.D. Cal. May 4, 1993).
64 Id. at *27.
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information to the pilot based upon known information. 45
Furthermore, even if the controller had been negligent, the
Court concluded that the pilot intentionally deviated from
the published altitudes and that the pilot's negligence was
the sole proximate cause of both the crash and the deaths
of the passengers for which the claims involved in this case
had been asserted.646 The pilot was not relying upon any
information from the approach controller at that point in
the approach after switching to the advisory frequency, and,
therefore
[a]ny failure of an air traffic controller to warn a pilot that
he is below the proper altitude cannot be regarded as a
proximate cause of an accident when the pilot is aware that
he is below the proper altitude, recognizes the danger in
being below the proper altitude, and decides to proceed.647
The court entered judgment in favor of the United
States.6 4s
C. MISCELLANEOUS
The liability of the federal government for damages due
to an automobile accident that occurred as a result of ef-
forts to avoid a collision with a low-flying military airplane
was the subject of Bunch v. United States. 49 The government
argued that military aircraft were flown by persons other
than the United States government in Nevada, but the
court concluded that, while positive identification of the
aircraft was not possible, the insignia on the aircraft and the
appearance of the aircraft supported the district court's
finding that the aircraft involved was a U.S. military air-
craft.650 The plaintiff suffered serious injuries and a miscar-
riage. The miscarriage actually occurred following a
pregnancy after the accident, but the court concluded that
F5 Id. at *43-44.
r46 Id.
W Id. at *44.
-8 Finley, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18949 at *44.
r9 No. 92-15310, No. 92-15332, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 12103 (9th Cir. May 13,
1993) (unpublished opinion reported as a table case at 993 F.2d 881).
a- Id. at *2-3.
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plaintiffs physical condition which led to the miscarriage
was "directly attributable to the accident. "651
VI. AIRPORTS
The liability of an airport operator for damage to an air-
craft engine resulting from the need to suddenly reverse
thrust on a snow and ice covered taxiway in order to avoid
ground equipment was presented in Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York.652 The trial court had
entered judgment against plaintiff Pan American as a mat-
ter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
50(A) (1) following the close of evidence. The Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the record
clearly could have supported a verdict in favor of Pan
American.653
The Pan American DC-10 was operating on a taxiway at
JFK International Airport under conditions of heavy fog.
The taxiways were reported to be "very slippery." The New
York Port Authority had sand trucks in the vicinity of the
taxiway. The air traffic controller advised the Pan American
aircraft of the presence of the sand trucks and advised the
aircraft to yield to the sand trucks.
The flight crew testified that as the aircraft approached
the sand trucks, the sand trucks suddenly accelerated out
into the path of the aircraft, although the captain and the
first officer could not agree on the direction from which
the trucks had come. The evidence also conflicted as to the
speed of the aircraft. The aircraft crew members stated that
they were going between three and five miles an hour,
whereas the defendant's expert opined that the aircraft was
travelling between fifteen and twenty miles per hour.
Pan American contended that judgment should not have
been entered as a matter of law because a question of fact
existed as to whether the taxiway had been properly main-
-' Id. at *4.
652 Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Port Auth. of New York & NewJersey, 995 F.2d
5 (2d Cir. 1993).
653 Id. at 10.
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tained, i.e., whether it should have been sanded before the
incident or closed all together. Pan American also argued
that fact questions remained regarding whether the sand
trucks had violated a New York State law that requires
ground equipment to yield the right-of-way to aircraft
(notwithstanding the air traffic controller's advisory).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Port
Authority's duty "encompassed more than an obligation to
warn" aircraft of the dangerous conditions.654 If the condi-
tions were too dangerous, then a jury could conclude that
the taxiway should have been closed or properly main-
tained.6 55 The court further concluded that, given the testi-
mony of the Pan Am flight crew as to the speed of the
aircraft and the sudden appearance of the sand trucks in
the path of the aircraft, a jury could reasonably conclude
that the sand truck operators, who may not have been
aware of the air traffic controller's warning to the aircraft,
were negligent.656 The court stated that
[c]ontrary to the Port Authority's suggestion, the instruc-
tions [to the aircraft to yield the right-of-way to the ground
crew] would not permit the trucks to cut off the aircraft. Be-
cause this sequence of events would permit a jury to con-
clude the Port Authority negligently operated its trucks, we
find the district court erred in granting the Port Authority's
motion for judgment as a matter of law.657
Finally, although the Second Circuit reversed the district
court's entry of judgment as a matter of law, the court af-
firmed the district court's discretion in refusing to allow
Pan Am's accident reconstruction expert to testify. 658 The
court concluded that the expert did not have the requisite
air traffic control training, had little experience at large air-
ports, had no familiarity with the ground procedures atJFK,
and had only been an accident investigator for the NTSB
654 Id. at 9.
655 Id.
656 Id.
6 Pan Am. World Airways, 995 F.2d at 9.
68 Id. at 10.
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for eighteen months. 659 Accordingly, the trial court did not
err in refusing to allow the expert to testify, although the
expert had previously testified on behalf of the Federal gov-
ernment and on behalf of others in federal court
litigation.660
Claims against an airport operator for closing a cross-
wind runway and allegedly closing the tower several min-
utes prior to its scheduled midnight closing, thereby depriv-
ing the pilot of wind information, were subject to summary
judgment in Berends v. City of Atlantic City.66 1 In a detailed
factual review of the cross-wind landing accident, the court
affirmed summary judgment in favor of Atlantic City, Pan
American World Airways, Inc. (the airport operator), and
International Technical Aviation Personnel, Inc. (the con-
trol tower operator)662
The court concluded that due to prior safety concerns
relating to operations on a short cross-wind runway, the clo-
sure of such a runway was not unreasonable and neither
Atlantic City nor Pan Am incurred any liability arising from
the closure of the runway.663 The plaintiff also alleged that
the control tower operators had left shortly before mid-
night, thereby depriving the pilot of wind information. The
court rejected this allegation on the grounds that there
were other sources of wind information available to the pi-
lot, including reports from a nearby airport.664 Moreover,
the pilot of the aircraft also would detect the high cross-
winds during the course of the approach.665 If the pilot was
uncomfortable about landing on the cross-wind runway
- Id.
66o Id.
661 621 A.2d 972 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
662 Id. at 982.
663 Id. at 980-82. Under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-2 (West 1992), a municipality's
sovereign immunity is not waived if the failure to take action against a dangerous
condition is "not palpably unreasonable." The court also based its decision on N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 59:2-3a (West 1992), which provides that there is no liability for "an
injury resulting... [from] 'high-level policy making decisions involving the balanc-
ing of competing considerations.'" Id.
6 Id. at 982.
- Id.
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without wind direction velocity, then he could have landed
at another airport.666 Notably, the court quoted from In re
Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport,667 stating "[t] he better
choice is represented by the standard pilot's maxim . . . 'If
in doubt, get out.' 668
VII. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
A. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
In Borg-Warner Corp. v. Avco Corp. the Alaska Supreme
Court considered the contribution claims of Borg-Warner
against Avco Corporation and Piper Aircraft Corpora-
tion.669 The case arose from a wrongful death action involv-
ing a 1986 accident on the North Slope of Alaska. The
wrongful death action was originally filed against Borg-
Warner, the carburetor manufacturer, and Edward DePries-
tan an aircraft mechanic. None of the parties sought a jury
trial.
Shortly before trial, Borg-Warner moved to add third-
party claims for contribution against Avco, Piper, Rogers
Corporation (the carbon float manufacturer) and Peterson
Aircraft (the holder of an auto-gas Supplemental Type Cer-
tificate). After each defendant was joined, Borg-Warner at-
tempted to have the contribution claims tried in the first
trial. The third-party defendants objected, and the trial of
plaintiff's wrongful death claims proceeded against Borg-
Warner alone.
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial
court found that the legal cause of the accident was a defec-
tive carburetor and that the use of auto-gas did not contrib-
ute to the absorption of fuel by the float.6 7 0 The court also
concluded that Borg-Warner had concealed a manufactur-
ing defect and that such concealment was "outrageous con-
- Id.
- 919 F.2d 1079, 1087 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 276 (1991).
- Berends, 621 A.2d at 982,
Borg-Warner Corp. v. Avco Corp., 850 P.2d 628 (Alaska 1993).
670 Id. at 630-31.
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duct and a reckless disregard of the rights of others."
671
The court found Borg-Warner at least fifty percent at fault
and, therefore, jointly and severally liable for $1.6 million
in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive dam-
ages.672 The court did not allocate specific percentages of
fault to any of the third-party defendants.673
Following the trial court's decision, but before entry of
judgment, Borg-Warner and Swanson settled for approxi-
mately $4.5 million, and the Swanson claims against Borg-
Warner were dismissed. Borg-Warner unsuccessfully moved
for the withdrawal of the court's findings of fact and con-
clusions of law. The third-party defendants moved for sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that Borg-Warner was not
entitled to contribution as a "willful and wanton tortfeasor"
and was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue.
The court granted Avco's and Piper's motions but denied
Rogers' motion because an issue existed as to whether Rog-
ers' conduct may have been as culpable as Borg-
Warner's. 674
On appeal, Borg-Warner first raised the propriety of sep-
arate trials, particularly where it was necessary to allocate
fault among the parties in accordance with Alaska's Tort
Reform Act.675 The court held that, while one complete
and comprehensive hearing is preferable where complex is-
sues are intertwined, separate trials of third-party claims
may be ordered in order to avoid prejudice.676 The court
noted that Borg-Warner did not attempt to add the third-
party defendants until three months before the scheduled
trial date and that a single trial would have "significantly
delayed" the Swanson wrongful death trial.677
The court next addressed the trial court's determination
that Borg-Warner was not entitled to contribution because
671 Id.
672 Id. at 631 n.4.
673 Id.
674 Borg-Warner Corp., 850 P.2d at 631 n.4.
675 ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (1986).
676 Borg-Warner Corp., 850 P.2d at 632.
677 Id.
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its conduct had been "willful and wanton." Alaska has
adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors Act,678 but in so doing deleted the restriction
on contribution for those parties who have been guilty of
willful or wanton misconduct.679 Instead, the Alaska version
of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act
only precludes contribution in those cases in which a
tortfeasor has "intentionally caused or contributed to an in-
jury or wrongful death."68 °
Additionally, the Alaska Supreme Court looked to other
state authorities which dealt with the issue of contribution
claims by a party who is guilty of willful or wanton miscon-
duct. The court noted that the allocation of fault under
both the Alaska Tort Reform Act and the doctrine of com-
parative negligence as adopted in other states "directs the
trier of fact to consider 'the nature of the conduct of each
party at fault,' as well as the degree of causal tie between the
conduct and the damages claimed."681 As such, in deter-
mining the allocation of fault for purposes of contribution,
the willful and wanton character of the misconduct would
be considered by the trier of fact in determining the proper
allocation of fault.
Finally, the court addressed Borg-Warner's argument that
it was not collaterally estopped from relitigating the trial
court's findings "concerning the nature of its conduct to-
ward [the deceased pilot]." Under Alaska law, mutuality of
parties is not required in order to support a claim of collat-
eral estoppel, and the claim of collateral estoppel may apply
under the following circumstances:
1. The plea of collateral estoppel must be asserted against a
party or one in privity with a party to the first action;
2. The issue to be precluded from relitigation by operation
of the doctrine must be identical to that decided in the first
action; and
678 ALAs A STAT. § 09.16.010(c) (1986).
679 AiLwsK STAT. § 09.16 (repealed 1989).
680 Borg-Warner Corp., 850 P.2d at 633.
681 Id.
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3. The issue in the first action must have been resolved by
final judgment on the merits. 682
The Alaska Supreme Court noted that there was no ques-
tion that the parties and the issues were identical. Instead,
the question was whether the trial court's memorandum de-
cision was sufficiently final for purposes of collateral estop-
pel.68 3 The court noted the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments, Section 13, which states that a final judgment is
not necessary if "any prior adjudication of an issue in an-
other action ... is determined to be sufficiently firm to be
accorded conclusive effect."684
The court agreed that entry of a final judgment was not
necessary and relied upon a Fifth Circuit decision, Cheme-
tron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc.,6"5 to support its view that a
memorandum decision, filed prior to the parties' settle-
ment and before entry of final judgment, was to be given
preclusive effect.68 6
The Alaska Supreme Court determined that the proper
test was whether the issue has been "fully litigated."687 The
court determined that the trial court's seventy-four page
memorandum decision and its findings were necessary and
essential to the trial court's decision. 688 The court held that
it was hard to imagine any case more "fully litigated" in the
absence of the final judgment.68 9 Accordingly, the court
held that Borg-Warner was precluded from relitigating the
nature of its conduct, but held that it was not bound by the
trial court's finding that it was more than fifty percent at
fault.690 The issue of relative fault between Borg-Warner
and the third-party defendants was not properly before the
682 Id. at 634.
683 Id.
-8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS, § 13 (1982).
6- 682 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983).
- Borg-Warner Corp., 850 P.2d at 635.
687 Id.
88 Id.
- Id. at 636.
6% Id.
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trial court in the wrongful death trial and could be reliti-
gated in the contribution case against Avco and Rogers.691
The Michigan Court of Appeals in Whitesell v. Zantop Inter-
national Airlines, Inc.692 considered a summary judgment for
express indemnity in an aircraft sales contract between the
seller Eastern and the purchaser Zantop. The court previ-
ously had entered a default judgment against Zantop and
dismissed Zantop's contribution claims. 69 3 As to Eastern's
claims against Zantop, however, the appellate court re-
viewed the summary judgment entered in favor of Eastern
and held that the indemnity agreement should be con-
strued in accordance with its terms, which called for the
application of Florida law.694 Pursuant to Florida law, an
indemnity agreement that is not "clear and unequivocal" on
its face in providing indemnification against a party's own
negligence will not be enforced.695 The court held that
Eastern Airlines had admitted its own negligence in estab-
lishing that it was not a "volunteer" in making initial pay-
ments to plaintiff Whitesell and, as such, Eastern would not
be entitled to indemnification for its own negligence under
the terms of the sales contract as interpreted in accordance
with Florida law.696 Accordingly, the appellate court re-
versed the summary judgment in favor of Eastern and
against Zantop on the issue of express contractual indem-
nity under the sales contract.
697
10 The court noted that Piper Aircraft Corporation had filed Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy in July 1991 and, therefore, would not be a party to the further proceedings.
Borg-Warner Corp., 850 P.2d at 631. Nevertheless, the issue of whether Piper's fault, if
any, should be included in the allocation for purposes of contribution may be im-
portant in determining the remaining percentages of fault against the other third-
party defendants and whether any of them are "jointly and severally" liable. Also, an
issue exists as to whether any party held "jointly and severally" liable can be required
to contribute any part which may be allocated to Piper but not paid due to the bank-
ruptcy. Id. at 630.
-2 503 N.W.2d 915 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
613 Id. at 918. See infra note 745 and accompanying text.
69 Id. at 919.
695 Id. at 922.
- Id. at 917.
697 503 N.W.2d at 917.
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B. MANDAMUS
In George Kabeller, Inc. v. Busey6 98 the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reviewed the dismissal of a mandamus ac-
tion filed by Zephyr Hills Parachute Center against the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA) for failure to issue a
final order with regard to its complaints of discrimination
by the City of Zephyr Hills in violation of the Federal Avia-
tion Act. On October 16, 1990, the plaintiff had requested
that the FAA review certain actions on the part of the City
of Zephyr Hills in granting a more favorable lease to a com-
peting skydiving business, which he contended discrimi-
nated against it in violation of the Federal Aviation Act.
Over the next fourteen months, the action was reviewed at
various local, regional and national levels by the FAA but
was not complete.
Kabeller filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia for a writ of mandamus requir-
ing the FAA to take action. The FAA moved to dismiss on
the grounds that 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) vests exclusive juris-
diction for review of FAA actions in the U.S. circuit courts
of appeal. Kabeller also argued, alternatively, that if the dis-
trict court did not have jurisdiction, then the action should
be transferred to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
The district court concluded that the FAA was correct in
its assertion that the federal circuit courts of appeal had ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the FAA, including the issuance of
any writs that would be necessary to aid their "future juris-
diction. 699 The district court and the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the absence of
a "final order" precluded application of the exclusive juris-
diction statute.700 Instead, both courts concluded that the
All Writs Act provided a basis for seeking relief in the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals in aid of its "future
jurisdiction. 70 1
698 George Kabeller, Inc. v. Busey, 999 F.2d 1417 (11th Cir. 1993).
69 Id. at 1419-20.
7- Id. at 1421-22.
701 Id.
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Finally, the district court had concluded that transfer to
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals was not "in the inter-
est of justice," because the case did not present extraordi-
nary circumstances to justify mandamus.0 2 Two of the
three judges of the Eleventh Circuit Court agreed, and the
court held that "even if jurisdiction were to properly reside
with the court at this point in time, [the court] conclude [s]
that the drastic remedy of mandamus is inappropriate.
70 3
C. PROPER PARTY IN INTEREST
In Reliant Airlines, Inc. v. County of Broome70 4 the district
court addressed the issue of whether an insurer was re-
quired to join the lawsuit as a real party in interest in a sub-
rogation property damage claim. Defendants moved to
dismiss the claim by Reliant Airlines, Inc. or, in the alterna-
tive, to have Reliant's insurer, U.S. Fire Insurance Com-
pany, named as a real party in interest pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a). Prior to a ruling on the de-
fendants' motions, Reliant filed a "ratification of the action
by U.S. Fire stating that U.S. Fire has agreed to be bound by
the decision of the court, '70 5 accompanied by a supporting
affidavit that stated that the general agent underwriting the
policy and the corporation adjusting the claim agreed to be
bound by the action. Notwithstanding the defendants' ar-
guments that under New York state law only the insurer was
the proper party in interest, the federal court held that the
real party in interest under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure was a procedural matter and that Rule 17(a) expressly
excepted the real party in interest from joinder in event
that there had been a ratification by the insurer.70 6 The
court noted that the decision whether to accept the ratifica-
tion was a decision with in the discretion of the trial court;
however, the court noted that the ratification was satisfac-
702 Id. at 1422.
703 Busey, 999 F.2d at 1422.
704 No. 90-CV-537, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10,110 (N.D.N.Y. July 16, 1993).
705 Id. at *4.
706 Id.
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tory in this case thus denying the motion to dismiss or, al-
ternatively, to add U.S. Fire as a real party in interest.7"7
D. EVIDENCE AND TRIAL- PRACTICE
The case of Van Steemburg v. General Aviation, Inc. 70 8 arose
from the crash of a single-engine Cessna 182 RG aircraft on
October 20, 1992. The pilot was killed in the crash. The
plaintiff was a passenger aboard the aircraft who was se-
verely injured. The defendant, Robertson Transformer
Corporation of Indiana, Inc. (RTCI), owned the aircraft,
and the defendant, TK Aviation, Inc., an aircraft rental fa-
cility at Chicago Midway Airport, operated the aircraft.
General Aviation, Inc. (GAC), a licensed repair facility,
maintained the plane.
The plaintiff contended that the accident occurred due
to an engine failure resulting from eroded spark plugs that
GAC had failed to replace during the last annual inspection
prior to the crash. The defendants contended that the acci-
dent was not due to an engine malfunction but rather to
the pilot flying in known icy conditions. At the close of the
plaintiff's case, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of
defendants TK and RTCI, and the jury returned a verdict in
favor of defendant GAC and against the plaintiffs. 70 9 The
Illinois Court of Appeals reversed the judgment in favor of
GAC and remanded the case for a new trial.710
Specifically, the court of appeals found that the trial
court had committed error by permitting the opinions of
NTSB investigators to be introduced as substantive evidence
in the case. 711 The evidence was introduced during the
cross-examination of the plaintiff's experts when they were
asked whether the NTSB investigators found any evidence
of pre-impact power loss and whether the NTSB investiga-
tors noted only one emergency condition with respect to
707 Id. at *8.
708 611 N.E.2d 1144 (I11. App. Ct. 1993).
7- Id. at 1148.
710 Id. at 1167.
711 Id. at 1155.
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the aircraft, namely air frame icing. The court rejected
GAC's argument that, because the experts had relied upon
the NTSB reports or portions thereof related to ice, the
"door had been opened" as to the opinions of the NTSB
investigators. 12
The trial court had initially ruled that the opinions of the
NTSB investigators were not admissible because they were
based largely on information derived from secondary
sources rather than upon personal knowledge. The court
concluded that the plaintiffs experts reasonably could have
relied upon the factual observations noted in the NTSB re-
port, even though hearsay, but not any opinions. The ap-
pellate court, however, concluded that the NTSB
investigators' opinions were based upon hearsay (double
hearsay) and that it was error to disclose those opinions to
the jury, even via cross-examination. 713 The court noted
that cross-examination of the plaintiffs experts might have
been conducted by simply showing that the plaintiffs ex-
perts relied only upon the factual observations in the re-
port, which were not in dispute, in dispelling any
implication that the NTSB report contained any opinions
that corroborated or were consistent with those of the
plaintiffs expert.
The appellate court also determined that the failure to
allow a passenger who was on a prior flight to explain her
lack of concern about using the aircraft on the accident
flight was error.' The defendants had filed a motion in
limine to exclude the witness' testimony regarding her rec-
ollection of the prior flight, but on cross-examination, de-
fense counsel asked: "you didn't have any concern about
getting back in that same plane, did you?" 715 The plaintiff's
counsel argued that the defense counsel had "opened the
door," but the court refused to allow her to testify as to why
712 Id.
71s Van Steemburg, 611 N.E.2d at 1156.
714 Id. at 1157.
715 Id. at 1156.
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she had no concern about getting back into the plane.716
In her pretrial deposition, the witness had testified that the
reason she was willing to get in the airplane was because she
had been told by the pilot that he had called "that place
about the plane" to discuss the problems which they had
encountered in the prior flight.717 The appellate court
agreed that such a report was hearsay and also was too in-
definite to even indicate notice to anyone of any particular
problems. 71 8 However, having created the implication that
the passenger was not concerned about the prior problems
and, therefore, was willing to take the accident flight, the
court of appeals held that the defendant had opened the
door to her explanation as to her state of mind and that
such testimony, therefore, should have been admitted.7 19
The court of appeals also concluded that the trial court
erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to the failure of the
defendant to produce its piloting expert and its weather ex-
pert.720 The defendants contended that such testimony was
merely cumulative and, therefore, unnecessary. The plain-
tiff, on the other hand, contended that the testimony of
these experts would have supported their position and that
they should have been permitted to comment on the fail-
ure of these experts to testify. The appellate court held
that, unless the defendants have "offered a reasonable ex-
planation for failing to call its experts," the plaintiff should




718 Van Steemburg, 611 N.E.2d at 1156.
719 Id.
720 Id.
72 Id. at 1158. Incredibly, the appellate court held that the pilot expert should
have been called by the defendant, so that the "plaintiffs should have had an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine [him] to bring out any weaknesses in [his] theory." Id. Inas-
much as the defendant's experts did not testify during the course of defendant's
evidence and his theory apparently, therefore, was not in evidence, it is difficult to
understand how the plaintiff was prejudiced by being denied the right to cross-ex-
amine an expert who had not yet even given any testimony in the case. Id.
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The court held that directed verdicts in favor of the
owner and operator of the aircraft should be affirmed on
the grounds that there was no circumstantial evidence
which would support a finding that either the owner or the
operator had notice of any prior problems with the air-
craft.7 22 The testimony of numerous other reputable pilots
and other mechanics who had flown the airplane indicated
that there had been no mechanical problems reported, de-
spite the apparent eroded condition of the spark plugs.
The appellate court also held that the trial court did not err
in allowing evidence of certain spark plug tests conducted
after the accident; in refusing to allow evidence of another
TK Aviation aircraft accident approximately 15 months
before involving "fouled" spark plugs; in allowing the de-
fendant to cross-examine the plaintiff as to her prior depo-
sition testimony; and in properly allowing a transcript of
ATC communications to be introduced into evidence in
which the controller stated to the pilot that there was
"heavy ice all over the area. ' 723 Notably, the appellate court
concluded that the ATC transcript (and its contents) were
not hearsay because the ATC transcript was a business rec-
ord. 2 Interestingly, the appellate court followed a Second
Circuit decision which had held that: "a recording of the
kind at issue here is 'part of a regular air control procedure
[and is] at least the equivalent of a regular written journal
kept by the [air traffic controller] and as such [is] a contem-
poraneous business record. 725 Even though the informa-
tion which the controller was relaying was based upon
information received from "unnamed pilots," such informa-
tion was related by the pilots as a part of their "regular prac-
tice to report to ATC specific weather conditions which they
observed in the course of their flights. 726
722 Van Steemburg, 611 N.E.2d at 1160.
723 Id. at 1161-66.
724 Id. at 1165.
7- Id. at 1166 (quoting from LeRoy v. Sabean Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d
266, 373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 878 (1965)).
726 Id.
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Finally, the court held that it was not error for the trial
court to have refused to instruct the jury on the require-
ments of maintenance in accordance with the manufac-
turer's maintenance manual pursuant to the Federal
Aviation Regulations. These regulations require that "each
person performing maintenance, alteration or preventative
maintenance on an aircraft ... shall use the methods, tech-
niques and practices prescribed in the current manufac-
turer's maintenance manual."727 The trial court held that
there was no evidence as to what the current manufac-
turer's maintenance manual required in connection with
the replacement of spark plugs at the annual inspection;
however, there was other testimony "as to what [the repair
facility] requires its mechanics to refer to when inspecting
spark plugs. "728
The admissibility of an expert witness's prior purported
inconsistent statement for purposes of impeachment and
counsel's argument relating thereto were the subjects of the
decision in Lentomyynti Oy v. Medivac, Inc.7 29 In that case,
the plaintiffs appealed a defense verdict on the grounds
that, following the grant of defendant's motion in limine to
exclude certain testimony of plaintiffs' expert. The plain-
tiffs chose not to call the expert as a witness at trial. During
the defense, however, the defendant read into evidence cer-
tain portions of the deposition testimony of the challenged
expert. In so doing, the defense counsel was warned not to
"open the door" to the excluded theory. In response to the
plaintiffs' insistence that the remainder of the deposition
testimony be read, the trial court allowed the plaintiffs to
read every additional passage they desired from the deposi-
tion. It is not clear, however, whether at that point any por-
tion of the deposition involving the excluded theory was
read into evidence.
The plaintiffs then chose to call the expert witness who
had not testified on the plaintiffs' case-in-chief as a rebuttal
721 Van Steemburg, 611 N.E.2d at 1166.
728 Id.
- 997 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993).
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witness to rebut a theory espoused by the defendant's ex-
pert. On cross-examination of the plaintiffs' expert, the de-
fense counsel cross-examined him with a discovery
statement, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, in
which the excluded theory had been espoused as the cause
of the accident. Additionally, counsel also challenged the
plaintiffs' expert on the grounds that in his deposition testi-
mony prior to trial he had given "an entirely different opin-
ion."730 As a result of this cross-examination, the trial court
concluded that defense counsel had opened the door and
then allowed all of the formerly excluded testimony to be
presented to the jury.7 3 1
On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that defense counsel
had opened the door only to enable the defense to argue
that the plaintiffs' expert had given two inconsistent theo-
ries on the cause of the accident, and the plaintiffs' theo-
ries, therefore, could not be believed. 32 The Seventh
Circuit held that the initial introduction and use of the
plaintiffs' expert's deposition testimony had been proper
and also that the subsequent impeachment on the appar-
ently "inconsistent" statements was proper.73 3 In examining
the statements, the court concluded that the statements
"seem inconsistent . . . [c]ertainly inconsistent enough to
justify inquiry into them during cross-examination." 73 4 Hav-
ing concluded that cross-examination into the purportedly
inconsistent statements was proper, the court then con-
cluded that defense counsel's closing argument that the
statements were inconsistent was also improper.735 Finally,
the court noted that the plaintiffs had not argued to the
jury that the reason they had not called their expert during
their case-in-chief was due to the court's order. Addition-
ally, the plaintiffs had not requested an instruction from
the court to the jury explaining that such testimony had
7- Id. at 372.
731 Id.
732 Id. at 373.
7s3 Id. at 372-73.
734 Lentomyynti Oy, 997 F.2d at 373.
735 Id.
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been excluded.736 Based upon the finding that defense
counsel's use of the deposition testimony, impeachment
and argument were proper, the defendant's verdict and
judgment were affirmed.737
In Combined Communications Corp., Inc. d/b/a KUSA-TV v.
Public Service Co.,738 the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed
a judgment in favor of plaintiff Combined Communications
Corporation and the spouses of the deceased pilot and pas-
senger of a helicopter arising from a wire-strike accident in-
volving cables in excess of 200 feet in height. In so doing,
the court considered several significant evidentiary issues.
First, the court considered defendant PSC's argument that
evidence of post-accident remedial measures was not admis-
sible, even though the measures were taken as a result of
another prior accident. The court rejected that argument,
noting that post-accident remedial measures refer to the ac-
cident involving injury to the plaintiff and not to other acci-
dents.7 39 The court further noted that the post-accident
remedial measures included notice to the Federal Aviation
Administration and consultation regarding the marking of
the precise cables involved in this accident with orange avia-
tion balls, and if defendant PSC had notified the FAA as it
had been required by law to do in the first instance, the
cables would have been marked with orange aviation balls
even before the first accident. 4
0
The court also rejected defendant PSC's argument that
the then existing version of the "good samaritan" statute
applied.741 Under the statute, no duty would be assumed if
a person performs an act of assistance without compensa-
736 Id. at 374. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit noted that the plaintiffs may have made
a tactical decision that they did not want the jury to be told that the testimony, once
submitted to the jury for their consideration, formerly had been held inadmissible
on the grounds that the plaintiff's expert lacked the medical competence to make
such opinion testimony admissible in the first instance. Id.
737 Id.
738 865 P.2d 893 (Col. Ct. App. 1993).
739 Id. at 896.
740 Id.
741 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-116 (1987).
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tion for the benefit of another.742 The court held that PSC
was under a duty to warn of a dangerous condition it had
created in the form of wire cables, and this common law
duty did not arise under the "good samaritan" statute.743
The court also rejected PSC's argument that certain evi-
dence should be excluded under the "self-critical analysis"
privilege. 7 " The court held that, even if such privilege ex-
ists, it does not protect against the discovery of information
developed by routine, internal corporate review of matters
relating to safety engaged in prior to the incident.745 The
court stated the following:
This is so because, while post-accident investigations might
be discouraged if no privilege were recognized, general pre-
accident safety reviews: "are designed to preempt litigation;
it is perverse to assume that candid assessments necessary to
prevent accidents will be inhibited by the fear that they
could later be used as a weapon in hypothetical litigation
they are supposed to prevent. "746
Finally, the court noted that any such privileged informa-
tion must be treated as confidential by the parties, and any
communications with the Federal Aviation Administration
could not be treated as confidential because they were part
of the agency's public files.747
E. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
In Phillips v. Hein 7 48 the representatives of a passenger
who was aboard a flight which disappeared off the coast of
Italy were not entitled to claim that the statute of limita-
tions under the Death on the High Seas Act was tolled
pending the issuance of a death certificate. Under Califor-
nia law, a death certificate could not be issued more than
742 Id.
743 Combined Comm. Corp., 865 P.2d at 897.
7,4 Id. at 898.
745 Id.
746 Id. at 897 (quoting Dowling v. American Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 427
(9th Cir. 1992)).
747 Id. at 898.
748 Phillips v. Heine, 984 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 285 (1993).
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two years after the disappearance. Nevertheless, the court
held that the date of disappearance of the aircraft would be
presumed to be the date of death and that the statute of
limitations begins to run at that time.749 Under the Death
on the High Seas Act, certain persons could have filed suit
at any time after the date of disappearance, and, therefore,
that date would be the date that "identified persons for
whose benefit the liability exists and who can start the ma-
chinery of law in motion to enforce it, by applying for the
appointment of an administrator," may do so.7 50 Later,
once an administrator was appointed, the complaint could
be amended to name the administrator as a party.751 Simi-
larly, the court held that "if the accrual of the cause of ac-
tion starts at death rather than the appointment of an
administrator for the plaintiffs decedent, it surely does not
await a formal finding of death, as in the issuance of a death
certificate." 752 The court concluded that if it permitted any
tolling or delay based upon the fact that an administrator
had not yet been appointed or upon the fact that a death
certificate had not yet been obtained, then that exception
would replace the definite limitations period established
under the Death of the High Seas Act with an indefinite
and unlimited statute of limitations.75 3
Finally, the court considered the doctrine of equitable
tolling and ruled that the newly-appointed conservator had
three weeks within which to file a wrongful death action
before the statute expired.754  The court stated the
following:
[N]othing had prevented plaintiff from gathering informa-
tion in the preceding years, and more than three weeks re-
mained, we question whether there was any need to extend
the statute at all. But plaintiff's reasonable needs surely did
not require extending the time a full nine and one-half
149 Id. at 490.
750 Id. at 491.
751 Id.
752 Id.
753 Phillips, 984 F.2d at 491.
7-4 Id. at 492.
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months that passed before he filed suit on December 12,
1990. 755
The court specifically noted that a prior version of the
statute, which explicitly permitted tolling, extended the pe-
riod for only 90 days after the end of the tolling event.756
The court stated the following:
When Congress extended that statutory period from two
years to three and deleted any reference to tolling, we doubt
it meant to allow plaintiffs more than 90 days from correc-
tion of the tolling event, at least in the absence of some ex-
traordinary factor that would make so long an extension
reasonable.75 7
F. SANCTIONS
In Zantop International Airlines, Inc. v. Eastern Airlines75
the Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed entry of a default
judgment against Zantop International Airlines as a result
of the conduct of its counsel during the course of trial. The
jury entered a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against Zan-
top in the amount of $2,000,000. Additionally, Zantop had
filed claims for contribution against Eastern Airlines, Lock-
heed Corporation, and Bendix Corporation for $2,000,000
which it had paid to the estates of the other four persons on
board the aircraft. Such claims were dismissed as a result of
counsel's conduct.
With respect to the issue of the default and dismissal of
Zantop's claims, such dismissal was based upon Zantop's
counsel's questions in violation of the court's order on a
motion in limine precluding any reference to a particular
post-accident service letter. Specifically, during trial, Zan-
top's attorney asked the witness, "You were involved in
01L24, weren't you, sir?" 759 OIL24 is "operating informa-
tion letter number 24," which was the subject of the pretrial
755 Id. at 491.
756 Id.
757 Id.
- 503 N.W.2d 915 (Mich. App. 1993). See supra note 679.
759 Id. at 918.
1994]
140 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [60
order on the motion in limine. 760 The trial court noted
that default and dismissal were unusually harsh sanctions,
but stated that the record demonstrated that Zantop vio-
lated many pretrial orders, which are cataloged in the deci-
sion, culminating in a pretrial sanction of penalties and
attorneys' fees of $25,000.761 The court summarized its con-
clusions as follows:
Lockheed and Bendix argue quite correctly that the court
was able to remedy many of the abuses, but was unable to
deter them. Zantop's argument on appeal attempts to iso-
late OIL24 by saying the trial court's decision to dismiss was
based solely on that violation. In fact, there was a history of
significant and frequent violations, and raising "OIL24" in
front of the jury was the last straw. Although in a long and
complex case there is more opportunity for error to occur
- and mindful of the drastic nature of the penalty imposed
- the history of this case shows that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when "all else having failed" it executed
the "death penalty" to Zantop's case. 762
The propriety of an award of sanctions under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 was the subject of the district
court's decision in Custer v. Bay View Federal Bank.763 The
plaintiff's attorney filed suit against Bay View Federal Bank
for failure to comply with a Beech Aircraft service bulletin,
which allegedly permitted a malfunction of the fuel selector
valve resulting in fuel starvation and the fatal crash involved
in this case. Bay View contended that it had sold the air-
plane to its former Chairman of the Board at the time of his
resignation two months prior to the issuance of the service
bulletin.
The plaintiff's attorney was unable to support with any
documentation his contention that prior to suit he had
been informed that the aircraft had been used by defend-
ant's chairman for bank business after title to the aircraft
760 Id.
761 Id. at 924.
762 Id.
- No. G-93-1788 MHP ENE, 1993 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14,468 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12,
1993).
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was transferred. Upon the filing of suit, defendant Bay
View informed plaintiffs counsel that the suit was barred
under California's one year statute of limitations for wrong-
ful death actions (even though the accident occurred in
Texas) and also that the aircraft had never been used for
bank business. This contention was supported by a declara-
tion from the bank's "legal representative," who stated that
he had told plaintiff's counsel that the aircraft was never
used for bank business and was sold to the chairman when
he resigned as Chairman of the Board at Bay View.764 Plain-
tiff's attorney either was unable or failed to counter this
specific allegation with any declaration to the contrary.
The court concluded that Rule 11 sanctions should be
granted based upon the objective standard of whether a
pleading, motion, or other paper is "frivolous or interposed
for an improper purpose," and the standard of "objective
reasonableness at the time of the attorney's signature."765
The court concluded that, although the claim was war-
ranted by existing law, it was not well grounded in fact in
that there was no evidence to support plaintiff's counsel's
contention that he had been told by the bank's legal repre-
sentative that the aircraft had been used for bank business
both before and after it was purchased by its chairman.766
Under these circumstances, the plaintiff's attorney's failure
to submit evidence to support his version of pre-suit com-
munications was "inexplicable" and the court found that
the plaintiffs' claim was "grounded on inadequate inquiry
and factual support in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.1"767
Notwithstanding the finding that Rule 11 had been vio-
lated, the court held that "Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting stat-
ute. . . 'a movant under Rule 11 has no entitlement to fees
or any other sanction.' ' 768 The court noted that the de-
fendant chose a two-prong Rule 11 attack on the complaint
76 Id. at *2.
7- Id. at *1.
7- Id. at *2.
767 Id. at *3.
- Custer, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14,468 1993 at *3 (citing Cooter & Cell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 409 (1990)).
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and that it prevailed on one ground. Accordingly, an award
of only half of its attorney's fees was entered against plain-
tiff's counsel.769
G. MISCELLANEOUS
In Dempsey v. Associated Aviation Underwriters770 the plain-
tiff attempted to set aside a $300,000 settlement involving a
1988 airplane accident against Cessna Aircraft Company on
the grounds that Cessna allegedly had "withheld" poten-
tially critical documents from the plaintiffs during discov-
ery. Plaintiffs filed this action against Cessna, Associated
Aviation Underwriters (AAU) and its Overland Park, Kansas
Claims Manager. The suit sought rescission of the settle-
ment without tendering the $300,000 settlement payment
back to Cessna. The court dismissed the fraud claim
against Cessna on the grounds that the plaintiffs had waived
their right to assert a fraud action by failing to tender the
settlement proceeds back to Cessna.771 The court dismissed
the claims against AAU and its claims manager on the
grounds that they owed no legal duty independent of that
which Cessna owed the plaintiffs. 772
In an attempt to seek postjudgment relief under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), the plaintiffs argued that
they had newly-discovered evidence. The newly-discovered
evidence was that: (1) Cessna allegedly would not have ac-
cepted the money, if tendered, based upon plaintiffs' subse-
quent attempt to return the funds in a Maryland court
proceeding; and (2) a letter from AAU to certain Cessna
counsel regarding document retention on closed Cessna
files. The court held that the new evidence that Cessna
would not have accepted the money was evidence which
could have been discovered if plaintiffs had acted dili-
gently.773 Indeed, the court noted that it had recom-
769 Id. at *3.
77. 147 F.R.D. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
771 Id. at 89.
772 Id.
77' Id. at 90.
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mended to plaintiffs counsel that the money be returned
during the course of oral argument, six weeks before enter-
ing the judgment against plaintiffs on those grounds. 74
The court stated that Cessna's refusal to accept the money
in the Maryland action was perfectly justified on the
grounds of collateral estoppel and res judicata and did not
indicate that Cessna would not have accepted the money
had it been offered prior to the judgment in the federal
action.775
The court further rejected the correspondence between
Cessna and its counsel as "newly-discovered evidence" on
the grounds that such correspondence was unrelated to the
present litigation and did not change the court's view that
neither AAU nor its claims manager had been involved in
the settlement negotiations which provided the basis for
plaintiffs' original claim against Cessna.776
VIII. DAMAGES
In Datskow v. Teledyne Continental Motors Aircraft Products777
the federal district court granted a remittitur on a verdict in
excess of $107 million dollars in the survival and wrongful
death actions arising from the crash of a Beechcraft Debo-
nair Aircraft carrying Robert Gross, his wife, and two sons.
As stated by the court:
This products liability case arises out of the crash of a pri-
vate airplane in which four people were killed. Plaintiffs
sued the manufacturer of the engine on the theory that a
defect in the plane's engine caused the crash.
On February 24, 1993, after a month long trial, ajury re-
turned a verdict in plaintiffs' favor on theories of strict lia-
bility, negligent design, and failure to warn. The jury
awarded the following damages: $250,000 to Juletta Cook,
the mother of one of the decedents, on her wrongful death
claim for economic loss; $5,000 for funeral expenses;
774 Id.
775 Dempsey, 147 F.R.D. at 90.
776 Id. at 91.
777 826 F. Supp. 677 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
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$30,000 to plaintiff Grossair, Inc., the owner of the plane,
for loss of the aircraft, and a total of $107,000,000 for con-
scious pain and suffering of the decedents. 771
Defendant TCM filed its motion to set aside the jury ver-
dict and enter judgment in its favor under Section 50(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for a new trial pursu-
ant to Rule 59, or for remittitur of damages under Rule 59.
The district court held that TCM had not met its burden
of establishing that the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs
should be set aside and that a verdict should be entered in
its favor.779 Instead, the court concluded that the expert
testimony presented by the plaintiffs, viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiffs, was sufficient to allow a rea-
sonable jury to arrive at a verdict in their favor. 78 0 The
court held that the challenge to the qualifications of plain-
tiffs experts had been ruled upon at trial.78 1 The court did
not elaborate upon its rulings other than to state that they
would not be repeated in response to the motion to set
aside the verdict.782 The court noted that both sides had
used accident reconstruction experts and that the recent
Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals 783 stressed the value of "' [v] igorous cross-ex-
amination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof' over the outright exclu-
sion of 'shaky but admissible evidence.' 784
The court also denied TCM's motion for a new trial, rul-
ing that evidence of correspondence between the deceased
pilot and TCM was properly admitted for the limited pur-
pose of showing notice to TCM of problems associated with
the engine. 785 This evidence did not show the specific de-
771 Id. at 681. Significantly, the $107 million award did not include any punitive
damages. As set forth above, it consisted solely of an award intended to compensate
for actual damages, including survival damages for conscious pain and suffering. Id.
779 Id. at 682.
- Id.
781 Id.
782 Datskow, 826 F. Supp. at 682.
783 _ U.S. __ 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
- Datskow, 826 F. Supp. at 682-83 n.1.
785 Id. at 684-85.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
fect which was alleged to have caused the crash. It did, how-
ever, explain the basis for the plaintiff's expert's opinion.786
The court also rejected TCM's arguments that a videotape
of a computer-generated animation should not have been
admitted into evidence.787 The court noted that plaintiff's
expert carefully couched his description of the animation
as "his opinions" of what occurred, rather than a true re-
construction of what had happened.788 The court further
stated that the cautionary instructions to the jury had been
sufficient to overcome any prejudice.789
The court also rejected TCM's arguments that plaintiffs
counsel had engaged in inflammatory and improper state-
ments and improper argument.790 The court again stated
that any improper statements, questions or argument were
the general subject of the precautionary statements to the
jury at the close of evidence and also in the jury charges.79'
These statements were that counsel's arguments were not
evidence and that the jury was not to be "swayed by bias,
prejudice or sympathy" as a result of such statements.792
The court further noted that defense counsel did not ob-
ject to certain statements, particularly during summation,
and that it may be error to grant a new trial where a party
fails to object during final argument.79
The court then considered the issue of whether a motion
for new trial on damages or a remittitur should be granted.
A threshold issue was presented by certain affidavits ob-
tained from a juror and certain private investigators who
786 Id. Arguably, the defendant may have avoided this problem by stipulating to
receipt of notice of generalized problems. However, to the extent that the informa-
tion contained in the letters also purported to provide a basis for the expert's opin-
ion, a legitimate objection, depending on the content of the letters, might have
been that such letters did not provide any more information than that stipulated or
provide the type of information upon which an expert should rely in forming opin-
ions as to the particular cause of the alleged engine failure in question.
787 Id. at 685.
7- Id. at 686.
789 Datskow, 826 F. Supp. at 685.
7- Id. at 686.
791 Id.
792 Id. at 687.
793 Id.
1994]
146 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [60
had contacted the jurors stating that they had been in-
formed of the $105 million verdict awarded against General
Motors in Atlanta on February 4, 1993. 9  The court criti-
cized TCM's counsel for conducting such a full scale inter-
rogation of the jurors without court approval.795 The court
stated that its statement that counsel for the parties could
speak to the jurors, if the jurors chose to speak to counsel,
did not authorize a full scale interrogation of the jury by
private investigators.796
The court concluded that the affidavits were not admissi-
ble under Rule 606 to the extent they related to the jurors'
thought processes.797 To the extent that the affidavits re-
ported on the jury's knowledge of the $100,000,000 verdict,
the court concluded that such information was not prejudi-
cial information "improperly brought to bear" upon the
jury.798 Moreover, the court noted that defense counsel was
aware of such $100,000,000 verdict, however, but never
asked the court to issue any cautionary instructions or re-
quest any other curative or preventative measures.799
In reviewing the issue of whether to grant remittitur or
new trial on damages, the court concluded that a new trial
on damages would only be granted in the event that "'prej-
udicial error has infected the jury's entire consideration of
plaintiff's pecuniary loss."'800 The court held that the size
of the award itself did not mandate a new trial as opposed
Id. at 688. This award included primarily punitive damages against General
Motors, Inc. for allegedly concealing a design defect. As suggested by the court, the
federal court review of whether remittitur or new trial should be granted on consti-
tutional grounds as to excessive punitive damage awards may be more limited than
that of a federal court in reviewing comparable awards under state law for compen-
satory damages, as in this case. Cf Id. at 690 n.6. See also Moseley v. General Motors,
No. A94A0826, No. A94A0827, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 797 (June 13, 1994) (reversing
a $105 million verdict against GM on grounds that plaintiff's counsel repeatedly
violated in limine instructions as to other accidents, deaths, lawsuits and discovery
disputes, but rejecting the constitutional challenge).
7,9 Datskow, 826 F. Supp. at 688.
7 Id.
797 Id.
798 Id. at 689.
7 Id.
oo Datskow, 826 F. Supp. at 691.
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to remittitur.80' The court also rejected TCM's argument
that the judge's instruction referring to the amount of the
jury verdict as being "ten dollars or ten million dollars,
whatever the figure is, just put it down there," was not prej-
udicial because the court was instructing the jury not to at-
tempt to discount the damage award according to the
percentage of fault attributed to each party.8 0 2 The court
said the contention that this statement "may have uninten-
tionally led the jury to believe that the range of reasonable-
ness on the facts of this case extended to an eight-figure
sum per person" bordered on ludicrous.8 0 3 Finally, the fact
that there was no objection made to this statement at trial
was reason enough to deny defendants' motion.804
The court concluded that remittitur was proper in this
case, and it should be in an amount which provides "the
maximum that would be upheld by the trial court as not
excessive," and "which least intrudes upon the province of
the jury."8 0 5 The court reviewed approximately 20 cases in-
volving verdicts for conscious pain and suffering to deter-
mine the proper remittitur in this case. The court
conditionally granted defendant's motion for a new trial
unless plaintiffs stipulated to a remittitur as to each decedent
of the amount awarded by the jury that exceeds
$250,000.806 The court also granted a remittitur of the
wrongful death award to Mrs. Gross' mother, finding a lack
of evidence of Susan Gross' income or evidence that would
support an award of $25,000 per year support to her
801 Id.
802 Id.
802 Id. at 691.
4Id.
Datskow, 826 F. Supp. at 694.
Id. The court stated that:
[plaintiffs] decedents suffered unbearable pain, as well as extreme
mental anguish both from fear of their own deaths and out of concern
for each other. It is clear, however, that the proof shows their suffer-
ing lasted at most for several minutes. There was no significant differ-
ence in the time that each lived. Under these facts and using the
"least intrusive" standard, I find that the damages for conscious pain
and suffering should not have exceeded $250,000 for each decedent.
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mother.80 7 Her mother lived several hundred miles away,
and, while it was undisputed that she provided personal
services to her mother, the award appeared to be exces-
sive. 08 The court reduced the award by remittitur to
$150,000.809
The court also conditionally granted the motion for a
new trial on the $30,000 award for the value of the air-
plane. 10 There was no evidence as to the fair market value
of the airplane other than it had been purchased in 1982
for $22,400.811 Accordingly, the court granted judgment as
a matter of law in favor of defendant and against plaintiff
Grossair, Inc., but conditionally granted the motion for new
trial if the judgment was thereafter vacated and reversed.812
In conclusion, the district court reduced the total
amount of the award to $1,105,000 from a jury verdict in
excess of $107,000,000, and ruled that defendant would be
entitled to a new trial unless plaintiffs agreed to
remittitur 8 13
In Quinones-Pacheco v. American Airlines"14 a "zero damages
verdict" was the subject of the plaintiffs' appeal. The plain-
tiffs' claims resulted from an encounter with severe turbu-
lence which allegedly caused severe permanent injuries to
both of them. Notably, however, both of them claimed to
be uninjured at the time of the incident, and did not seek
immediate follow-up care. Further, Mr. Quinones-Pacheco
continued with his military duty and Ms. Fernandez took a
new and strenuous job as a seamstress, while also for caring
for two young daughters. The only evidence of any injury
was a CT scan of Mr. Quinones which was taken approxi-
mately one year after the accident. This scan showed a her-
-'7 Id. at 695.
808 Id.
809 Id. at 697.
810 Datskow, 826 F. Supp. at 697.
811 Id.
812 Id.
813 Id. at 698. The court also denied plaintiffs' motion to apply North Carolina
law of damages in the event that a new trial is granted on the issue of damages. Id.
814 979 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1992).
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niated lumbar disk. Mr. Quinones claimed that as a result
of that back injury he had been denied reenlistment in the
U.S. Army and claimed total and permanent disability as a
result of his injury.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the jury rea-
sonably could have rejected all of Ms. Fernandez' claims.815
Upon the trial of the case, the evidence of an independent
medical examination was submitted in which the examiner
stated that Ms. Fernandez arrived at the examination wear-
ing a shoulder brace (not the neck brace that her treating
physician had prescribed) and that she was extremely unco-
operative, refusing to move or bend because of pain and
crying out whenever she was touched. 816 The physician tes-
tified that he found this behavior bizarre, could find no ob-
jective basis for her claims of injury, and concluded that her
injuries were likely a fabrication for secondary gain. 17
Although a slightly more difficult case, the First Circuit
held a jury also could have rejected the claims of Mr. Qui-
nones."18 Even though he had been diagnosed as having a
herniated lumbar disk, the only evidence of causation was
the conclusion of the doctor that it was secondary to the
turbulence incident more than a year before.819 The trial
court also excluded the expert testimony of an economist
seeking to establish Mr. Quinones' loss of income over the
course of his lifetime.8 2 0 The First Circuit held that there
was no medical evidence to support the conclusion that any
injury which he had suffered resulted either in total disabil-
ity or permanent disability.8 21 As such, it was improper for
an economic expert to rely on the assumption that he was
totally and permanently disabled in arriving at the conclu-
sion of damages.822 Hence, the trial court's discretion with
81- Id. at 4.
816 Id.
817 Id.
818 Id. at 6.
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respect to the admission or exclusion of testimony was
affirmed. 23
Finally, the court refused to award attorney's fees to
American Airlines because the trial court had refused to do
so.8 2 4 The appellate court held that it would not substitute
its judgment for that of the trial judge who had seen the




In Undewriters v. Cascade Helicopters, Inc.126 the federal dis-
trict court interpreted coverage under a non-owned aircraft
endorsement issued to Cascade Helicopters. Cascade Heli-
copters, a commercial operator, had an insurance policy
providing up to $1,000,000 bodily injury and property dam-
age liability coverage for a 1990 Robinson R-22 rotorcraft
aircraft. The policy included a non-owned aircraft endorse-
ment subject, inter alia, to the following provisions:
[I]n addition to the Aircraft declared hereunder, cover
granted under this policy applies to Aircraft used by the
Named Insured but not so declared, ALWAYS PROVIDED
the Named Insured:
(1) has no interest in the Aircraft as owner in whole or in
part;
(2) exercises no part in the servicing or maintenance of
Aircraft;
(3) exercises no part in the appointment or provision of
personnel for the operation of the Aircraft.
THIS ENDORSEMENT does not apply:
(b) to any Aircraft having a seating capacity in excess of one
(1) passenger seat;
823 Id. at 6.
824 Quinones-Pacheco, 979 F.2d at 7.
825 Id.
826 No. 92-C5607, No. 93-C2396, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227 (N.D. Il1. Sept. 17,
1993).
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(d) when the Aircraft is used by the Named Insured for
hire and reward."2 7
Cascade entered into a contract with A & A Aerial Spray-
ing for the use of a Hiller helicopter to be used, along with
its Robinson aircraft, to fulfill a contract to fly video produ-
cers to film an off-shore boat race near Michigan City, Indi-
ana. Plaintiffs alleged that Michigan City Water Sports
agreed to pay Cascade for the use of both helicopters. De-
fendants contended that Cascade was to receive no com-
pensation for the operation of the Hiller aircraft, but only
for use of the helicopter owned by Cascade.
On August 3, 1991, during the flight to film the off-shore
boat race, the Hiller helicopter crashed injuring the pilot
and two passengers. Defendant Cascade requested cover-
age for the injuries and property damage claims arising out
of the incident. Underwriters claimed that no coverage ex-
isted because the Hiller aircraft had a seating capacity of
more than one passenger and was being used for "hire and
reward."
The district court first evaluated the one passenger seat
exclusion.828 The insured argued that, even though the he-
licopter was occupied by two passengers, it only had one
continuous bench seat on which three people can sit.829
Since the terms "passenger seat," "seat" and "seating capac-
ity" are not defined in the plaintiff's policy, the court con-
cluded that the policy was ambiguous and must be
construed against the insurer. 30 It stated:
[Underwriters] could have been more specific as to their in-
tended meaning of the word seat when drafting the policy
simply by either defining the term or by not using the word
when drafting this exclusion, stating instead that the added
coverage does not apply to any aircraft having a seating ca-
pacity in excess of one passenger. By choosing to use the
827 Id. at *1-2.
828 Id. at *6.
829 Id. at *6-7.
sm Id.
1994]
152 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [60
word seat in this way, the term can reasonably be construed
to mean a bench that can hold more than one passenger.
Because ambiguities are to be construed against the insurer,
summary judgment is inappropriate as to the application of
this exclusion.8"'
With respect to the "hire and reward" exclusion, the
court noted that there was a question of fact as to whether
Cascade received compensation for the use of the Hiller he-
licopter.832 More fundamentally, however, the district court
considered the affidavit of an aviation claims manager that
a "hire and reward" exclusion contained in an insurance
policy purchased by a commercial operator, such as Cas-
cade, could not apply to commercial operators because their
operations are generally only for hire and reward.833 Such
an exclusion would "completely abrogate the extended cov-
erage of the non-owned aircraft endorsement since it would
eliminate every possible use of the aircraft by the named
insured.'8 34 Accordingly, the court held that genuine issues
of fact existed as to whether the "hire and reward" clause
was intended by the parties to apply to Cascade, and Under-
writers' motion for summary judgment was denied.8 35
2. Unambiguous Terms
In Home Insurance Co. v. PhillipS136 coverage under a
premises liability policy for an accident which occurred off
the airport was the issue before the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Florida. The claim arose from a
takeoff accident on August 25, 1988, from North Perry Air-
port in Broward County, Florida. This accident involved
the crash of a twin engine Piper Aerostar into the roof of a
building. One of the persons injured was an employee of
one of the stores in the building. The employee subse-
quently filed suit against the insured, Lauderdale Aviation
83, Cascade Helicopters, Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227 at *7-8.
832 Id. at *8.
833 Id. at *9.
834 Id. at *10.
835 Id.
816 815 F. Supp. 1471 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
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and against the Estate of Louis E. Phillips, its president and
owner, who died in the accident. A consent judgment for
$750,000 was entered against the personal representative of
Mr. Phillips' Estate. Plaintiffs then filed a second complaint
against Lauderdale Aviation. Final judgment was entered
against Lauderdale Aviation after the parties agreed that
plaintiffs would accept an assignment of the rights under
the insurance policy issued by Home. After final judgment
was entered against Lauderdale Aviation, the plaintiffs'
counsel demanded that Home satisfy the judgment of
$750,000 on behalf of Lauderdale Aviation.
The policy in question was entitled "Owners', Landlords'
and Tenants' Liability Insurance Coverage for Designated
Premises and Related Operations in Progress (other than
structural alterations, new construction and demolition)."
Premises-operations was defined as follows: "That por-
tion of the airport located at North Perry Airport, FL, in the
care custody or control of the named insured." 37
The body of the policy states in pertinent part:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of A. bodily injury or B. property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence
and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the
Insured Premises and all operations necessary or incidental
thereto. 838
Additionally, an airport liability endorsement which was
incorporated into the policy also stated that it applied to
the ownership, maintenance, or use of the airport by the
named insured, including all operations, necessary or inci-
dental thereto.
The policy included the following exclusion: "This insur-
ance does not apply ... (b) to bodily injury or property
damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance, opera-
tion, use, loading or unloading of . . . (3) any aircraft
87 Id. at 1473.
8- Id. (emphasis added).
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owned by, rented to, loaned to or held for demonstration
or sale by the insured."839
The district court held that there was no coverage for the
liability claims on the ground that to broadly construe the
language "arising out of the ... use of the insured's prem-
ises, and all operations necessary or incidental thereto"
would effectively convert the premises liability policy to a
general liability policy.8 40 The court recognized other deci-
sions which had drawn a distinction between the immediate
circumstances which inflict bodily injury and the antece-
dent negligence which sets the chain of events leading to
the injury in motion.841 To provide coverage simply be-
cause the antecedent negligence occurred as a part of the
use of the premises (i.e., maintenance and servicing of air-
craft on the premises) would be to eliminate any distinction
between premises liability and general liability policies.8 42
As an alternative basis for the decision, the court also
noted that the pilot Louis E. Phillips, was an additional in-
sured under the policy, and, as such, there was no coverage
for bodily injury arising out of the use of an aircraft owned
by, rented to, or loaned to the insured.843 The district court
rejected the argument that the exclusion did not apply be-
cause Louis E. Phillips was simply "an insured," rather than
"the insured. 8 44 The court held that "the intended mean-
ing of the policy exclusion [was] clear."845 Accordingly, the
district court denied any coverage for the $750,000 consent
judgment which had been entered against Home's
insured.846
In Coleman v. Charlesworth847 the Illinois Supreme Court
interpreted the coverage provided to an insured as a result
8-9 Id. at 1474.
840 Id. at 1473.
841 Phillips, 815 F. Supp. at 1473.
842 Id.
843 Id. at 1474.
844 Id.
845 Id.
846 Phillips, 815 F. Supp. at 1474-75.
847 623 N.E.2d 1366 (I1. 1993).
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of a "cover note" or "binder" prior to issuance of the policy.
As stated by the court: "[The insured,) Windy City Balloon
Port purchased a policy providing aviation premises and
products liability insurance. Windy City offered commer-
cial sightseeing flights to the public in hot air and helium
balloons owned by third parties. Windy City also offered
repair and refueling services for balloons." 4 The claims
involved in this case arose from an accident in which a hot
air balloon piloted by a third party carrying five passengers
struck electrical power lines, resulting in the death of the
pilot and four of the five passengers. The passengers filed
suit against Windy City and coverage was tendered to the
insurer, which refused to appear, defend, or extend cover-
age.849 The court entered a judgment of $4.4 million
against Windy City.850
Windy City contended that the "cover note" conflicted
with the policy itself, but that under both the cover note
and the policy, coverage was provided. The court noted
that the cover note itself only stated that it provided cover-
age "to premises and products liability to third parties aris-
ing out of [their] operations at their balloon port, excluding
repairs." The cover note also specifically stated that it was
subject to the terms, conditions and exceptions of the pol-
icy to be issued by the insurers. 85 1 The Illinois Supreme
Court acknowledged that an "insurance binder which does
not itself specify the terms and provisions of the policy, in-
corporates, as a matter of law, all of the terms and provi-
sions of the policy."852
Referring to the terms and conditions of the policy, the
court noted that coverage was provided as follows:
bodily injury or property damage (a) in or about the prem-
ises ... as a direct result of the services granted by the As-
sured [Windy City] or (b) elsewhere in the course of any
8 Id. at 1367.
849 Id.
850 Id.
851 Id. at 1368.
852 Coleman, 623 N.E.2d at 1368.
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work or the performance of any duties carried out by the
Assured or his employees in connection with the business or
operations ... caused by the fault or negligence of the As-
sured or any of his employees engaged in the Asssured's
business.8 53
The court further noted that the policy also was subject
to the following exclusion: "bodily injury or property dam-
age caused by ... (b) any Ships, Vessels, Crafts, or Aircraft
owned, chartered used or operated by or on account of the
assured [Windy City] .854
The court noted that Windy City initially claimed that the
pilot "was an employee, agent and joint venturer of Windy
City" and that coverage, therefore, was provided under the
policy for the fault or negligence of the pilot as an em-
ployee of the insured's business. 55 The court held that the
exclusion for bodily injury caused by aircraft operated by or
on account of the insured excluded such coverage. 56 The
court also noted that the premises liability portions were
not applicable in that the accident did not occur "in or
about the premises."8 57
The insured's alternative argument was that there was no
joint venture agreement and that Windy City's negligent act
was "allowing the balloon to take off given the weather con-
ditions at the time of departure"158 which occurred at its
premises. 5 9 The court refused to allow Windy City to disa-
vow the joint venture relationship, having plead such a rela-
tionship in its initial complaint. 60 The court held that, in
view of the joint venture relationship, the exclusion for air-






857 Coleman, 623 N.E.2d at 1368-69.
- Id. at 1368.
859 Id.
-' Id. at 1369.
861 Id.
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Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court held that providing
balloon rides was not a good or product, therefore, there
was no coverage under the products liability provisions.86 2
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded "Aircraft operators
insurance would have provided Windy City with coverage
for liabilities arising out of the use of aircraft. The policy in
question, however, was not that type of insurance. "863
The definition of "in motion" versus "not in motion" was
the issue decided by the Arkansas Court of Appeals in Keller
v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America.864 If the aircraft was "not
in motion," then a $1,000 deductible applied. If the aircraft
was "in motion," however, then a 10% deductible applied.
The aircraft was insured for $140,000, and suffered $9,650
in damages during a wind storm. The damage occurred
during a storm which developed when the aircraft was on
the apron, but not tied down. The pilot noticed the storm
approaching, started the engine, and taxied down the run-
way in order to secure the plane. Before the pilot could
reach the tie-down area, the wind conditions worsened, and
the pilot turned the engine off. The propeller continued
turning, and the wind lifted the tail, causing the propeller
to hit the tarmac and damage all its blades. The insured
testified that the engine was not running, but apparently
conceded that the propeller was still turning from the mo-
mentum of the engine when the tail was lifted up.865 The
term "in motion" is defined as follows: "The aircraft shall be
deemed 'in motion' when moving under its own power, or
momentum therefrom. The aircraft shall be deemed 'not
in motion' under all other circumstances. 866
Similarly "aircraft" is defined as follows:
"Aircraft" means the airplane or rotorcraft described herein
and shall include the engines, propellers, rotor blades, tools
and repair equipment therein which are standard for the
862 Coleman, 623 N.E.2d at 1369.
- Id.
866 S.W.2d 419 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993).
85 Id. at 421.
8r6 Id. at 420.
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make and type of the aircraft, and operating and navigation
instruments and radio equipment usually attached to the
aircraft, including parts temporarily detached and not re-
placed by other similar parts.
86 7
The policy also included a provision which stated that:
[i] n the event the aircraft, while not in flight, is damaged by
wind... which occurs while the aircraft is unhangared and
not in flight, the insurance.., is subject to a single amount
deductible "Not in Motion" or "In Motion" of ten percent
(10%) of the amount of the insurance for the aircraft. 68
Safeco's position was that, because the propeller was a
part of the aircraft and was in motion, the "in motion" de-
ductible applied. The insureds argued that it was not clear,
under the definition of "in motion," whether the aircraft
was "in motion" if any part of it was moving. The insureds
also argued that, under the policy, for the aircraft to have
been "in motion" the aircraft as a whole must have been
moving. 86
9
The Arkansas Court of Appeals agreed with the insurer
that the policy was not ambiguous and the "in motion" de-
ductible was applicable.870 Furthermore, even though the
insurer apparently had not raised the wind damage exclu-
sion, the court also concluded that "the aircraft was dam-
aged by wind, while unhangared and not in flight," thereby
invoking the single amount deductible for wind damage. 71
The dissent criticized the majority opinion for overlook-
ing the ambiguity as to whether the aircraft as a whole must
be "in motion," as opposed to any of its parts.8 72 Addition-
ally, the dissent strongly objected to the majority reference
to the wind damage exclusion when the parties had not
raised the issue. The dissent noted as follows:
-7 Id.
- Id.
Keller, 866 S.W.2d at 421.




Although I agree that this provision may be applicable, it is
extremely important to note that this provision was not ab-
stracted by the parties, and none of the parties argued
either to the trial court or to this court that it is applicable
to the issue before us. The silence of the parties in this re-
gard gives us an important indication of how they interpret
their own agreement, and I believe that we have failed to
give the parties' construction of the agreement the great
weight to which it is entitled. Perhaps the parties do not
cite the deductible provision because it was not in effect at
the time of the accident. I suggest that it is unwise of us to
presume that we have a greater familiarity with the terms of
the parties' agreement than the parties themselves.
Finally, I wish to emphasize that the deductible provision
quoted by the majority in support of its decision was not
argued as a basis for summary judgment in the appellee's
motion. By seizing on this unargued point in order to af-
firm, we are going far beyond the parameters of Rule 56.
Our Supreme Court has said that, in considering a motion
for summary judgment, it would be error for a court to con-
sider any allegations brought out for the first time in the
parties' briefs. In the case at bar, we are, in effect, sanction-
ing a summary judgment on grounds that were never
brought out by the parties at all. Even if we have thereby
arrived at an answer that is academically sound, that answer
is not legally correct if we must depart from our standard of
review to reach it.873
A coverage issue under a homeowner's policy was
presented to the Georgia Court of Appeals in Ivey v. First of
Georgia Insurance Co.174 The case arose from an accident in
which Ivey, the insured under the policy, sold a Midget
Mustang I Airplane to 19-year-old Randy Smith. Smith only
recently obtained his private pilot's license and Ivey under-
took to provide flight instruction.
After some preliminary instruction in a two-seat, tail-wheel
aircraft, Smith attempted his first solo flight in the Mustang.
Because of the single seat design of the Mustang, Ivey re-
873 Id. at 422-23 (citations omitted).
87- 434 S.E.2d 556 (Ga. App. 1993).
1994]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
mained on the ground and used a handheld radio to com-
municate with Smith during flight. On his first landing
approach, Smith bounced the airplane and attempted to
abort the landing and execute a "go around" by applying
full power. While this procedure was correct for the aircraft
Smith had been trained in, the Mustang was a high-power,
high-torque aircraft, and applying full power caused the
plane to roll inverted. Smith then lost control resulting in a
serious accident.875
First of Georgia brought a declaratory judgment action
alleging no liability coverage for Ivey because the claims
arose "out of the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or
unloading of an aircraft. '876 The majority found that use of
the aircraft did not require the insured, Ivey, to actually be
in physical contact with the aircraft as long as there was
"control" over the aircraft while it was being used.877 The
court stated that "[i] t [was] impossible to imagine a circum-
stance in which a flight instructor could provide ground to
air instruction without the involvement of an airplane. 878
Accordingly, both Ivey and Smith were "using the plane at
the time of the tragic accident."879 The court held that cov-
erage was excluded under the homeowner's policy.88 ° A
dissenting opinion argued that the term "use" in an exclu-
sion should be narrowly interpreted and that the majority
had confused the rules of construction by applying cases
involving the liberal interpretation of coverage provisions.
The dissent concluded that the word "use" was subject to
two interpretations requiring a narrow construction which
would support coverage. 881
In St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co.882 St.
Paul sought a declaration that its personal umbrella liability
policy did not provide coverage for liability due to aircraft




87 Ivey, 434 S.E.2d at 557.
880 Id. at 558.
88, Id. at 560.
882 No. 92-1045-FR, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4458, at *2 (D. Or. Apr. 2, 1993).
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accidents. The underlying St. Paul policy excluded "liability
resulting from aircraft accidents, commercial or noncom-
mercial. But we do cover model aircraft incapable of carry-
ing passengers or property. PAR II covers your personal
property while it is on any aircraft."883 The umbrella policy
did not itself contain an exclusion of aircraft liability cover-
age, but stated the following: "In addition to the claims not
covered that are listed in your PAR II policy, this endorse-
"1884ment does not cover the following types of claims ....
Construing the two provisions in combination, the court
held that the umbrella endorsement incorporated the ex-
clusions of the PAR II policy, which expressly excluded lia-
bility coverage for aviation accidents.885 Accordingly, the
court held that there was no liability insurance coverage for
the aircraft and the accident involved in that case.886
B. PERSONS COVERED
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of liability coverage
for injuries to a renter pilot in Ranger Insurance Co. v.
Mijne. 8 7 In Mijne Marc Potzner rented a Piper Tomahawk
aircraft from Ranger's insured, Levelland Aviation. Potzner
and a friend, Mijne, both of whom were licensed pilots,
were involved in a crash in which it was uncertain which of
the two men was piloting the plane when it crashed. The
policy limits under the Ranger Insurance Company were
limited to $100,000.00 for each person and $300,000.00 for
each occurrence.
Notably, the policy defined passenger as "any person who
is in the aircraft or getting in or out of it.""88 The policy
also included a provision which stated that it did not pro-
vide bodily injury and property damage coverage to renter
pilots.88 9
- Id. at *3.
- Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
- Id. at *8.
- Id. at *9.
-7 991 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1993).
- Id. at 241.
,, Id. at 242.
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Prior to suit, Ranger Insurance Company offered
$100,000.00 to be divided between the estates of Mijne and
Potzner. The estates of Mijne and Potzner contended that
they each were entitled to $100,000.00. As a result of this
dispute, Ranger Insurance Company interpleaded
$100,000.00 into the registry of the federal court and re-
quested a declaratory judgment as to whom to pay the in-
surance proceeds. 890  Each of the defendants filed
counterclaims and crossclaims for declaratory judgment
and all parties filed motions for summary judgment.89 1
The district court concluded that the following provision
precluded coverage for any injuries to renter pilot Potzner:
"Who is not protected Your bodily injury and property damage
coverage does not protect: ... [a] ny renter pilot."892 Hence,
the district court concluded that there was no ambiguity
and held that there was no coverage for any injuries to
Potzner because "renter pilots are not 'protected' under
the policy - as excluding from coverage any bodily injury to
renter pilots."8 93
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals distin-
guished the issue of liability coverage from the types of
damages for which coverage would be provided under the
policy.8 94 The court held that the exclusion from liability
coverage for renter pilots did not exclude coverage for any
claims which a renter pilot might make arising from bodily
injuries to himself895 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the policy, while not providing liability
coverage for the liability of a renter pilot, did provide cover-
age for any injuries to the renter pilot.8 96 The Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court's grant of declaratory and sum-
89- Id.
8 Id.
89 Mine, 991 F.2d at 242.
893 Id. at 242-43.




mary judgment for Ranger and rendered judgment for
Potzner. s97
C. LIENHOLDER'S ENDORSEMENTS
In Union Planter's National Bank v. American Home Assur-
ance Co.s98 the court addressed the proper recovery by a
lienholder under a breach of warranty endorsement where
the insured aircraft had been recovered, repossessed, and
sold, thereby resulting in a deficiency claim on the part of
the lender. The lender contended that the full amount of
the deficiency was the amount of its damages under the
breach of warranty endorsement. The insurer, on the
other hand, contended that it had liability only for property
damage to the aircraft prior to its recovery as collateral for
the debt, but not for the underlying debt.
The aircraft involved in this case apparently had been
seized as a result of its use in drug trafficking by a person
other than the named insured. Upon its recovery by the
lienholder, the aircraft was sold for a substantial deficiency.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals found it was necessary to
look to the underlying policy to determine the extent of
coverage.8 99 The only coverage provided in the underlying
policy was "physical damage coverage" and, as such, the pol-
icy clearly and unambiguously limited the lienholder's cov-
erage to any physical property damage which the lienholder
could establish was covered under the policy.900 The under-
lying policy also expressly precluded seizure as a covered
event.
D. POLICY RENEWAL
In Insurance Company of Pennsylvania v. Hoffmana l the
U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota held that
certain alleged misrepresentations by the insured as to
8-7 Mijne, 991 F.2d at 244.
898 865 S.W.2d 907 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).
899 Id. at 912.
goo Id.
-01 814 F. Supp. 782 (D. Minn. 1993).
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whether the aircraft to be insured was newly purchased and
whether the aircraft had four seats, rather than five seats,
were not material misrepresentations such as to void cover-
age arising from a mid-air collision involving the aircraft. 90 2
The court held that Minnesota law did not define an in-
creased risk of loss as an increase in the "amount of the
insured's exposure. 90 3 Instead, the court held that Minne-
sota law limited the phrase risk of loss to the "likelihood of
future liability on the insurance company for loss."904
The district court further held that the misrepresenta-
tions, even if they increased the risk, were not material mis-
representations because the plaintiff's insurance manager,
AIG Aviation, issued coverage to the insured for the same
aircraft for the prior policy year.90 5 The court stated that
the application for the prior policy correctly stated that the
aircraft was not newly acquired and that the aircraft had
been modified to have seats for five passengers.90 6 Appar-
ently, the policy in question in this case had been obtained
by a new insurance agent.
Finally, the district court did not permit the Insurance
Company of the State of Pennsylvania to amend its com-
plaint to add a claim that the misrepresentations were
made with "the intent to deceive or defraud." 907 The court
held that the time for amendments of the pleadings had
expired and that no reason or justification to permit the
amendment had been established.90
902 Id. at 786.
- Id. at 786-87.
-1 Id. (quoting Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 152 N.W.2d 476 (Minn.
1967)).
o5 Id. at 788.
- Hoffman, 814 F. Supp. at 787 n.14.
-7 Id. at 787-88.
-' Id. at 787.
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X. FAA ENFORCEMENT/LOCAL REGULATION
A. DUE PROCESS AND PROCEDURES
In Pinney v. National Transportation Safety Board9' the
court held that the NTSB did not exceed its statutory juris-
diction when it promulgated 14 C.F.R. § 61.15910 which
states that: "[a] conviction for the violation of any Federal or
state statute relating to the... importation of ... marijuana
... is grounds for . . . [s]uspension or revocation of any
certificate or rating issued under this part."911
Pinney challenged the regulation on the grounds that it
exceeded the FAA's statutory jurisdiction. The Tenth Cir-
cuit court held that the FAA promulgated § 61.15 because a
conviction indicated that the convicted "demonstrated" a
"tendency" to act "without inhibition in an unstable man-
ner with regard to the rights of others," and that pilots con-
victed of violating drug laws are "potentially dangerous
because they are also likely to violate requirements con-
cerning air safety. ' 912 This rationale provided a reasonable
relationship between a conviction for violation of a drug
law and flight safety. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit held
that the revocation of Pinney's certificate was the proper
sanction because Pinney admitted piloting an aircraft which
he believed may have been used to import marijuana.913
In Smith v. NTSB914 the suspension of a pilot's certificate
for violating terminal control air space was reversed on the
grounds that the FAA Bulletin 86-2 of the Compliance and
Enforcement Manual was not available to the public at the
time of the violation.915 The pilot challenged the suspen-
sion based upon the Administrative Procedure Act which
states that "[a]dministrative staff manuals and instructions
to staff that affect a member of the public" must be made
-0 993 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1993).
910 14 C.F.R. § 61.15(a) (1993).
91 Pinney, 993 F.2d at 202 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 61.15 (1993)).
912 Id. at 203.
91 Id. at 204.
914 981 F.2d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
915 Id. at 1327.
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available to the public and that "an agency may not rely
upon any manual or instruction that it has not made avail-
able to the public. 916
The NTSB attempted to avoid this reversal by contending
that the policy did not affect the public and also that it did
not rely upon Bulletin 86-2. The D.C. Circuit concluded
that the Compliance and Enforcement Manual, which set
forth the severity of sanctions for certain violations, directly
affected the public and made a careful analysis of deter-
rence jurisprudence from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Rich-
ard A. Posner in concluding that the severity of the
punishment is a well-recognized form of deterrence. 17 In-
deed, the FAA had, itself, concluded that increased sanc-
tions were necessary to provide "an effective deterrent"
because previous sanctions had been ineffective.918 Finally,
the court rejected the argument that the NTSB had not re-
lied upon Bulletin 86-2, in noting the sanctions imposed
were precisely those established for the first time under the
bulletin. 919
B. PILOT CERTIFICATE ACTIONS
The responsibility of an aircraft captain or pilot in com-
mand to determine the fitness of crew members for flight
was presented in Johnson v. National Transportation Safety
Board. 920 This case involved a commuter airline passenger
flight in which the co-pilot was found to be intoxicated.
Upon landing, the co-pilot was determined to have a blood
alcohol level of .14, and was unable to pass certain objective
field sobriety tests, such as "count[ing] backwards from
thirty-nine, recit[ing] the alphabet, or balanc[ing] while
walking heel-to-toe." 21 Additionally, other witnesses testi-
fied that they had detected the presence of alcohol on the
co-pilot's breath. As a result, the co-pilot's pilot certificate
916 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2) (c) (1978)).
9,7 Smith 981 F.2d at 1327-28 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2) (c)(1978)).
918 Id. at 1327.
919 Id. at 1329.
-0 979 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1992).
921 Id. at 619.
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was revoked. The FAA also sought an emergency revoca-
tion of the captain's certificate under Federal Aviation Reg-
ulations 91.13(a) and 91.17(b).922
The administrative lawjudge reversed the emergency rev-
ocation of the captain's certificate on the grounds that sec-
tion 91.17(b), which allows an intoxicated person to be
carried in an aircraft, was not violated, but the judge af-
firmed the revocation on the grounds of section 91.13, stat-
ing that she believed the captain did know that the co-pilot
was impaired, but was bound by a "conspiracy of silence"
which prevented proof of that knowledge.923 Nevertheless,
the administrative law judge determined that the failure to
detect the impaired condition was sufficient only to justify a
four-month suspension rather than a revocation. 924 Both
pilots appealed to the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), which reinstated the revocation against the
captain.
In a strongly-worded opinion, the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the NTSB and rejected any argument that the cap-
tain's conduct was merely negligent.925 Indeed, that very
argument seemed to inflame the court, which adopted a
portion of the NTSB's brief that read as follows:
In our view, the cockpit is no place to indulge uncertainties
over a crewmember's full capacity to perform all required
duties, and an ATP certificate holder serving as captain of a
commercial flight who does not reflexively recoil from the
possibility of entrusting the safety of his passengers and air-
craft to a crewmember whose judgment and skill may be di-
minished by alcohol use neither appreciates the seriousness
of operating while impaired nor understands the public
safety obligations of his command.926
The court recognized that revocation of the pilot's certifi-
cate and deprivation of the pilot's ability to earn a living was
9- 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a), 91.17(b) (1992).
92S Johnson, 979 F.2d at 619 n.14.
924 Id. at 622-23.
925 Id. at 622.
926 Id. at 622.
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a "harsh sentence."927 Nevertheless, it refused to substitute
its judgment for that of the NTSB stating:
It is not an abuse of discretion to conclude that flying an
aircraft while impaired is inherently dangerous conduct.
Nor is it an abuse of discretion to conclude that the com-
manding pilot has an absolute, non-delegable duty to ascertain
the readiness of the co-pilot. The Board is not constrained to
impose serious sanctions on pilots only when tragedy oc-
curs. Congress has delegated to the agency wide discretion
to take reasonable action to avert preventable tragedies.
This discretion extends both to removing culpable crew
members to taking administrative actions to encourage re-
sponsible supervision by commanding pilots. 92 1
The issue of providing common carriage without comply-
ing with the requirements of either FAR Part 135 or FAR
part 121 was reviewed in detail in Woolsey v. National Trans-
portation Safety Board,929 which involved the revocation of
Roger Woolsey's pilot certificate as the result of his failure
to comply with safety requirements for pilots operating air-
craft for a common carrier under FAR Part 135. Woolsey
was the president of a corporation which provided air trans-
portation to many prominent clients in the music indus-
try.930 The case arose as the result of an investigation
following the crash of an aircraft carrying Reba McIntyre's
band.
Woolsey contended that his operations consisted entirely
of private contracts under which he arranged for the lease
of an aircraft by each of the performers and then provided
a flight crew. The court noted that Woolsey actively solic-
ited business from entertainers and represented that his
927 Id.
928 Johnson, 979 F.2d at 623 (emphasis added).
929 993 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1993).
910 The 25 artists listed in a "thank you note" to clients included: Reba McIntyre,
Billy Joel, Ricky Scaggs, Larry Gatlin and the Gatlin Brothers, the Jerry Garcia Band,
Duran Duran, Chicago, Kiss, Alice Cooper, Clint Black, Europe, Arron Tippon, Cin-
derella, Robert Plant, White Snake,Jimmy Buffet, U-2, Depeche Mode, Stevie Nicks,
the Judds, Don Williams, Sawyer Brown, Chet Atkins, the Grateful Dead, and Garri-
son Keillor. Id. at 517 n.1.
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company complied with the "strict flight requirements that
meet the highest Federal Aviation Regulations."93 '
The FAA contended that Woolsey was providing common
carriage and was subject to the requirements of FAR Part
135. Woolsey argued that he was not holding himself out to
the "public," but was merely sending out invitations to a se-
lected group to negotiate contracts on a case-by-case basis,
"without any evidence of uniformity of charges or willing-
ness to carry all persons applying so long as there is room in
the aircraft. 932
The FAA contended that common carriage did not re-
quire a holding out to the public at large, but merely to an
identifiable segment of the public. Moreover, there was no
evidence that Woolsey had ever turned away anyone in the
music industry able to pay for his services.
Woolsey also contended that the absence of uniform tar-
iffs precluded a finding of common carriage, but the court
gave deference to the FAA's argument that the absence of
tariffs or rate schedules, ".. . or [even] occasional refusals to
transport, are not conclusive proof that the carrier is not a
common carrier. 9 3
Woolsey also contended that he charged no more than
was permitted under the timesharing regulations of FAR
Part 91.501(c) (1). Nevertheless, the court concluded that
timesharing regulations only apply to private or contract
carriers and not to common carriers.3 The court con-
cluded that:
The objective conduct of [Woolsey's company] holding out
its services to the music industry and actually serving scores
of different musicians, makes [the company's] operations
subject to FAR Part 135. The subjective intentions of Wool-
sey are not controlling. It is the objective conduct of him-
self and his corporation which bring their actions under
FAR Part 135. The Federal Aviation Regulations are primar-
93, Id. at 519 n.9.
932 Id. at 522.
933 Id. at 524 (quoting Advisory Circular No. 120-12A, April 24, 1986, at 1).
9-4 Woolsey, 993 F.2d at 524.
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ily designed to protect the public safety, and not the private
contractual aspirations of given parties.935
C. APPEAL
The reviewability of FAA revocation of an FAA-designated
Pilot Examiner Designation was the subject of Adams v. Fed-
eral Aviation Administration.936 In that case, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that there were no 'judicially manageable
standards" by which it might review the FAA administrator's
decision not to review a designation as a Pilot Examiner. 93 7
The court noted:
Agency action is unreviewable when "the statute is drawn so
that a court would have no meaningful standard against
which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion.... Such
a determination is statute specific and relates to the lan-
guage of the statute and whether the general purposes of
the statute would be endangered by judicial review. 938
The court also noted that the Federal Aviation Act specifi-
cally authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to rescind
any delegation "at any time and for any reason which he
deems appropriate."93 9 This statutory language supported
the conclusion that rescission of an FAA Designated Exam-
iner's Certificate was entirely within the discretion of the
FAA.940
In Green v. Brantley9 4' the issue of jurisdiction to review
FAA orders apparently was reviewed sua sponte by the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals in an appeal from a district
court decision pertaining to a constitutional attack on the
revocation of a Flight Examiner's authorization. The FAA,
through its representatives, had revoked Flight Examiner
935 Id. at 525 (emphasis added).
93 1 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 690 (1994).
937 Id. at 956.
o3 Id. (citations omitted).
939 Id.
94Id.
9' 981 F.2d 514 (11th Cir. 1993).
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Green's authorization to conduct flight tests for certifica-
tion of pilots.
Rather than challenging this revocation by an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit pursuant
to 49 U.S.C. § 1486, Pilot Examiner Green's attorney filed a
constitutional challenge, alleging both a conspiracy to de-
prive Flight Examiner Green of a valuable property right
and also a conspiracy to violate his First Amendment rights
as a result of testimony he gave against the United States in
an unrelated action. The FAA employees denied that they
had acted improperly and further claimed qualified immu-
nity under Mitchell v. Forsyth.94 2 The U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia held that there was a jury
question as to qualified immunity and denied their motion
for summary judgment.9 43 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
did not reach the merits of the summary judgment issues,
stating that the court had the obligation to "satisfy itself not
only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a
cause under review." 4"
The Eleventh Circuit then reviewed the jurisdiction of
the district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) and con-
cluded that the constitutional challenges against the FAA
employees were intertwined with the procedural and sub-
stantive merits of the FAA's revocation action and that such
constitutional challenge constituted an impermissible col-
lateral attack on a final FAA order. 45
The court stated that the letter to Mr. Green revoking his
Flight Examiner designation possessed the requisite finality,
and even the correspondence itself might be a sufficient
record for review of the Agency action.946 Accordingly, the
court held that the proper method of review of the FAA
action would have been to file a petition within sixty days of
-42 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
- Green, 981 F.2d at 519.
944 Id. at 516 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
94s Id. at 520.
946 Id. at 521.
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the FAA order in the appropriate court of appeals pursuant
to Section 1006 of the Federal Aviation Act.
947
The Eleventh Circuit declined to exercise jurisdiction to
accept review of the FAA order, stating that Flight Exam-
iner Green had failed to file that petition within sixty days
after the order was issued and had not demonstrated "rea-
sonable grounds for failure to file."948
The issue of bankruptcy court jurisdiction over review
and enforcement of an FAA emergency revocation order
was presented in In re Horizon Air, Inc.9 49 where the FAA is-
sued an emergency order revoking the air carrier operating
certificate of Horizon Air a Chapter 11 debtor. Horizon Air
immediately petitioned the bankruptcy judge for a tempo-
rary restraining order enjoining enforcement of the emer-
gency revocation order. A series of appeals were filed to the
U.S. district judge, culminating in the following decision.
The district court held that the Bankruptcy Code grants
subject matter jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters to the
U.S. district courts. 950 The grant of jurisdiction extends to
all civil proceedings which "arise under" or "arise in" Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.951 These proceedings spe-
cifically include orders to turn over property of the estate
under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2).952
An emergency revocation of an air carrier operating cer-
tificate was deemed by the court to be an order to turnover
property of the estate.95 The district court rejected a series
of decisions in which FAA landing slots had been deemed
not to be property of the estate.954 The court held that the
air carrier operating certificate was property of the estate;
947 Id.; see 49 U.S.C. app. § 1486 (1988).
948 Green, 981 F.2d at 521 n.2.
049 156 B.R. 369 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1993).
9- Id. at 372; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 157, 1334 (1988).
951 In re Horizon Air, Inc., 156 B.R. at 375.
952 Id.
953 Id.
954 Id. at 376.
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therefore, the federal district court had subject matter juris-
diction over the FAA's action requiring its revocation.955
The court further noted that, pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(b) (4), the automatic stay would not apply to "the
commencement or continuation of an action or proceed-
ing by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental
unit's police or regulatory power." '956 Accordingly, if the
district court were to conclude that the FAA acted properly,
then the automatic stay would be lifted.95 7 Conversely, if
the governmental unit had not acted properly, then the au-
tomatic stay would remain in force.95 Based upon this
analysis, along with the express waiver of sovereign immu-
nity in 11 U.S.C. § 106(c), the court also concluded that the
United States was subject to personal jurisdiction in the dis-
trict court for purposes of the automatic stay.95 9
Finally, the court evaluated the question of whether the
grant of jurisdiction to review FAA administrative decisions
to the U. S. Circuit Courts of Appeals under 49 U.S.C.
§ 1486 precluded the exercise of district court jurisdiction.
The court held that the U. S. district courts and the U.S.
circuit courts of appeals had concurrent jurisdiction, the
district court under the bankruptcy law, and the U. S. cir-
cuit courts of appeals under the Federal Aviation Act.960
The district court concluded that referring this case to the
U. S. circuit court of appeals would not be in the interest of
an expeditious disposition of this matter (which involved a
hearing on a preliminary injunction within days of the
court's order).961 Instead, the court held that retaining ju-
risdiction would result in the most expeditious resolution of
955 Id. at 377.




-6 Id. at 378.
-61 In re Horizon Air, Inc., 156 B.R. at 378.
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the matter and therefore retained jurisdiction pursuant to
Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.962
D. FoRFEITURE
The operation and seizure of an unregistered helicopter
was the subject of United States v. One Helicopter.963 Under
the amendments to the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1472(b) (1) (C), "it is unlawful for any person, who is the
owner of an aircraft eligible for registration, to knowingly
and willfully operate, attempt to operate, or permit any
other person to operate such aircraft if the aircraft is not
registered under 49 U.S.C. § 1401.964 Furthermore, pursu-
ant to §1472(b) (3) (A), an aircraft used in connection with
aiding or facilitating a violation of paragraph 1, whether or
not a person is charged in connection with such violation,
may be seized and subjected to forfeiture by the Drug En-
forcement Administration.9 65
In this case, no attempt had been made by the owner of
the aircraft either to file the bill of sale or to register the
aircraft with the FAA Aircraft Registry. Additionally, the al-
leged existence of a dispute as to title was irrelevant in that
the "owner" for purposes of registration was deemed to in-
clude a "buyer in possession" and application of the statute
is not limited to those with "perfect tide."9 6 6 Accordingly,
the "buyer in possession" was required to register the air-
- Id. The distinction between this case and other cases which have concluded
that only the U. S. circuit courts of appeal have jurisdiction to review FAA actions
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. App. § 1486 is that the Bankruptcy Code contains an express
grant of federal subject matter jurisdiction for matters related to the debtor. In
other cases in which the district courts have been denied original jurisdiction, there
has been no specific grant of federal district court jurisdiction other than general
federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). Further, in Green v. Brant-
ley, 981 F.2d 514, 520 (lth Cir. 1993), the court concluded that the suit against
individual FAA employees under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, was merely a "back door" attempt
to seek review of the agency action in the district court, contrary to the exclusive
provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 1486. Id.
-3 No. 90-C6777, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7749 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 1993).
9 Id. at *1.
965 Id. at *2.
966 Id. at *7.
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craft and the failure to do so resulted in forfeiture of the
aircraft to the United States Government. 67
E. ArroRNys' FEES
In Smith v. NTSB 68 the pilot appealed the NTSB reversal
an award of attorneys fees' under 5 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1). Pi-
lot Smith was charged with violating FAR § 91.75(a) and
(b) (prohibiting deviation from air traffic controller's in-
structions), § 91.9 (prohibiting careless or reckless opera-
tion of aircraft), and § 61.3(c) (requiring pilots to have a
current medical certificate). Pilot Smith allegedly deviated
from his assigned altitude resulting in a near-miss alarm at
Chicago Center. Smith contended that he was responding
to an air traffic control instruction at the time of his de-
scent. Immediately after the near-miss alarm, the radar
controller responsible for the sector contacted Smith and,
as stated by the court, "in what can be charitably described
as 'unprofessional' and 'colorful' language, asked Smith
what he was doing and ordered him to maintain an altitude
of 5,000 feet.19 6
9
Following the incident, the voice tape of the radar side
transmissions which normally would have contained the in-
struction to descend was found to contain only static. It was
also determined that the radar and manual controller had
visited the recording room immediately after the incident.
There was absolutely no explanation for why static was on
the tape or why the controllers had been present in the
room in which the recording equipment was located imme-
diately after the incident. The FAA attorneys conceded
that this was the first time they had ever been involved in a
prosecution in which the radar tape was unavailable. The
administrative law judge dismissed the charges and granted
the request for attorneys' fees.97 °
97 Id. at *9.
- 992 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1993).
- Id. at 851.
970 Id.
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The Eighth Circuit reviewed the record and determined
that the "record as a whole gives rise to a strong suspicion
that, as stated by the ALJ, 'something was wrong in the State
of Denmark,. . .' but the FAA [in proceeding with the pros-
ecution] chose to ignore certain facts and simply failed to
discover others."97' On these grounds, the Eighth Circuit
held that there was no substantial evidence which would
justify the conclusion that there was a reasonable basis in
truth for the facts alleged in the pleadings, that a reason-
able basis existed in the law for the theory propounded by
the FAA, or that the facts alleged would reasonably support
the legal theory advanced.972 The Eighth Circuit reversed
the NTSB's decision that the FAA's decision to proceed
based solely on the statements of the air traffic controllers
was substantially justified.973
F. MISCELLANEOUS
The liability of the federal government for failing to issue
a registration certificate for an aircraft was the subject of
Koppie v. United States.974 In this case, Koppie had satisfied a
garnishment lien which he contended resulted in his ob-
taining title to the subject aircraft. Unbeknownst to Kop-
pie, however, the aircraft had been repossessed, and the
repossession and subsequent sale of the aircraft had been
recorded in the FAA aircraft registry. Accordingly, the FAA
would not issue a certificate of registration to him because
he was not shown to be the owner of the aircraft.
Relying upon provisions of the Federal Aviation Act
which state that registration of an aircraft shall not be "evi-
dence of ownership," the Seventh Circuit held that any de-
cision that the FAA made to deny issuance of a registration
certificate could not have harmed Koppie as it was not evi-
dence of ownership.975 The court did not address the addi-
971 Id. at 852 (citations omitted).
972 Id.
973 992 F.2d at 852-53.
974 1 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 1993).
97, Id. at 653.
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tional defenses that the FAA was barred both by the Federal
Tort Claims Act exception for discretionary functions and
by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the owner-
ship issue had been decided adversely to Koppie.976
XI. DEBTOR-CREDITOR
The determination of the scope of an aircraft security
agreement with regard to certain components installed in
the aircraft after the security agreement was granted is the
subject to First Fidelity National Bank v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.977
This case demonstrates the application of the adage that
"more may be less" in defining the scope of a security agree-
ment. The case involved the installation of TCAS collision
avoidance systems in certain Eastern Airlines aircraft sub-
ject to a security agreement. The security agreement specif-
ically stated that certain parts subsequently installed on the
aircraft would not be included as part of the collateral if the
following conditions were met:
(1) The Part was not installed or attached to "an Airframe
or Engine in order to cause such Airframe or Engine to be in
compliance with any ruling, regulation, order or other ac-
tion of the FAA[;]" and
(2) The Part could be removed without "impairing the air-
worthiness" of the Airframe or Engine; and either
(3) (a) The parts were "additions to and [were] not in re-
placement or renewal or substitution for, Parts incorporated
or installed in or attached to such Airframe or Engine on
the Delivery Date"; or (b) the removal of the Part did "not
diminish the value of the Aircraft or Engine from which it
[was] removed in any material respect."978
The court concluded that while certain components of
the overall TCAS system were "replacements" (such as ra-
dar, transponders, vertical speed indicators, and other in-
struments), and, were therefore part of the collateral, the
976 Id.
977 147 B.R. 325 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
978 Id. at 328.
1994]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
TCAS systems processors were not replacements. 979 Fur-
thermore, those parts were not installed or attached in or-
der to cause the "Airframe" to be in compliance with any
ruling, regulation, order or other action by the FAA.980 In-
stead, Eastern had been required to install TCAS systems in
twenty percent of its fleet at the time the systems were in-
stalled, and such a requirement was a "fleet" requirement
and not one relating to "such Airframe."981 Accordingly, if
removal of the part did not "diminish the value of the air-
craft," the TCAS system processors would not be a part of
the collateral.982 Nevertheless, the court held that ques-
tions of fact existed as to whether the removal of the TCAS
system diminished the value of the aircraft and therefore
denied the summary judgment motions of both parties.983
In this case, the exclusion of certain after installed parts
from the collateral may have reduced the value of the col-
lateral, and the exclusion of each of its additional sub-parts,
may have further reduced the value of the collateral. These
were offset, however, by the exception which the drafters of
the security agreement incorporated in order to assure that
the basic value of the collateral was not adversely affected.
979 Id. at 328-29.
9- Id. at 328.
98, Id.
982 First Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 147 B.R. at 329.
983 Id. at 330.
